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Sheep farmers who protested against the promulgation of anti-scab legislation presented their 
opinions of the disease in a slew of letters to the press and in testimonies before various scab 
commissions. Although the farmers‟ beliefs about scab were heterogeneous, they contained 
elements of an environmental theory of disease. Progressives ridiculed these ideas: they 
constructed the struggle surrounding the Act as the struggle between progress and ignorance.  
 
It is argued in this dissertation that the progressives‟ explanation for the motives of their 
opponents is not sufficient. Despite government education campaigns, the opposition remained 
sceptical of the scientific explanation for scab and completely disbelieved that eradicating scab 
was in their economic interests. In order to evaluate the farmers‟ resistance and scepticism 
adequately, the progressives‟ side of the divide has to be examined. Was the cure for the disease 
as simple and accessible as presented by progressives? How persuasive and logically coherent 
was the scientific account of scab? Was the Scab Act really economically beneficial in the 
straightforward manner it was presented to be?  
 
These are the questions any account of the Scab Act must ask and try to answer. However, the 
progressives‟ assertions that eradicating scab would benefit the pastoral sector of the Cape 
Colony has never been subject to thorough investigation  
 
This thesis draws on current debates in anthropology and the sociology of science to provide a 
theoretical framework to contextualize the apparent conflict between scientific knowledge and 
trek farmers‟ purported „traditional‟ knowledge. It is concluded that the division between 
veterinary knowledge and trek farmer knowledge on epistemological grounds is misguided. A 















official aetiology of scab contained a number of inaccuracies that obscured how difficult it was 
for farmers to clean their sheep.  
 
Through a close reading of primary source material government efforts to convince trek farmers 
of the necessity for a general scab act is analysed. Proceeding from the conviction that trek farmer 
views on scab were mistaken, officials believed that proving this to them would convince them of 
the necessity of anti-scab legislation. This, it is argued, was naïve. The „error‟ of trek farmer 
views could not be conclusively proven while the scientific aetiology of scab was not logically 
persuasive. 
 
It is also shown in this dissertation that eradicating scab would only be beneficial and affordable 
for wealthier wool farmers. Mutton farmers had no economic incentive to clean their sheep and 
therefore did not exert themselves to this end. The practical necessities of trek farming in arid 
areas also made complying with the legislation arduous. Anti-scab legislation is therefore 
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NOTES ON THE TEXT 
The words “Scab Act” or the “Act” (if capitalized) refer to Act 20 of 1894. While previous scab 
acts were permissively applied on a district-by-district basis, this was a compulsory, colony-wide 
act. Act 20 of 1894 was amended with Act 28 of 1899. As these two acts were enforced together, 
they were collectively known as the “Scab Acts”. “Scab act(s)” refer to any anti-scab legislation. 
All other scab acts mentioned in the text will be specifically named and appropriately capitalized. 
The words “Scab Act” will, for example, not be used to refer to the Scab Act of 1886 (Act 28 of 
1886).   
  
Using the term “Afrikaner” for the Dutch/ early Afrikaans-speaking population of the Cape 
Colony has been largely avoided in this text. Although Herman Giliomee‟s The Afrikaners shows 
that a proto-Afrikaner ethnicity emerged at the Cape in the late nineteenth century, Giliomee also 
indicated that the tern “Afrikaner” was not exclusively used during this period to refer to this 
Cape Dutch ethnicity. It is also argued below that construing the anti-Scab Act movement in 
exclusively ethnic terms is inappropriate. The anti-Scab Act movement‟s members were men 
Giliomee would have called “Afrikaners” but being Afrikaners did not underpin their protest. The 
opponents of the Scab Act were mainly motivated by economic concerns. Their being Afrikaners 
or Dutch-speaking farmers (the short-hand used in this text to refer to the Dutch/ early Afrikaans-
speaking farming community) did cause them to attempt to use the Afrikaner Bond in their 
struggle but their opposition to anti-scab legislation transcended Bond politics. 
 
I use the term “progressives” rather loosely in this dissertation. The progressives were a 
parliamentary lobby consisting mainly of Eastern Province English-speakers who campaigned for 
a range of government interventions in the colonial economy. They later formed the Progressive 















this party. The ideology of progress was widespread across the English-speaking world and 
progressives were normally self-appointed advocates of modernity.  
 
The term “acari” is used in the text to refer to the scab mite, Psoroptes ovis. P. ovis is one of a 
multitude of acari sub-species; the genus acari include other species of lice and ticks. The term 
“acari” and its singular “acarus” together with “scab insect” were widely and indiscriminately 
used to refer to P. ovis in the primary literature. There are, however, three different scab mite 
species, each with sub-species, which cause different types of scab in different hosts. The proper 
name for scab in sheep is psoroptic mange. This should not be confused with scab in goats (or 
sarcoptic mange) which is caused by Sarcoptes caprae. Since goats were subsumed in the Scab 
Act of 1894‟s definition of “sheep”, this distinction was not always made in the primary literature 
on scab and it is also seldom made in the text below. Since acari are arachnids and not insects, I 
used “scab insect” only when directly quoting from primary sources.   
 
The North West does not have clear boundaries. While the Orange River bounds the region to the 
north, it‟s southern and western boundaries are less clearly defined. The region is characterised by 
aridity, sparse vegetation and extreme temperatures. It included the districts of Calvinia, 
Carnarvon, Ceres, Clanwilliam, Fraserburg, Kenhardt, Namaqualand, Sutherland and Van 
Rhynsdorp. The Scab Act could be suspended in these districts due to drought. For the purpose of 
this dissertation, the term “North West” refers mainly to these district and adjoining areas that 
hosted trek farmers.  
 
Except if stated otherwise the terms “Cape” and “Cape Colony” refer to the Cape Colony Proper, 
i.e. the historic Cape Colony minus the Transkeian Territories and Bechuanaland. Bechuanaland 















African War. Few inspectors were appointed and the data they gathered were incomplete. 
Reasons for excluding the Transkei are mentioned below. 
 
I use the term “class” rather casually in the thesis as a short-hand for people who share the same 
economic conditions. It is not my intention to discuss to which extent people identified 
subjectively with their class position. People have various social and political commitments that 
compete with their awareness of their economic position to shape their identity. It would take a 
substantial digression away from the main themes of my thesis to untangle the interrelationships 
of these factors for Cape farmers.       
 
I have followed a similar deflationary approach to the concepts “true” and “belief”. “Truth”, 
“true” and their permutations are used in conformity to their everyday spoken usage. Truth is 
therefore not a transcendent value but a contingent quality of statements of fact. “Belief” does not 
refer to a hypothetical subjective state but is a short hand for empirical statements or statements 
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The implementation of anti-scab measures by the government of the Cape Colony was beset by 
controversy. Scab, an apparently simple parasitical skin disease, came to demand a great deal of 
attention. Measures against scab were investigated by parliamentary committees and 
commissions in 1874, 1884, 1888, 1892-1894, 1898, 1905 and 1909. The first anti-scab 
legislation was the Scab Act of 1874. This was followed by the Scab Act of 1886 (amended in 
1887 and 1888) and the Scab Act of 1894 (amended in 1899). The first scab acts were only 
applied in selected districts at sheep farmers‟ request but the 1894 legislation was a colony-wide, 
compulsory act.   
 
Sheep farmers who protested against the Scab Act of 1894 presented their opinions of the disease 
in a slew of letters to the press and in testimonies before various scab commissions. Although the 
farmers‟ beliefs about scab were heterogeneous, they contained elements of an environmental 
theory of disease. Progressives ridiculed these ideas: they constructed the struggle surrounding 
the Act as the struggle between progress and ignorance. While progress was seen as self-
explanatory, ignorance was elaborated and the motives of the ignorant „explained‟ – negligent 
farming practices inspired by laziness and a lack of a sense of duty to their neighbours and fellow 
countrymen; fatalism; geographical isolation and a resultant ignorance and slow adoption of 
progressive practices. The debate therefore had a clear moral tone – progress was presented as 
uncomplicatedly good while ignorance was a moral flaw that was excusable to a degree 
depending on the prejudice of the observer.   
 
It is argued in this thesis that the progressive explanation of the anti-Scab Act movement is not 
sufficient. The opponents of the Act, if their many letters to the press can be taken as an accurate 
expression of their position, were sceptical of the scientific explanation offered for scab and 















Scab Act of 1894 was promulgated, progressive wool farmers have been trying to implement a 
general scab act for several decades, as shown by the existence of the Act‟s many predecessors. 
The scientific account of scab and the means of curing the disease were published in the press and 
the Agricultural Journal. The Chief Veterinary Surgeon (CVS), Duncan Hutcheon, also traveled 
the colony with a microscope in 1884 and 1885 to educate the public about scab. Why then were 
the benefits of the Scab Act not apparent to farmers and why did they remain sceptical of the 
scientific explanation of the disease? To answer (like late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
Cape progressives did) by saying that the farmers were ignorant is to engage in a circular 
argument: farmers‟ ignorance is proved by their scepticism and resistance to the Scab Act and 
their supposed ignorance also serves as explanation for their scepticism and resistance.    
 
In order to evaluate the farmers‟ resistance and scepticism adequately, the progressives‟ side of 
the debate has to be examined. Firstly, was the cure for the disease as simple and accessible as 
claimed by progressives? Secondly, how persuasive and logically coherent was the scientific 
account of scab? And thirdly, was the Scab Act really economically beneficial in the 
straightforward manner it was presented to be? These are the questions any account of the Scab 
Act must ask and try to answer. However, recent secondary sources dealing with settler farmers‟ 
resistance against the Scab Act accept the progressive‟s arguments as correct and try to „excuse‟ 
the farmers‟ „backwardness‟ with varying degrees of sympathy. These excuses boil down to the 
self-evident fact that trek farmers were not „scientific‟. Neither the scientific explanation for scab 
nor the trek farmers‟ own explanation for the disease is thoroughly interrogated. At most, aspects 
of the farmers‟ explanation for scab are enumerated and used to motivate ascribing alternate 
epistemological states to trek farmers. These excuses for trek farmer „ignorance‟ inevitably create 
the impression that trek farmers, despite their self-description as „practical farmers‟, were 
perversely blind to the economic benefits of scab eradication. As a consequence, the 















Colony has never been subject to thorough investigation Although various euphemisms are used 
as disguise, trek farmers are depicted as irrational, essentially echoing the views of nineteenth and 
early twentieth century progressives. 
 
This dissertation is an attempt to recover the trek farmers‟ rationality, a project that empathically 
disowns the progressive discourse that construed trek farmers as traditionalists unfit for modern 
life. It is maintained that contemporary authors have neglected the Scab Act or approached it in 
an overly simplistic manner because they are locked into this same dichotomy that positions 
progress, science and modernism on one side of a divide with conservatism, indigenous 
knowledge and tradition on the other. 
 
It should be considered that trek farmers‟ refusal to accept the scientific view as valid was a 
strategic choice. Disputing that scab was infectious allowed them to deny that they had a civic 
responsibility to clean their sheep and supported their argument that the Act was an imposition by 
English progressives. Lance van Sittert (2003) highlights the hypocrisy underlying many of the 
Cape government agricultural interventions. Since progressives were not negatively impacted by 
these interventions, they refused to see their victims‟ economic concerns as valid. When 
progressives were affected by such interventions, namely government efforts to stamp out rabies 
through the extermination of pedigree dogs, they too vocally protested. Middle class Port 
Elizabethans even disputed the competency of the local district veterinary surgeon to diagnose 
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 L. van Sittert, „Class and Canicide in Little Bess: The 1893 Port Elizabeth Rabies Epidemic‟(2003), pp. 















Research in America and Europe suggests that farmers were in general slow to accept veterinary 
medicine due to economic concerns. Despite the sentimental regard farmers might have for their 
livestock, saving an individual animal was not always seen as cost effective. Farmers therefore 
did not always see the benefit of employing a veterinarian.
2
 Professional veterinarians‟ advice 
often incorporated popular remedies. They therefore struggled initially to differentiate themselves 
from  “…unqualified animal doctors, the „question-and- answer‟ pages of agricultural magazines, 





The North West farmers‟ economic protest against veterinary interventions is also not isolated 
case. Catherine Strom (2009) has discussed the economic grievances of Southern yeomen farmers 
against federal tick eradication programs in similar terms. These small holders‟ cattle were mostly 
grazing free range on waste municipal land, a strategy that afforded them the opportunity to own 
more livestock than their own property would sustain. Regulations that required livestock to be 
fenced and all cattle to be dipped every two weeks during the summer months was a severe 
economic burden on them and they therefore violently resisted the tick eradication program.
4
 
Early twentieth century American government prescriptions for dairy hygiene also disadvantaged 
the farmers with small dairy and urban poor who supplemented their diets by keeping dairy cows 
and other livestock in garden sheds. New regulations for housing dairy cows and dairy production 
were prohibitively expensive to apply on such a small scale. These people were therefore forced 
to rid themselves of their dairy animals.
5
 In both cases mentioned above, the interests of large 
scale agricultural entrepreneurs trumped that of small scale producers. The unwillingness of the 
                                                 
2
 A. Greene, „The Now-Opprobrious Title of “Horse Doctor”: Veterinarians and Professional Identity in 
Late Nineteenth-Century America‟ (2010), p. 53. 
3
 A. Woods, A. „Breeding Cows, Maximizing Milk: British Veterinarians and the Livestock Economy, 
1930-50‟ (2010), p. 61. 
4
 C. Strom, “Making Catfish Bait out of Government Boys”: The Fight against Cattle Ticks and the 
Transformation of the Yeoman South (2009), pp. 3-4. 
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progressives at the Cape to accommodate the trek farmers‟ economic objections against the Act is 
a case in point.  
 
The Dutch farmers‟ position was not one that could be sustained. Saul Dubow (2006) argued that 
progressive discourse shifted after the South African War from its previous focus on the civilising 
mission and the patronising depiction of Dutch-speakers as needing to be civilized by their 
English-speaking country-men, to espouse economic development as the chief public good. A 
shift also occurred in how technological progress was presented in public discourse. By stripping 
technological interventions of the ideological baggage of the civilising mission, they could be 
presented as politically neutral. The representation of technology as politically neutral denied the 
validity of ethnic-based arguments against the Scab Act, while the political mood surrounding 
Union gave little space for anti-English sentiments to be expressed or used for political ends. 6   
 
After Union, opponents of anti-scab legislation based their protests solely on the economic need 
of trek farmers.
7
 This position was equally untenable. There was widespread concern from church 
groups and welfare organizations about rural poverty and urbanization. But during the sittings of 
the 1905 select committee on the poor white question these groups and government role players 
displayed consensus that the rural poor should not be assisted to remain independent producers 
but rather be accommodated through various work creation schemes. The logic behind this was to 
concentrate poor families so that their children could be educated.
8
 This view was echoed in the 





                                                 
6
 S. Dubow, A Commonwealth of Knowledge (2006), p. 178. 
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Since I comment extensively on recent historical literature, a brief overview of the historiography 
of sheep farming is necessary to contextualize these works. The persistence of scab in Cape 
flocks exited a great deal of negative commentary in a number of late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century sources providing historical background on sheep farming practices in the Cape 
Colony.
 
Tracts like Robert Wallace‟s 1896 Farming Industries of Cape Colony, the veterinary 
surgeon William Cooper‟s The World’s Sheep Farming for Fifty Years, 1843-1893 (published to 
commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Cooper‟s Sheep Dip) and a 1913 sheep farming 
textbook by William McKee, government wool expert and shearing shed designer, entitled South 
African Sheep and Wool, contained equal parts description and prescription. All of these sources 
imbued their accounts with the progressive ideology, common at the time, which construed 
material progress as a moral duty.  
 
In this literature scab was presented as one of a range of stigmas, albeit perhaps the most visible, 
that afflicted the Cape sheep farming sector. Subsequent historians, however, have largely 
ignored this contemporary concern with the economic development of sheep farming. Early 
South African pastoral history was written within the so-called „frontier tradition‟. Martin 
Legassick‟s 1980 essay, „The Frontier Tradition in South African Historiography‟ provides an 
excellent critique of this pastoral history. Nigel Penn also discussed it in some detail in The 
Forgotten Frontier (2005).
10
 I will therefore merely outline it here. The South African frontier 
tradition builds on the work of the American historian Frederick Jackson Turner. He argued that 
key traits of the American national character (democracy, self-reliance, individualism and 
nationalism) developed during the settlement of the American frontier. Mid-twentieth century 
liberal historians in South Africa, eager to explain the rise of apartheid and the racism endemic to 
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 M. Legassick, „The Frontier Tradition in South African Historiography‟, in S. Marks and A. Atmore 
(eds.) Economy and society in pre-industrial South Africa (London: Longman, 1980), pp. 44-79; N.G. 















South African society, inverted this frontier theory. Instead of trek farmers civilising the frontier, 
the frontier brutalised trek farmers. Racism was therefore seen as a product of economic 
marginality that would disappear gradually as the economy developed, conveniently invalidating 
serious investigation into the complicity of mining capital with segregation and apartheid. 
Afrikaner nationalist asserted the organic reality of the Afrikaner volk and needed historians to 
create historical origins for what was at that stage still a fairly recent ideological construct. 
Afrikaner nationalists therefore used the frontier theory in a more conventional manner to 
mythologize frontier pioneers and the Great Trek as exemplifying the Afrikaner nation. Traits 
they fondly ascribed to themselves, namely physical courage, self-sufficiency and individualism, 




Both the liberal and Afrikaner nationalist variants of the frontier tradition were strongly 
influenced by environmental determinism. However, the environment was not solely perceived as 
an economic constraint but as the main factor forging the pioneers‟ ethnic character. For both 
camps, the pioneers‟ main purpose was to open up the interior to civilisation. According to liberal 
historians, the pioneers conclusively failed in this goal and reverted to barbarism: they are 
described as adapting to the environment rather than adapting it to their needs.  
 
This early assessment of the agricultural sector of South Africa as underdeveloped was based on 
an unfairly negative comparison between South Africa and other colonies, especially Australia.
12
 
Australia, although a younger colony, out-competed the Cape economically. The basis for this 
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 N. G. Penn, The Forgotten Frontier (2005), pp. 9-11. 
12
 See C. W. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa: Social and Economical (1941), pp.  44-45. “The 
Australian sheep-farmers came from the England of the Industrial Revolution; their attention and that of 
their sons remained focused on England. In their new land they strove to relate their activities to the great 
industrial and commercial metropolis to which their essential loyalty never wavered. The roar of the 
shuttling looms was never out of their ears, nor were the needs of great industrial towns for food and raw 
materials out of their minds.” In contrast the Dutch settlers South Africa of were lacking: “Against the 
diseases that ravaged their flocks and the drought that withered their crops, they opposed the habits and 















economic growth was the large expanse of arable land in Australia, twice the surface area of 
South Africa.
 
Since land was initially cheap in Australia while the cost of dispossessing the 
Aboriginal Australians was slight in comparison with the cost of the Cape frontier wars, it was 
possible for sheep ranchers (or squatters) to carve out vast land holdings in Victoria and New 
South Wales.
 13
 These farms could support tens of thousands of sheep and squatters therefore 
enjoyed the economies of scale in their farming operations.
14
 The Cape could not hope to 
realistically compete with this Australian wool industry, but because of Australian dominance in 
the international wool market, its wool production practices and technology set the benchmark.    
Australia, specifically the large wool farms of New South Wales, was idealized in the Cape‟s 
agricultural press. Very little real economic information regarding the problems experienced by 
small scale farmers or wool producers in more arid regions of the continent reached the Cape. 
This thesis does not aim to give an overview of the wool industry in Australia that details the 
different economic outcomes experienced by farmers respective to climate or size of their 
holdings. Australia therefore largely features here as its idealisation by Cape progressives.   
 
As shown in Chapter 4, advocates of anti-scab legislation foreshadowed this frontier tradition. It 
was commonplace for progressives to blame the persistence of scab in Cape flocks on trek farmer 
negligence. For progressives, transhumance was not an economic strategy but a habit motivated 
by laziness that was destined to be cast off as progress gained ground. Such observers 
conveniently forgot to factor in the adverse impact of reduced wool and mutton prices during the 
Long Depression of the late nineteenth century; the great capital cost of fencing farms and 
drilling boreholes for water; the devastating effects of the South African War; the recurrent 
droughts suffered by the Cape Colony; the adverse effects of land speculation; increased interests 
rates; and the lack of transportation infrastructure that hampered North West farmers‟ market 
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 W. Beinart, „Sheep, Pastures and Demography in Australia‟ (2007), pp. 99-101. 
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access. Rather, poor farmers were perceived as having failed to meet the challenges of 
„modernity‟. 
 
In this climate, frontier economic underdevelopment was a well established fact that needed no 
explication. There was therefore no space in early South African history for detailed analysis of 
the economic impact of scab and the motivations of the trek farmers who opposed the Scab Act. It 
is therefore unremarkable that scab does not feature in the early English-language South African 
historiography. The disease, however, is equally absent from Afrikaans historiography.   
 
H.B. Thom‟s 1936 Die Geskiedenis van die Skaapboerdery in Suid-Afrika is the earliest 
Afrikaans text on the history of sheep farming and as no historian has since revised his account, it 
remains the only comprehensive history on the subject in any language. However, Thom ignored 
scab entirely. The years since Union had witnessed increased government intervention in sheep 
farming with the introduction of improved sheep breeds and farming methods. The problems 
complained of by progressive commentators were mostly being resolved. It was therefore 
possible for Thom to view the high production levels and improved technology employed by the 
post-First World War sheep farming sector as the result of centuries of progress. As a nationalist, 
Thom wanted to include „Afrikaner‟ sheep farming in this narrative of progress. The refusal of 
the Dutch-speaking farmers in the Cape Colony to implement anti-scab measures and other 
symptoms of their supposed resistance to progress could not be incorporated into this narrative 
and were ignored by Thom. 
 
The other major Afrikaner nationalist historian of the pastoral economy, P.J. van der Merwe, has 
little in common with Thom as he did not deny trek farmers‟ lack of economic progress. He 
sought the roots of poor whiteism in trek farming but his approach differed significantly from that 















deficiencies. In his trilogy on trek farming Van der Merwe elaborated the implicit environmental 
determinism of the frontier tradition into a detailed discussion of the environmental challenges 
that faced trek farmers and dictated their patterns of transhumance. In his work, the environment 
features as a real economic constraint determining the returns on farmers‟ labour and capital 
investments. This depiction challenged the common liberal interpretation of trek farmers as 
nomadic subsistence farmers isolated from the market economy and degenerating into savagery 
on the backveld without idealising trek farmers like other Afrikaner nationalists.  
 
Van der Merwe‟s theory of frontier expansion is the default explanation for the phenomenon and 
its central aspects will be discussed below and in Chapter 4. Van der Merwe‟s explanation is 
greatly indebted to the report of the Carnegie Commission on poor whiteism. This report 
highlighted the impact of new agriculture technologies such as jackal-proof fencing and wind mill 
water pumps on the rural economy but ultimately concluded that white poverty was caused by 
certain character deficiencies in the poor.
15
 In contrast, Van der Merwe stresses frontier farmers‟ 
inability to obtain capital to purchase and improve land. His work provides a theoretical 
framework for trek farmers‟ resistance against new agricultural technologies (like anti-scab 
measures), but he does not discuss farming technologies in any detail and does not mention scab 
at all.  
 
There are few secondary sources that discus sheep farming at the Cape in any detail. William 
Beinart explains this historiographical lacuna as being due to historians‟ efforts to contextualize 
the history of South Africa by using the historiographies of the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism in Europe and of slavery as comparative models. These agrarian histories were 
produced as part of the 1970s and 80s Marxist revision of South Africa‟s history that sought to 
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develop a rigorous analysis of the apartheid era labour market. This led to a focus on the history 
of maize production on the Highveld and on grain and wine farming in the Western Cape 
respectively. Pastoralism was only discussed in the context of trek farmer expansion on the 




There are only a handful of recent historical sources that mention scab. They can be divided into 
two groups. Firstly, a number of authors (namely William Beinart, Daniel Gilfoyle and Karen 
Brown) have touched on scab in works that focus on nineteenth century South African intellectual 
history, specifically the history of science. The demise of the apartheid state in the early 1990s 
opened the way for a renewed interest in late nineteenth century and early twentieth century 
agrarian history that was neglected during the Marxist revision. This body of literature take up 
concerns raised in the history of science and medicine in the 1970s and 80s and apply it to South 
African examples. Since South Africa‟s scientific establishment was largely dependent on the 
state during this period, authors mainly focus on government interventions. As many of the 
agricultural policies pursued by the Union Government after 1910 were pioneered in the 
nineteenth century Cape Colony, these historians take the Cape Colony as their starting point.  
 
Secondly, a number of authors concerned with the development of Afrikaner ethnicity dealt with 
the Scab Act of 1894 since it precipitated a crisis within the Afrikaner Bond. T. R. H. Davenport 
discussed the Act in his 1960 doctoral dissertation on the Afrikaner Bond (published in 1966 as 
The Afrikaner Bond: the History of a South African Political Party, 1980-1911 with the section 
on the Scab Act considerably reduced). Herman Gilliomee mentions the anti-Scab Act movement 
briefly in The Afrikaners (2003). The two authors mentioned above are interested in the Afrikaner 
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Bond and the Afrikaners‟ progress to nationhood respectively and so do not devote much space to 
discussing the particulars of the Scab Act. Mordechai Tamarkin, however, has recently (2009) 
published a book on the anti-Scab Act movement called Volk and Flock. In it he explicitly denies 
that class were a motivating factor for opposing the Scab Act. Instead he argues that the 
opponents of the Act were motivated by their degree of allegiance to a trek farmer ethnic 
identity.
17





HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE SCAB ACTS OF THE CAPE COLONY  
Sheep scab (or psoroptic mange) is probably the oldest known livestock disease. References to it 
occur in the Bible and in classical sources.
19
 In 1894 progressive parliamentarians traced the 
history of the disease in the Cape back to 1693.
20
 The Council of Policy was concerned about the 
high mortality caused by a disease called schurvt amongst Company sheep and ordered that all 
infected sheep should be slaughtered to prevent the spread of the disease.
21
 It is not clear, 
however, if this disease was psoroptic or sarcoptic mange. In late nineteenth century Cape Dutch, 
scab was called brandziekte while goat scab was called scurf.
22
 Sarcoptic mange (or goat scab) 
outbreaks occurred periodically, if rarely, in colonial sheep flocks
23
 and it is endemic in the 
Iberian Peninsula, a region with a climate similar to that of the Cape.
24
 Sarcoptic mange is a more 
serious disease, possibly explaining the Council of Policy‟s extermination order for sheep 
infected with schurvt. But nineteenth century progressives did not query the identification of 
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schurvt as sheep scab. They attempted to contrast their proposed anti-scab legislation favourably 
with this early legislation and the severe penalties it imposed, arguing that the Scab Act had 
historical continuity with the earlier Dutch administration and that it was not a harmful English 
imposition.
25
  There is, however, no evidence that the VOC implemented its extermination order.  
 
The prevalence of scab in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century Cape Colony is unknown. 
When public concern about the disease first arose in the 1870s, the disease was widespread. 
Witnesses before the 1874 Scab Commission reported that scab had worsened in recent decades. 
F. L. Liesching, sheep farmer and MP for Uitenhage, speculated that the disease had become 
more prevalent as farmers invested more in thoroughbred livestock.
26
 Another sheep farming MP, 
William Hockley, also testified that thoroughbred sheep were more vulnerable but he argued that 




As discussed in Chapter 2, the Cape fat-tailed sheep was highly resistant to scab. Eastern Cape 
fat-tailed sheep would have been as scab infected as Karoo sheep but the better grazing in the 
region would have kept the disease in remission. Such sheep acted as an infection reservoir for 
the more vulnerable wool sheep. It is therefore not necessary for the disease to have spread from 
the North West to the Eastern Cape as wool sheep could contract scab from their Cape sheep 
flock mates. As more farmers turned towards wool production, the prevalence and severity of 
scab increased.  
 
This increase in scab was simultaneous with increasing competition amongst wool producers in 
the international wool market. Overproduction caused wool prices to fall and motivated wool 
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farmers to increase the yield and quality of their product. The eradication of scab was central to 
both these aims.  
 
It should be noted that anti-scab legislation was a dubious proposition from the outset. The 
government could not afford to hire sufficient sheep inspectors to inspect all the whole colonial 
flock at short intervals. Anti-scab legislation therefore required farmers to police themselves by 
voluntarily reporting scab outbreaks amongst their flocks, allowing them considerable leeway for 
passive resistance. The scab acts of the Cape Colony therefore suffered from an inherent flaw: 
legislation was necessary because some farmers did not clean their sheep but, as long as they did 




In addition, a scab act could not prohibit the removal of sheep. Even progressive farmers had to 
trek with their sheep to and from stock fairs. A network of outspans were maintained for trekking 
purposes on crown and private land. Sir John Frost, a progressive Eastern Province MP, had an 
outspan servitude on his property. Although his farm was fenced he could not legally prohibit 
trekkers from crossing his property and as consequence his sheep was constantly re-infected. 
Needless to say, he passionately supported anti-scab legislation since it would give him the ability 
to save guard his flock.
29
 The government could not employ enough inspectors to examine each 
flock before removal. It was therefore tacitly assumed that farmers were competent to recognise 
scab and would meet their civic duty by refraining from removing their sheep if these were 
scabby. Again, the success of anti-scab legislation rested on the goodwill of its opponents.
30
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The Scab Act of 1874 was a dead letter. Permissive, vaguely worded and imposing an overly long 
quarantine period of three to six months, even progressives found it unattractive.
31
 The latter 
knew that a new, compulsory, colony-wide scab act was needed but the struggle to obtain it was a 
drawn-out affair.  
 
Progressive arguments that anti-scab legislation would benefit the Colony as a whole rang 
hollow. They knew that anti-scab legislation would be very unpopular with a great number of 
farmers who saw it as an economic burden. Opponents of anti-scab legislation bluntly called it “a 
class measure.”
32
 As detailed in Chapter 4, anti-scab legislation essentially required mutton 
farmers (who were often poor) and wool farmers in arid regions to accept legal and financial 
sanctions for the benefit of wealthier wool farmers concerned with improving their product. This 
was acknowledged by progressives but did not sway them. E. Y. Brabant, MP of East London, 
opinioned the following in 1885: 
Of course in passing an Act of this kind it was impossible to meet every possible case of 
hardship; it must be expected that certain individuals would suffer some hardship for the 
general good. But if the Bill were passed very soon all cause of hardship will be removed, 
for the disease would be stamped out.
33
   
 
Brabant and other progressives wanted a strict act that would eradicate the disease quickly, limit 
government expenditure on anti-scab regulations and limit the amount of time unwilling farmers 
would be forced to „suffer‟. In contrast, the opponents of anti-scab legislation wanted to reduce 
the economic burden that a scab act would place on their constituents so they sought to weaken 
the proposed Scab Bill.  
 
The permissive Scab Act of 1886 was a compromise aimed at resolving these contradictions. A 
compulsory, colony-wide scab act was proposed in parliament in 1884 but it was withdrawn due 
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 while a revised scab bill was defeated in 1885.
35
 A new scab bill was 
introduced during the 1886 parliamentary sitting, resulting in a reprisal of the debates of the 





A number of districts had adopted the 1886 Scab Act by 1893 (see Map 1). Limiting it to these 
areas, however, was not practical. Districts did not have natural boundaries that could inhibit the 
movement of sheep and the government did not have the funding to fence and patrol districts that 
have adopted anti-scab legislation. „Clean‟ areas were therefore constantly re-infected by the 
introduction of scabby sheep from elsewhere in the colony. 
 
It was proposed to make the districts containing the trans-Karoo railway line the boundary of a 
future scab act with no sheep from north and west of the line permitted to cross into the 
proclaimed area, but such a long boundary was impossible to police effectively. It would also 
have excluded farmers beyond the boundary from markets.
37
 One recalcitrant Fraserburg farmer, 
Johannes Bernardus Nigrini, actually saw this as a better option than being incorporated under a 
general scab act, implying that inhabitants of these districts would still have market access for 
their mutton (presumably through smuggling although he was not willing to elaborate).
38
 Other 
farmers were less sanguine and this option was rejected in Parliament as impractical. Thereafter a 
colony-wide scab act was seen as the only viable option by progressives.
39
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Districts (in alphabetical order) 
 
 
In the early 1890s the fight to institute such an act broke out anew. In the intervening years the 
wool price continued to decrease. The colony experienced a severe drought in these years and the 
resultant influx of trekkers into the Midlands spread scab and intensified progressive‟s concern 
with the disease. Progressives finally got colony-wide anti-scab legislation in 1894 but had to be 
    
  1. Aberdeen 27. Graaff Reinet 53. Piquetberg 
  2. Albany 28. Hanover 54. Port Elizabeth 
  3. Albert 29. Hay 55. Prieska 
  4. Alexandria 30. Herbert 56. Prince Albert 
  5. Aliwal North 31. Herschel 57. Queenstown 
  6. Barkley East 32. Hopetown 58. Richmond 
  7. Barkley West 33. Humansdorp 59. Riversdale 
  8. Bathurst 34. Jansenville 60. Robertson 
  9. Beaufort West 35. Kenhardt 61. Somerset East 
 10. Bedford 36. Kimberley 62. Stellenbosch 
 11. Bredasdorp 37. King Williamstown 63. Steynsburg 
 12. Britstown 38. Knysna 64. Steytlerville (1908 →) 
 13. Caledon 39. Komgha 65. Stockenstrom 
 14. Calvinia 40. Ladismith 66. Stutterheim 
 15. Cape 41. Laingsburg (1907 →) 67. Sutherland 
 16. Carnarvon 42. Malmesbury 68. Swellendam 
 17. Cathcart 43. Middelburg 69. Tarka 
 18. Ceres 44. Molteno (1903 →) 70. Tulbagh 
 19. Clanwilliam 45. Montagu (1909 →) 71. Uitenhage 
 20. Colesberg 46. Mossel Bay 72. Uniondale 
 21. Cradock 47. Murraysburg 73. Van Rhynsdorp 
 22. East London 48. Namaqualand 74. Victoria East 
 23. Fort Beaufort 49. Oudtshoorn 75. Victoria West 
 24. Fraserburg 50. Paarl 76. Willowmore 
 25. George 51. Peddie 77. Wodehouse 
 26. Glen Grey 52. Philipstown 78. Worcester 

















content with weak regulations providing several loopholes for the removal of scabby sheep. The 




The Scab Bill stipulated that all sheep farmers must maintain a dipping tank of specified volume 
and that sheep inspectors would be authorized to destroy kraals that were considered infected.
41
 
These measures were tailored to the scientific view of scab: Quarantined sheep should not be 
removed to a neighbouring property to be dipped as this would spread infection; when sheep was 
under quarantine, centrums of infection like kraals and sleeping places should be cleansed or scab 
would return after dipping. Opponents of the Act protested against both these measures.  
 
Opposition against the destruction of kraals was particularly fierce. Many Western Cape farmers 
practiced mixed farming and kraaled their sheep to obtain manure for fertilizer. A proper stone 
sheep kraal was an expensive investment and farmers protested their destruction.
42
 Farmers were 
also concerned about giving inspectors the power to demolish kraals and other farm buildings, 
since this power could conceivable be abused.
43
  Frost defended the destruction of kraals by 
arguing that it was not the intention to get rid of substantial enclosures which could be disinfected 
but to destroy “those wretched little bush kraals” that were built partly from manure and could not 
be disinfected.
44
 The Act would therefore disproportionately affect poorer farmers who did not 
own land or who could not afford to construct stone kraals.   
 
The measure that all sheep farmers must construct and maintained dipping tanks simply did not 
accord with the realities of trek farming. Farmers who survived by squatting on crown land or by 
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moving between rented pasture had little incentive to make improvements to land that would 
eventually benefit others. The Bill proposed that farmers could deduct the money spent on 
constructing a dip tank from their rent
45
 but a great deal of land that was rented out to trek farmers 
or that was used by squatters did not have perennial water. Sheep farmers were often dependent 
on a few pools of stagnant rainwater run-off to water their sheep and it is doubtful that farmers 
could afford to reserve some of this water for dipping.
46
 If they dipped their sheep, they used a 
portable wood or metal bath tub. Constructing a permanent dipping tank in the veld would be 
impractical. Poorer farmers and farmers with small sheep flocks also complained that they simply 




These measures were widely perceived to place an unfair burden on the poor and they were not 
included in the final Act. The Scab Act stipulated that farmers should have access to a dipping 
tank on a neighbouring property while sheep inspectors were not allowed to destroy kraals but 




The appointment of inspectors was identified by the Scab Commission as a major sticking point 
as it was clear Dutch-speaking farmers, afraid that English monolingual outsiders would be 
appointed over them, wanted to elect inspectors locally.
49
 Farmers were also concerned about 
undue expansion of government power in local affairs. Karen Brown (2002) argues that a 
political tradition of independence and self-sufficiency existed amongst Dutch-speakers, 
especially in the Western Cape. Farmers protested the interference of central government and 
rather preferred to resolve problems through local representatives. This can be seen historically in 
the Western Cape Dutch-speakers‟ campaigns for the establishment of municipalities, 
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representative rule and responsible rule. According to Brown, these farmers were not anti-
progressives as they were pioneers in establishing farming co-operatives.
50
  Scab was controlled 
to a degree in some districts before the Scab Act was promulgated through the locally funded and 




Political tradition aside, administering legislation through local boards or municipalities was a 
well-known method of ameliorating the impact of detested central government directives. So, for 
instance, this strategy was used to weaken the English Public Health Act of 1875. MPs from 
country boroughs knew that their voters would not appreciate being descended upon by overly 
zealous Londoners blind to country practicalities and fought to have the proposed legislation 
administered through local bodies. They were also concerned about allowing a central 
government, which many believed to be corrupt, to take charge of locally raised funds. As result 
the legislation was only fully enacted in large cities.
52
 The Cape Colony‟s public hygiene 
measures suffered a similar fate. The Colonial Office, which oversaw district surgeons and 
concerned itself with public hygiene, employed Dr. Alfred Gregory to oversee the gathering of 
the Colony‟s vital statistics. Gregory, known for his irritable abrasiveness, was precisely the type 
of central government employee despised in the countryside. He framed the Public Health Act of 
1897 but parliamentary opposition caused it to be amended so that the Act gave central 
government no coercive powers. Public hygiene measures therefore floundered in the countryside 
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The appointment of inspectors was also a major point of concern for the supporters of the Act. 
Experience under the Scab Act of 1886 showed that locally appointed inspectors were 
ineffective.
54
 According to John X. Merriman, the Scab Act of 1886 was a farce. Inspectors were 
dependent on the divisional council for their position and so curried favour with divisional 
council members and voters by administering it leniently. To compensate, they prosecuted 
Africans who could not afford to pay the fines (see figure 1.1 – until 1895, more „Africans‟ than 
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   Figure 1.1: Africans and Europeans accused of contravening anti-scab regulations in the  
                      Colony Proper and in the Transkeian Territories.   
 
 
Note that figures for 1904 are for the half year. The figures include the small number of women who were also 


























































































Opponents, however, refused to accept government appointed inspectors and pushed through 
amendments that resulted in the appointment of locally elected sheep inspectors. In wards where 
the majority of farmers opposed the Act, inspectors who were opposed to the Act or known 
incompetents were elected. Allan Gardiner Davison, the Chief Inspector of Sheep (CIS), bitterly 





Constant problems were experienced with the caliber of locally elected sheep inspectors and 
progressives attempted to have the Scab Act amended in 1899. However, they were forced to 
once again accept a compromise: in return for more lenient provisions for the removal of scabby 
sheep, sheep inspectors would no longer be locally elected but appointed on the recommendation 
of locally elected scab boards. As scab boards were often comprised of opponents of the Act, they 
nominated unsuitable inspectors. In addition, since the new crop of inspectors were supposed to 




After the South African War, Davison attempted to circumvent the scab boards. He did not form 
new scab boards when the incumbent board‟s term expired. This allowed him to appoint 
inspectors himself. In districts where the inhabitants constituted scab boards on own initiative, 
Davison simply ignored their recommendations. A number of North West MPs who opposed the 
Scab Act kept track of the appointment of sheep inspectors and queried Davison‟s summary 
rejection of scab board recommendations. This led to the appointment of a select committee, 
chaired by Dirk Jacobus Albertus van Zyl, MP of Clanwilliam and member of the Clanwilliam 
scab board, to investigate the administration of the Scab Act.
58
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The 1905 Select Committee on the Scab Acts found that Davison‟s appointment practices were in 
contravention of the Scab Act. Since a number of former sheep inspectors had complained that 
they were unfairly dismissed by Davison, the committee found that inspectors had the right to ask 
for a magisterial enquiry into their suspension and dismissal. This made it difficult for the CIS to 
dismiss incompetent inspectors. He was also instructed to establish scab boards in those districts 
without one and to only appoint scab board nominees. Henceforth Davison was allowed to 
institute a practical and written exam on the Scab Act and the diagnosis and treatment of the 
disease. The minimum performance requirement for this examination gave Davison grounds for 
declining scab board nominees, thereby preventing scab boards from insisting on the appointment 
of entirely unsuitable individuals. Conversely, it also prevented him from refusing to appoint 
known supporters of the anti-Scab Act movement who were knowledgeable on scab.
 59
 The office 
of the CIS therefore continued to experience staffing and compliance problems. 
 
The opponents of the Act in parliament also reduced the CIS‟s budget. The Cape Government 
suffered serious financial difficulties in the 1900s and passed Special Retrenchment Acts in 1908 
and 1909.
60
 Despite these measures the Progressive Party which governed the Cape from 1904 to 
1908 increased spending on agriculture. The budget for the Agriculture Department grew from 
£148 350 in 1905-6 (or 1.71% of the total budget)
61
 to £279 161 in 1906-7 (3.08% of the total).
62
 
It continued to increase proportionally in succeeding years: £257 779 (or 3.20% of the total) in 
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 and £269 981 (3.31% of the total) in 1908-9.
64
 During this period, however, the funding 
for the Scab Act declined. The budget for administering the Scab Act shrunk from £80,248 in the 
1906-7 financial year
65
 to £75,472 in 1907-8
66




As a consequence, the number of sheep inspectors declined. After the scab board system was 
introduced, the number of sheep inspectors was halved from its 1899 peak of 356 inspectors 
68
 
and fluctuated between 173 and 161 over the following decade before being further reduced in 
1909 to 127.
69
 The remaining inspectors had much larger areas to oversee and their work, which 
was already physically demanding, became nearly impossible. Scab could not be eradicated under 
these circumstances, motivating a frustrated Davison to report that the office of the CIS was 




The Scab Act of 1894 was deemed a failure by progressives. Average scab incidence in the 
colony, according to the statistics of the CIS, was just over 15% in 1895. In 1911, scab incidence 
had decreased to 3.6%. Scab was therefore suppressed in the Cape Colony but it was hardly 
eradicated. In addition, no progress had been made since 1907 as government retrenchment 
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measures and renewed resistance against the Act saw scab incidence increase.
71
 The main legacy 
of the Scab Act of 1894 was the office of the CIS. Under Union, this body was expanded to 
provide extension services to sheep farmers such as information on wool classing.  
 
The failure of the Scab Act also served to cement progressives‟ negative opinion of trek farmers. 
Their increased frustration was expressed in increasingly vehement correspondence against “scab 
breeders” in the Agricultural Journal. When the 1911 Stock Diseases Act was discussed, few 
Cape MPs evinced any sympathy for trek farmers. The view of the MP for Beaufort West was 
representative: notwithstanding the fact that his district contained a large number of trek farmers 
and he acknowledged that their needs conflicted with anti-scab legislation, his suggested solution 
was that trek farming should be prohibited.
72
    
 
THE DISSERTATION 
Chapter 1 provides my general theoretical approach to the issue of scientific knowledge as 
opposed to trek farmers‟ purported traditional knowledge. I draw on debates in anthropology and 
the sociology of science to argue that the division between veterinary knowledge and trek farmer 
knowledge on epistemological grounds is misguided. 
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview and critique of nineteenth century veterinary knowledge of scab. 
This chapter was inspired by the absence of detailed discussions of the aetiology of scab in the 
historical literature on the Scab Act. It is argued that the official aetiology of scab obscured how 
difficult it was for farmers to clean their sheep.  
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Chapter 3 provides a close reading of primary source material (the 1884 and 1885 CVS reports 
and the testimonies before the 1892-4 Scab Commission) in order to critique government efforts 
to convince trek farmers of the necessity for a general scab act. Proceeding from the conviction 
that trek farmer views on scab were mistaken, officials believed that proving this to them would 
automatically convert them to the anti-scab position of progressives. This, it is argued, was naïve. 
The „error‟ of trek farmer views could not be conclusively proven while the scientific explanation 
for scab was not logically persuasive.   
 
In Chapter 4 the progressives‟ argument that eradicating scab would benefit the sheep farming 
sector of the Cape Colony is analysed. It is shown that eradicating scab would only have been 
beneficial and affordable for wealthier wool farmers of the colony. Mutton farmers had no 
economic incentive to clean their sheep and therefore did not exert themselves to this end. The 
practical necessities of trek farming in the arid North West also made complying with the Scab 
Act arduous for the region‟s inhabitants. Overall, the Scab Act imposed a normative vision of 
sheep farming that was at variance with the lived reality of mutton farmers and wool farmers in 
arid regions. This chapter makes extensive use of the agricultural statistics of the Cape of Good 
Hope. All the information regarding scab incidence was gleaned from the annual reports of the 





The CIS‟s statistics were often of dubious accuracy. Sheep inspectors were required to provide 
livestock statistics and the number of sheep under quarantine (or “cleansing order” in CIS 
parlance) bi-annually in June and December. Davison had to submit his report in the first quarter 
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and, as he was required to provide the latest statistics in it, he published the December returns 
even though he was of the opinion that the June returns gave a better indication of the real scab 
incidence in the colony (the disease was worse in winter). However, he was only allowed to 




Another level of inaccuracy is built into the statistics due to the definition of “infected sheep” in 
the Scab Act. If a few sheep of a particular flock were visibly infected, the whole flock was 
deemed infected and placed under a four to six week cleansing order, depending on whether it 
was summer or winter. Similarly, if scabby sheep mixed with goats, the goats were quarantined 
even though they did not contract scab from sheep. It was possible for a farmer to clean his flock 
in two weeks but the cleaning order was only lifted after the inspector re-inspected the flock. As 
inspectors had increasingly large areas to oversee, they often did not manage to re-inspect and lift 
the cleansing order after the quarantine period had expired. Clean animals were therefore 
included amongst the statistics of infected sheep. Equally, infected sheep were missed by 




Some sheep inspectors also underreported scab incidence in their areas to an unknown extent. 
Davison testified before the 1898 Select Committee on the Scab Act that inspectors were often 
negligent, did not report scab incidence or sheep numbers correctly, performed only the minimum 
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Even though the CIS data is inaccurate, it is the only quantitative data on scab incidence in the 
Cape Colony and informed government policy. The office of the CIS supplied the government 
with statistics for sheep and goat numbers after the Scab Act took effect and these statistics were 
reproduced in the annual Cape Colony Statistical Register. The Statistical Register is a major 
source of data on the pastoral economy. This data is, unfortunately, equally problematic. Since 
the accuracy of agricultural statistics (excluding export figures) depended on the willingness of 
the farmers‟ to provide detailed reports of their economic activities to government employees and 
given that they feared that the information would be used for taxation purposes, underreporting 
was rife. In addition, government enumerators had no means of establishing whether information 
were gathered from transhumant pastoralist or not, who potentially evaded census takers. Hence 
the Colonial Secretary, J.W. Sauer, apologized for the inaccuracy of the 1891 agricultural census:  
I wish it, however, to be distinctly understood that, in the nature of things especially in this 
Colony, agricultural statistics are at best but mere approximations. All I can do is to vouch 




These statistics are therefore used to show economic trends and not intended to give accurate 
quantitative information on the Cape pastoral economy.    
      
The limitations of this dissertation do not allow room for me to offer a complete analysis of the 
impact of the Scab Act and the socio-economic and environmental factors that impinged on it. 
This has compelled selection and hence a number of omissions. 
 
Firstly, as Davenport and Tamarkin provide detailed narrative accounts of the activities of the 
anti-Scab Act movement within the context of the Bond‟s internal politics, I have not discussed 
the division caused by anti-scab legislation in the Afrikaner Bond in any detail. Political strife 
between English and Dutch-speakers certainly inspired the belligerent nature of the trek farmers‟ 
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opposition against the legislation, but this English-Dutch opposition was complicated by the 
support of progressive Dutch-speakers, amongst them the leadership of the Afrikaner Bond, for 
the scab acts. Opposition against the scab acts therefore followed class and occupational, not 
ethnic, lines. Poorer farmers and mutton producers, however, were mainly Dutch-speakers so 
ethnic and class lines coincided to a large extent. This made trek farmers, used to suffering the 
condescension of English progressives, especially touchy about scab. 
 
Secondly, although the archives of the CIS provided me with many colourful examples of farmer 
intransigence against the Scab Act, the hopeless incompetence or blatant collusion of sheep 
inspectors and a mounting sense of disillusionment on the part of Davison and his assistants, most 
of this material could not be used for present purposes. Unfortunately a dearth of source material 
makes it difficult for a socio-economically nuanced account of the administration of the Scab 
Acts to move beyond generalities. The archive of the CIS is not properly organized and contains 
large chronological gaps. Specific individuals can therefore not be traced and sufficient 
information to create even a rough portrait of specific regions is not available.  
 
Thirdly, the issue of land alienation and rural class divisions is only explored in a peripheral 
fashion below. The archives of the Chief Inspector of Sheep contain case studies of individual 
farmers trying to make a living on the margins of the rural economy. Their biographies 
encompass the full array of rural economic choices from the dependency of bywoners to 
struggling start-up farmers and rural entrepreneurs. Their work as sheep inspectors charged these 
men with the difficult task of enforcing highly unpopular legislation. Their choice of employment 
reflects their economic need while the conflicts that surrounded prosecutions under the Scab Act 
illustrate fault lines in their communities. A study of these individuals could possibly help to 
provide a more nuanced account of the Cape sheep farming sector and the question of land 
















Fourthly, the dissertation does not discuss the working of anti-scab legislation in the Transkei, 
Tembuland, Griqualand East and Pondoland. The Cape Colony Statistical Register shows that the 
majority of those prosecuted under the Scab Act were African. Figure 1.1 and show the number 
of Europeans and Africans accused of contravening the anti-scab legislation in the Colony and the 
Transkeian Territories.
 78
 Although more Europeans than Africans were prosecuted after 1895 
under the Scab Act of 1894 in the Colony Proper, the number of Africans accused of 
contravening anti-scab regulations in the Transkeian Territories far exceeded the total number of 
Europeans accused. Africans therefore borne the real brunt of the Scab Act but this fact was not 
acknowledged by the office of the CIS. Indeed, Davison‟s focussed most of his attention on the 
administration of the Scab Act in the Colony Proper, suggesting that „cleaning‟ the Transkeian 
flock was perhaps of lesser importance than preventing the removal of scabby African-owned 
sheep within the colony. 
 
Since 1889 successive proclamations enlarged the area under anti-scab regulations in the 
Transkeian Territories until the whole of Tembuland, Pondoland and Griqualand East was placed 
under regulation with the promulgation of Proclamation 60 of 1903. Under these proclamations, 
dipping facilities had to be maintained in locations through revenue collected by the Transkeian 
Territories General Council, African-owned sheep had to be dipped simultaneously by a 
government appointed sheep inspector at the owner‟s cost twice a year, and local headmen were 
held liable and could be fined for their subjects‟ non-compliance. Davison reports that average 
fines in the Transkei ranged between £1 and £2 for the period 1889 to 1909 while the maximum 
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recommended fine was £10.
79
 In Natures of Colonial Change: Environmental Relations in 
the Making of the Transkei (2006) Jacob Tropp argues that colonial environmental 
intervention in the Transkei, by limiting the community‟s access to natural resources, threatened 
their subsistence and served to push individual Africans into the wage labour economy.
80
 Fines 
incurred under the Transkeian Scab Act, the added tax burden to maintain dipping facilities and 
the cost of biannual simultaneous dipping presented a substantial financial burden on Africans 
which would similarly have forced them into wage labour.  
 
The extensive historiography of South African peasant agriculture and rural resistance against 
government interference does not, however, discuss the working of the Transkeian Territories‟ 
anti-scab regulations. William Beinart briefly discussed the growing importance of sheep to 
African peasant producers in his The Political Economy of Pondoland 1860-1930.
81
 Colin Bundy 
also briefly comments on the increasing importance of wool as pastoral cash crop in the 
Transkeian Territories in his The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry.
82
 Neither author, 
however, discusses how scab and anti-scab regulations affected the region. The historiography 
focuses mainly on the measures against East Coast fever (a serious tick-borne cattle disease) that 
caused violent resistance in the Transkeian Territories.
83
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Pamela Scully correctly notes that the 1914 dipping disturbances should be contextualized with 
reference to “existing divisions in Black society.”
84
 More capitalist orientated African farmers 
were in conflict with subsistence peasant producers, a division that echoes the conflict between 
trek farmers and progressives. She also mentions that increased dissatisfaction with anti-scab 
regulations in the same period points towards broader dissatisfaction with government 
interference in peasant pastoral production and agriculture.
85
 The Transkeian Territories, like the 
North West, contained farmers who did not fit the progressives‟ normative vision for agrarian 
improvement. Spatial constrains and the decision to focus on the issue of the popularisation of 
scientific knowledge has, however, resulted in the omission of a detailed discussion of the 
administration of anti-scab measures in the Transkeien Territories. 
 
The government could and did unilaterally enforce anti-scab regulations on Africans but they 
could not do so on trek farmers, a fact that progressives apparently regretted.
86
 Whites could 
apparently escape prosecution through a show of “a little red-faced indignity”.
87
 Progressives 
therefore had to try and convince their opponents of the benefits of anti-scab legislation and had 
to convince them of the validity of the scientific view of scab and the economic benefits of 
eradicating the disease, generating the primary sources employed here. The frustration evinced by 
progressives at the failure of the Act was worsened by their sense that “retrogressive” farmers 
were betraying the civilising mission. Thus the adoption of the Scab Act of 1886 by a number of 
African chieftains was used by progressive parliamentarians to mock trek farmer opposition to 
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 Davison would employ the same strategy in his early annual reports, 
apparently trying to use the relative success
89
 of anti-scab regulations in the Transkeian 




Lastly, I do not address the topic of pasture degradation and overgrazing in much detail. The issue 
is extremely complex and is already the subject of an abundant literature. Beinart (1996) 
comments that nineteenth century farmers could not have overstocked to the extent progressives 
accused them of doing since stocking numbers peaked only decades later in the 1930s. The 
expected Malthusian outcome of overstocking did therefore not occur.
91
 Sean Archer (2000) also 
shows that botanists cannot reach agreement on the extent of damage sheep farming did to Karoo 
vegetation. Some botanists argue that the Karoo was undergoing progressive desiccating before it 
was utilized as grazing by Europeans. In this view overstocking did not precipitate vegetation 
change but merely increased its tempo. Others dispute whether overgrazing did permanent 
damage or if areas with low bio-diversity will recover naturally.
92
 Despite these caveats, 
progressives generally believed that overstocking and overgrazing were taking place and this 
governed their impressions of trek farmers‟ pasture management.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE RATIONALITY ETHIC    
Both the progressives and the Dutch-speaking farmers who opposed the Act accused their 
opponents of not being able to farm. The progressives insisted that scab eradication was 
essentially a technical matter and maintained that those farmers who opposed the Act did so out 
of ignorance. This dichotomy between trekboer ignorance and progressives‟ „scientific‟ 
efficiency led to the stigmatization of those farmers who refused to be educated (i.e. those who 
resisted the official scientific explanation of scab or were seen as either unwilling or unable to 
clean their sheep) as “scab breeders”
1




The opponents of the Scab Act constructed a dichotomy of their own. They saw the proponents of 
the Act as being guided by mere book knowledge while they themselves were practical, 
experienced farmers: “much was said about sheep-farming, but that was farming on paper.”
 3 This 
opinion lingered after the Scab Act of 1894 was promulgated. According to Dirk Jacobus 
Albertus van Zyl, MP of Clanwilliam and a vocal opponent of the Scab Act:  
The farmers did not want and never wanted the Scab Act. It was shopkeepers, doctors, 
lawyers and English farmers who had placed the Act upon the farmers. He could understand 
why English farmers were in favour of the Act, for they did not know how to farm with 





Both sides therefore framed the conflict surrounding the Scab Act as a struggle between 
knowledge and ignorance. This is also how the conflict is presented in the Cape agrarian 
historiography. In addition, the majority of historians take the point of view of the progressives. 
In their works on colonial science in the Cape Colony and the Union of South Africa, Beinart, 
Gilfoyle and Brown focus on the progressives, who campaigned for the establishment a CVS and 
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supported government veterinary policies, rather than on the views of their opponents or on the 
economic impact these policies had. Government experts are the main focus of their works.  
 
T. R. H. Davenport discusses the Act in his 1960 doctoral dissertation on the Afrikaner Bond. He 
discusses the chronology of the anti-Scab Act movement in a narrative fashion but also uses it to 
illustrate the differences between the Western Cape, urban-based Bond leadership and their rural 
followers. He depicted the farmers who protested against the Scab Act as anti-modern because 
they maintained “an astonishing degree of ignorance” in their views on scab.
5
 In The Afrikaners, 
Herman Gilliomee follows Davenport‟s lead. He does not interrogate the progressives‟ arguments 
that the Scab Act would be beneficial and sees the opposition to it as symptomatic of an 
aggressive anti-modernism displayed by poorer and less educated Afrikaners.
6 
 
Dawn D‟Arcy Nell and Mordechai Tamarkin are more sympathetic towards the Dutch-speaking 
farmers who opposed progress. Instead of portraying these farmers as ignorant, they query why 
the farmers persisted in believing things that progressives considered to be untrue. These efforts 
to provide reasons for the farmers‟ resistance against expert knowledge will be the focus of this 
chapter.  
  
REASONS WHY OPPONENTS OF THE SCAB ACT CONTESTED THE ACT AND 
VETERINARY KNOWLEDGE 
The apparent conflict between farmers’ religious explanations for scab and secularization 
It is not clear how many farmers had religious objections to the Scab Act of 1894. After the 
sittings of the Scab Commission were concluded, the Zuid Afrikaan expressed relief that no 
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witnesses made religious arguments during the sittings.
7
 As no subsequent correspondent to the 
newspaper based their opposition to the Scab Act on religious grounds, this editorial commentary 
also seems to have served notice on correspondents not to expect the paper to publish such views.  
 
Contrary to the Zuid Afrikaan, one Dutch-speaking farmer who testified before the Commission 
did motivate his opposition against the Act on religious grounds. Joseph Adriaan Jacobus Coetzee 
of Burghersdorp stated, "I only believe in blessing from Providence; I don't believe in individual 
efforts. I believe in keeping the commandments and the law, and the blessing will follow." But he 
was no example of resigned fatalism. With 7000 sheep Coetzee could indeed believe that he was 
blessed. Providence had similarly blessed him with sufficient land for his livestock: he linked 




The Patriot did publish religiously inspired protests to the Act. These correspondents argued that 
as scab was mentioned in the Old Testament, it was God‟s will that the disease should exist and 
to want to eradicate it was tantamount to heresy.
9
 However, this view was heavily criticised: an 
anonymous respondent denounced it as an insincere attempt to give lazy and negligent farmers‟ 
behaviour a religious gloss. He argued that such a view was an example of „bad religion‟ as other 
diseases mentioned in the Bible were not used to support a religious doctrine advocating fatalism. 
A farmer who took his children to the doctor when they were sick or who himself took 
medication was a hypocrite if he argued against doctoring his sheep for scab on religious 
grounds.
10
 Another correspondent wrote that the Biblical arguments against dipping were an 
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example of superstition. He opposed the Act on economic grounds and was insulted by 
progressives who presented opposition to the Act as based solely on religious reasoning.
11
      
 
It is therefore difficult to know what, if anything, to make of such incidences of religious 
reasoning. It seems that progressives gleefully pounced on such examples of religious fatalism in 
order to conflate this view with Afrikaner farmers‟ perceived reluctance to accept new farming 




However, religious arguments did not only rest on whether it was sinful to eradicate scab but also 
involved the political morality of the Act. A correspondent to De Volksbode, a newspaper 
sponsored by the Dutch Reformed Church, wrote that the Scab Act was immoral as it would 
punish farmers if their sheep contracted an illness. As scab, whatever its cause may be, was 
created by God, it was not just to punish farmers if their sheep became infected.
13
 The 
Volksbode‟s editorial position was broadly similar: farmers‟ ignorance of scab and inability to 
effectively cure their sheep were cited as reasons to postpone the implementation of a general 
Scab Act as it would be unjust to punish farmers for what they could do nothing about. An 
educational campaign was far preferable.
14
 Others argued in parliament that it was sinful to 
promulgate an Act against the wishes of the people.
15
     
 
For Tamarkin farmers‟ religiously inspired objections to the Act support his explanatory 
paradigm by providing one more instance of trek farmers‟ „traditionalism‟. The farmers‟ 
willingness to make use of religious arguments is, like their unwillingness to accept that scab was 
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caused by an arachnid, another symptom of the difference between them and English or Dutch 
speaking progressives. He argues that these differences were caused by their isolation from 
modernity in the interior.
16
 Giliomee has no trouble describing the trek farmers in the interior as 
ignorant and obstinate in this ignorance and cites religious arguments against scab in support of 
this view.
17
 He does not blame their ignorance solely on isolation but on their deliberate 
withdrawal from the modern world. Apparently frustrated with the lack of accessible historical 
data these farmers generated, he likens them to their German counterparts as described by Karl 




D‟Arcy Nell deals with these religious arguments in a different way in her 1998 Masters thesis: in 
her discussion of religious objections to irrigation works – the attempts of the government to 
change the „God-given‟ flow of rivers – she conceptualizes the conflict as the opposition of two 
different understandings of knowledge. Primarily concerned with how farmers resisted 
government efforts to gather statistics, she identifies a conservative position (gleamed from J. du 
Plessis‟s work on Van der Lingen and the Paarl conservatives) that was deeply sceptical about the 
claim that development necessarily indicated progress. Progressives‟ faith in the ability of human 
reason and specifically numbers to encompass the world “…was seen as arrogant speculation 
about the will of God by conservatives.”
19
 The conservatives‟ reservations about progress and the 
potential of scientific rationality is interpreted by D‟Arcy Nell as a sign that conservatives and the 
progressives had different knowledge systems – the former viewed revealed knowledge, like the 
existence of God, as a valid basis for knowledge while the latter, trusting in empiricism, regarded 
the former‟s conception of knowledge as irrational. She suggests further that arguments based on 
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religious fatalism, like the religion-based opposition to irrigation and the Scab Act, are further 




Extending the argument this way does not, however, seem plausible as there is a distinction to be 
made between philosophical arguments regarding the basis of knowledge and arguments 
regarding the appropriateness of human alteration to „God-given‟ natural conditions. D‟Arcy 
Nell‟s comparison between the North West farmers‟ opposition to agricultural improvement and 
the Paarl conservative‟s opposition against the progressive secularization of Cape society is not 
persuasive. The Paarl conservatives who were so uneasy about secular, rationalistic, knowledge 
claims were caricatured as hopelessly unprogressive by their opponents but the conservatives‟ 
protests were finely judged: they saw trains as potentially useful technology but did not want 
them to run on Sundays. This is very different from arguing that people should walk because God 




D‟Arcy Nell‟s argument, coming at the end of a chapter that convincingly defends the farmers of 
the North West from the charge that they were resistant to progress, strikes an odd note. She 
defends trek farmers by defending their knowledge of the capabilities of their region and the 
limits of their own economical resources. The trek farmers‟ environmental and farming practice is 
valorised in the process and shown to be superior in some instances than the knowledge of 
progressive government officials and scientists. To then conclude by proposing that many trek 
farmers held to a God-centered epistemology and that this is what motivated their resistance to 
progress undermines her prior argument.  
 




 J. Du Plessis, Colonial progress and countryside conservatism: an essay on the legacy of Van der Lingen 















It would also not be helpful to contrast farmers‟ religious fatalism with secularization since 
religion did not have a monopoly on fatalism. The doctrine of progress itself is a good example of 
secular fatalism. In the words of Mary Midgely (2002): “…nineteenth-century thought, fired with 
the idea of individualistic progress by the Industrial Revolution, the expanding empire and the 
social-contract model, accepted a quite different dynamic picture of a steadily evolving world, a 
world in which enlightened self-interest was a sufficient force to lead life all the way from the 
primal soup to a predictable earthly heaven.” This view may seem relatively innocuous, but it was 
accompanied by a faith in the power of the free market economy that fatalistically (and 
revealingly) accepted the poverty and misery of those who could not adapt quickly enough to the 
new system of production as a necessary cost of progress.
22
   
 
To argue like A.G. Davison that the farmers‟ appeals to religion was a “medieval view”, casting 
religion and science on opposites sides of the well-known dichotomy of tradition and modernity, 
is also problematic. To conflate religious views with remnants of the medieval denies those views 
a developmental trajectory. Jürgen Habermas argues that the resurgence of religious 
fundamentalism in the late 20
th
 century should induce a re-evaluation of the positivist belief that 
the modern world is on a trajectory towards greater secularization. Instead of religion being 
replaced with newer ways of thought, religion has renewed itself in response to modernity. In 
addition, the rise of religious fundamentalism cannot be seen as solely a reaction against secular 
Western values since religion has recently also re-emerged as a political force in the United 
States, one of the most „modern‟ counties in the world. The religious revival in America can also 
not convincingly be identified with „tradition‟ as it represents a break with the tradition of the 
country, starting with the founding fathers, of the separation of church and state. Habermas 
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suggests that the secularization of Europe, once presented as the trajectory all nations would 
follow, has been revealed as an exception.
23
         
 
Habermas emphasises the resilience of religion in the face of challenges from rationalist science 
to its doctrines. This accommodation is made both by theologians and by lay adherents who may 
or may not accept the rationalisations of the former. For people believing in the precepts of a 
particular religion, doctrine is not decided by reference to purely secular arguments. The 
accommodation between religion and what is commonly called „modernity‟ is therefore a matter 
internal to the religion in question.
24
 The problem of religious fatalism seems a similarly internal 
matter. As discussed above, a respondent to the Patriot could argue that it is „bad religion‟ by 
quoting alternative scripture.  
   
This brings the discussion back to Tamarkin: After initially suggesting that the farmers‟ religious 
objections to the Scab Act were a sincere expression of their religious beliefs and a symptom of 
their conservatism, he mentions that the proponents of the Act also appealed to religion as the 
Bible is a “two edged sword” that can be quoted to substantiate a variety of positions. The 
opponents of the Act quoted extensively from the Old Testament, stressing that submitting to 
plagues were a religious duty or that rulers must obey the will of God or else face punishment. 





Scriptural references therefore served as idiom through which both sides outlined their position in 
relation to progress and the role of the state. Tamarkin then retreats from his earlier position that 
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the use of Biblical quotations is a sign of traditionalism – the divide between tradition and 
modernity now becomes the divide between the Old and the New Testaments.  
 
But in the light of the above, can any use of scripture to oppose the Scab Act be truly and 
independently religiously inspired? Rather than sourcing their arguments from scripture, it seems 
as if scripture was used to give authority to pre-formulated arguments. So the MP of Riversdale, 
I.W.J. van der Vyver, compared the promulgation of the Scab Act to the oppressive rule of King 
Rehoboam who plunged his country into civil war because he ignored wise council. His statement 
was met with derisive laughter by his fellow MPs. Angered, he promised violent retaliation from 
the Dutch-speaking farming community if the Act was passed.
26
 But Van der Vyver‟s conviction 
that the government of the Cape should not make laws contrary to the citizenry‟s wishes was not 
inspired by the politics of an Old Testament monarchy. Rather, he used the circumstances leading 
to revolt in pre-historic Israel as the idiom through which he expressed the duties of a government 
towards its citizens. The substance of his argument was therefore about democratic rights, not 
religion.  
 
This is not to say that Van der Vyver or others making scripturally-based arguments were not 
sincerely religious. Religions renew themselves through their adherents interpreting scripture in 
new ways to address new concerns. Progressives, themselves often the products of a solid 
Christian upbringing, justified their creed with similar appeals to Biblical authority: by 
endeavouring to increase economic productivity they were following God‟s command to mankind 
to rule the earth.
27
 The Bible was therefore a shared reference point that was used for areligious 
purposes. But appeal to the authority of scripture was indeed a “two-edged sword” as the verse 
and chapter structure of the Bible makes it easy to find passages ( and quote them out of context) 
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to support a range of positions. Hutcheon, the Chief Veterinary Surgeon, was raised by an uncle 
who was a Calvinist minister and forced to memorise great swaths of scripture as a child. This 
equipped him with a prodigiously trained memory and he had the ability to recite passages from 
literature and scientific writing at length. His photographic memory helped him to completely 
overwhelm the scripture-based arguments against veterinary science proposed by farmers he met 





Rationality and ignorance: some reflections on epistemology and the debate on indigenous 
knowledge 
Any discussion of the opposition against the Scab Act must explain why the scientific view of 
scab was rejected. Progressives, trying to explain farmers‟ reluctance to accept this explanation, 
accused them of superstition, ignorance or of holding on to childish ideas in an unreflective 
manner.
29
 However, many of the opponents of the Scab Act were farmers with many years of 
experience. The many letters they wrote to the press to protest the Act further attests to the fact 
that a good number of them were literate. Having access to newspapers and being the subjects of 
a veterinary educational campaign, they were familiar with the scientific explanation of scab by 
1894, but apparently chose to reject it. In spite of continued education efforts and public debate 
on scab, some still rejected the scientific explanation in 1908, many years after the Scab Act was 
promulgated.
30
 Such resistance to the Scab Act and veterinary science is therefore not solely 
explicable in terms of ignorance.  
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Opponents tended to base their rejection of the Scab Act and the scientific explanation of scab on 
their personal experience of sheep farming. But farmers‟ insistence on the validity of their 
experience cannot be taken at face value. Opponents of the Act were quick to argue that the 
progressives were farming with “book knowledge” and lacked practical farming experience. 
Their position on scab, however, cannot be contrasted with the scientific view by seeing the 
difference between the two positions as the difference between theory and practice. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 3, some farmers also developed theories to explain scab and conducted 
experiments to test them. What was at stake was therefore not ignorance opposed to knowledge 
but how practical experience and scientific experiment were to be interpreted.  
 
Tamarkin, taking the farmers‟ assertion that their opposition was based on „experience‟ at face 
value, argues that farmers had an experienced-based epistemology.
31
 He proposes the existence of 
an epistemological gap between these farmers and the progressives who saw science as 
authoritative.  
 
The dichotomy between „science‟ and „experience‟ needs more careful exploration, however. 
Science is difficult to differentiate from every day sensory experience. Some scientific disciplines 
use advanced measuring and imaging equipment to reveal hidden complexities in the objects of 
every day perception which lead scientist working in these disciplines from explaining physical 
phenomena in counter-intuitive. The practice of scientists to form counter-intuitive explanations 
for phenomena, however, does not solely depend on their reliance on sophisticated technology. In 
cases where scientists and non-scientist both depend on their unaided senses, distinguishing 
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between the non-scientific experience and scientific experience of phenomena becomes 




Historians of medicine has often focused on the history of laboratory science to the exclusion of 
field practice precisely because laboratory science is easy to differentiate from the science of field 
practice were medical science often merged with existing popular medical practices: 
“Laboratories are supposed to be generic spaces with invariable tools and practices that produce 
universal knowledge, in contrast to work in the field” while field practice are seen as particular, 
context-based and often consisted of unrepeatable experiences – qualities that conflict with the 
scientific method and its stress on the repeatability of scientific experiments.
33
 This definition of 
science, that equates science with the scientific method, implies that different scientific practices 
can be evaluated as more or less scientific according to their methodological rigour. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, veterinary scientist did not perform technologically advanced and methodologically 
rigorous experiments on acari at the Cape in the nineteenth century. It is therefore unclear 
whether they had access to scientific data that trek farmers, relying on their experience and the 
occasional employment of the magnifying glass, lacked. As discussed in the introduction, 
veterinarians struggled to establish scientific authority for their field precisely for this reason. The 
trek farmers‟ description of scab, as expressed before the 1892-1894 Scab Commission, did not 
greatly differ from Hutcheon‟s description of the symptoms and course of the disease. The main 
differences were in their explanations for the causes of scab and the role of acari in the progress 
of the disease. In the case of scab, science could therefore not be clearly defined vis-à-vis non-
science. 
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Instead of possessing a special type of epistemology reliant on personal experience, the opponents 
of the Act gathered knowledge from a number of sources and evaluated potential sources for 
trustworthiness. As discussed in Chapter 3, opponents of the Scab Act placed various degrees of 
trust in Hutcheon‟s account of scab. Some disputed his empirical claims while others merely 
disputed the conclusions he drew from these empirical findings. Opponents of the Act went as far 
as disbelieving the evidence of their own eyes by blankly refusing to accept the existence of the 
arachnids after being shown acari through a microscope. They preferred to believe that they were 
being tricked.  
 
Tamarkin later retreats from his representation of the Dutch-speaking farmers as having a unique 
epistemology: apparently they did not apply experience as an arbiter of knowledge in a doctrinal 
fashion but were “open to new inputs and new ideas as long as they suited their prosperity and 
survival.”
34   
 
According to Tamarkin the scientific diagnosis and prognosis of scab was simple and 
straightforward: the disease was caused by an arachnid and was cured by killing the arachnid. 
This view supposedly had little sympathy for the farmers‟ assertion that the disease was 
connected with the condition of the sheep and the pasture. He therefore represents science as 
decontextualized technical knowledge that can be universally applied and the Scab Act as an 




This echoes a recent debate in the social sciences about the scientific practices underlying 
development schemes and large-scale state controlled urban planning projects. In Seeing Like a 
State, James Scott (1998) theorizes that such projects normally fail or have unforeseen 
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consequences because they are based on overly simplified explanatory frameworks. The state 
tends to favour projects that would increase the legibility of a specific economic or cultural 
terrain in order to make these terrains subject to state control. The state is therefore easily seduced 
by standardised and simplified explanations and solutions that promise to give it this desired 
legibility and control. But state schemes based on such standardised, simplified explanations tend 
to fail because of their abstraction from real world contingencies. An abstract scheme cannot be 
substituted in place of a complex ecological system or social network and if such a substitution is 
attempted, the real terrain that the scheme seeks to manipulate is damaged or destroyed.
36
   
 
To prevent such failed state interventions, Scott suggests that governments should take greater 
notice of the local context and of the local knowledge practices that developed to deal with the 
issues the state scheme seeks to address. He introduces an epistemological distinction between the 
idealised abstractions used by the state and the contextualised practical knowledge of local actors, 
reviving the classical knowledge categories mētis and techne. The knowledge categories mētis 
and techne refer to how knowledge is practiced rather to how the truth of a statement is verified. 
Rather than defining and demarcating science from non-science, these terms cut through 
scientific practice. Mētis consists of practical skills, the rules of thumb and tricks of the trade that 
a knowledge practitioner acquires through practical experience. Techne, however, is abstract, 
organised and universally valid knowledge and can be reduced to formula that can be taught in a 
formal classroom. 
 
Few skills consist purely of techne. Certain forms of analytical philosophy and high level 
mathematics seems to be the only fields of enquiry that do not require either the input of 
experimental data (which requires technical skill) or for the practitioner to gain experience before 
he or she can be judged competent. Techne and mētis are therefore entwined in most knowledge-
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based activities. Formal education can teach rules and methods of dealing with a situation, but 
only experience tells which rules and methods should be followed in a particular situation. 
Techne, however, is often held up as an ideal since „proper‟ scientific methodology is seen to 
consist of reductionist abstraction from context. Statist schemes that impose standardised 
frameworks onto real-life situations are a consequence of this mistaken theory regarding the 
nature of the technical knowledge that governs human activities.
37
 This dichotomy echoes the 
distinction between laboratory science and field practice and explains why the latter has 
succeeded in claiming cultural authority for scientific endeavour in general.    
 
Characterising Hutcheon‟s description of scab as techne is not persuasive in light of the preceding 
discussion of the nature of veterinary science, at least so far as it regards scab at the Cape. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the explanation offered by veterinary science for scab was also 
environmentally nuanced and took the effects of drought and malnutrition into account. It can, 
however, be argued that the Scab Act was context-insensitive. The Act, and Hutcheon‟s 
prescriptions to the Scab Commission, focused on eradicating the disease and had no place for 
scientific nuance or ambiguities. The Act, with the restrictions it placed on certain types of 
trekking, was therefore perceived by its opponents as a „one-type-fits‟ all solution devised for the 
ecological conditions prevailing in the Eastern Cape.
38
 In contrast, A. G. Davison, the Chief 
Inspector of Sheep, argued that the Act was too lenient in order to accommodate the North West 
and that it was possible to implement much more stringent anti-scab regulations in the Eastern 
Cape. Scab eradication was also believed to be easier in the North West due to the lower stock 
densities and the dry, hot climate that reduced the survival rate of acari when separated from their 
hosts.
39
 This argument was born out by the statistics gathered by the CIS. In the arid, thinly 
populated Clanwilliam, Namaqualand and Van Rhynsdorp districts, scab incidence was 
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drastically reduced during the period the Scab Act was in effect. The latter two districts were 
even declared scab free on several occasions.
40
 This example served to confirm Davison‟s 
conviction that scab persisted in the North West solely due to farmers‟ apathy regarding scab and 




It was difficult to dip sheep in the North West and transhumant pastoralism made complying with 
the Scab Act burdensome. However progressives were not blind to these environmental realities, 
rather they believed the environmental difficulties suffered by trek farmers were caused by their 
farming practices and could be overcome by sedentarisation and better pasture management. This 
is fully discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
More problematically, Tamarkin explicitly frames his discussion of the Scab Act and farmers‟ 
resistance against it in terms of the struggle between tradition and modernity. This conception of 
trek farmer knowledge as in some way „traditional‟ and of veterinary science as a „modern‟ 
imposition cannot be sustained. There is currently a debate in the social sciences on the nature of 
so-called „indigenous‟ or „traditional‟ knowledge but this debate is largely politically motivated. 
In an essay on the topic, Arun Agrawal (1995) summarizes the core issue succinctly: 
Where „western‟ soc al science, technological might, and institutional models – reified in 
monolithic ways – seem to have failed, local knowledge and technology – reified as 
„indigenous‟ – are often viewed  as the latest and the best strategy in the old fight against 
hunger, poverty and underdevelopment. Because indigenous knowledge has permitted its 
holders to exist in „harmony‟ with nature, allowing them to use it sustainably, it is seen as 




Agrawal sympathises with this attempt to promote indigenous knowledge but he argues 
persuasively that a clear distinction cannot be made between indigenous knowledge and „western‟ 
knowledge. Rather, social scientists who attempt to do so replicate definitions of indigenous 
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knowledge originally formulated by structuralist anthropology and contrast these definitions with 
outdated, idealised definitions of science.  
 
So „indigenistas‟, for instance, argue that indigenous knowledge is deeply imbedded in local 
contexts and practicalities while science is abstracted from everyday life and practical concerns. 
But the very fact that „western‟ science could not be successfully imposed on indigenous societies 
indicates that such science is imbedded in unacknowledged western cultural contexts, a point 
these same social scientists are eager to make elsewhere. Also, there are few aspects of western 
life that are not impacted in some way by technological change, so science cannot be abstracted 




Underlying the attempts to define indigenous knowledge and to contrast it with western science is 
the assumption that these categories can be fixed in time and place. But it is implausible that an 
indigenous society subject to development programs possesses a body of knowledge that is 
somehow innocent of outside influences and uniquely its own. The indigenistas also seek to 
group completely heterogeneous bodies of beliefs and practices together. Under western 
knowledge counts, for example, the work of Derrida and Foucault, particle physics, agricultural 
science and western medicine; while witchcraft beliefs, indigenous pasture management, West 
African agroforestry, complex theories on the origins of disease and oral histories are all 
supposed to possess some essential quality that make them „indigenous‟.
44
      
 
A better avenue of explanation is to investigate how knowledge is produced and new ideas 
incorporated by a cultural group. But this seems to lead to analyses that characterise indigenous 
societies as being „closed‟ while western scientific thinking is said to be „open‟. „Closed‟ 
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knowledge systems protect existing theories and practices at the expense of new facts while 
„open‟ systems welcome contrary facts as a challenge that helps improve theories. This 
characterisation is equally problematic as it cannot account for how indigenous thinkers develop 
and incorporate new theories and techniques. It also assumes that the characterisation of science 
as „open‟ is valid. However, scientific methodology cannot simply be seen as the proving of 
hypotheses by experimental data because the relationship between experiments and theory is a 
complex one. This point is more fully explored below, for now it must suffice that philosophers 




As discussed above, Scott avoids using the terms „indigenous knowledge‟ or „traditional 
knowledge‟ and so avoids the problematic political content of these terms. Commenting on the 
problematic dichotomy between „modernity‟ and „tradition‟, he argues that “…a certain 
understanding of science, modernity, and development has so successfully structured the 
dominant discourse that all other kinds of knowledge are regarded as backwards, static traditions, 
as old wife‟s tales and superstition. High modernism has needed this „other,‟ this dark twin, in 
order to rhetorically present itself as the antidote to backwardness.”
46
 The indigenistas‟ program 
is born from this problematic dichotomy and cannot escape validating it.   
 
Tamarkin‟s description of trek farmer knowledge as „traditional‟ is therefore theoretically flawed. 
In addition, his attempts to demarcate the Dutch-speaking farmer‟s „traditional‟ knowledge from 
the „scientific‟ knowledge of the progressives through exemplification suffer from factual errors. 
He claims that dipping sheep in tobacco extract was a „traditional remedy‟ while the government 
experts advocated the use of patent dips.
47
 The use of tobacco extract as general insecticide was 
widespread, however, and dipping in tobacco extract was commonly used to cure scab in 
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Australia. It was therefore neither a local nor a traditional remedy.
48
 In addition, the Agricultural 
Department advocated the use of lime and sulphur dips rather that the use of patented dips that 
often contained arsenic and carbolic acid that could poison sheep. The lime and sulphur dip had a 
longer lasting residual effect than these dips and it was safer to use, but it needed to be prepared 
according to an exact and lengthy process that required the ingredients to be boiled. Using 




Tobacco extract was used at the Cape together with a host of herbal remedies before the 
introduction of patent dip. Tamarkin mentions the use of infusions of wormwood, mint, valerian 
and cannabis as dips
50
 while kruidjie roer my niet, melkbos and stinkblad were also used if 
tobacco and patent dips were not available. According to one farmer‟s testimony in 1874, these 
were only “partial remedies”. He considered tobacco extract as the surest remedy but complained 
that it was too expensive and, as it had to be imported, it was not always available. He deemed 
lime and sulphur to be the best alternative.
51
 The scientific view of scab and prescriptions for 
dipping sheep were first publicised in Dutch at the Cape in the bilingual newspaper, De Zuid 
Afrikaan, in 1835. The article advocated a dip made of tobacco water, spirits of turpentine, 
corrosive sublimate and salamoniac. Treatment was to be repeated after 14 days and visibly 
infected sheep were to be hand dressed with turpentine until completely cured.
52
 Dipping was 
therefore not a „new‟ technology that the Agriculture Department tried to impose on the farming 
community. Rather, as discussed in Chapter 4, farmers did not see combating the disease as cost 
effective. 
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Shearing sheep bi-annually or even more often together with hand dressing visibly infected sheep 
with mixtures of fat, herbs and minerals such as mercury or sulphur (as practiced by Dutch-
speaking Cape farmers during the 19
th
 century) was „traditional‟ in the sense that these were age-
old European remedies for scab commonly used since at least the Medieval period.
53
 In the 
nineteenth century, arsenic replaced mercury as the medicinal poison of choice, at least where 
veterinary science was concerned, while turpentine replaced lard. Cooper‟s Dipping Powder 
became widely used as part of „traditional‟ remedies due to the arsenic it contained. Feeding 
sheep a mixture of Cooper‟s Powder and salt or sulphur was a popular and effective remedy for 
parasitical infections and it was endorsed by Hutcheon who gave farmers precise dosage 
instructions so that they could avoid inadvertently poisoning their livestock.
54
 Such “internal 





Dutch-speaking farmers‟ often expressed view that scab was caused by environmental poverty – 
i.e. malnutrition – seems to be derived from the mid-nineteenth century environmental and 
nutritional explanations for illnesses like cholera, tuberculosis, typhoid, typhus, measles and 
diphtheria that decimated Europe‟s industrial centers.
56
 This malnutrition theory was therefore 
neither particularly old nor of local origin. In contrast, progressives‟ insistence that kraals, resting 
places and pasture frequented by infected sheep retained the ability to re-infect sheep months and 
even years after the infected flock was cured and removed was not supported by adequate 
scientific evidence
57
 and dated from early Medieval Europe.
58
 Progressive nomenclature of for 
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the disease like describe scabby sheep as “unclean” and referring to quarantine periods as 
“cleansing orders” suggests the infectability of kraals were stressed in progressive accounts of 
scab due to the influence of the mid-nineteenth century hygiene theory for diseases and the 
ideological impact of public hygiene campaigns.    
 
Illustration 1.1: A contemporary advertisement for the ubiquitous Cooper‟s Dip 
 
 
Source: Ons Land, 6 November 1894. “Cooper‟s is the boss. Cooper‟s is the dip to kill the scab devil. It 
















The Dutch-speaking farmers‟ practice can therefore not be seen as purely „traditional‟ while the 
progressives‟ aetiology is not purely „modern‟ and neither side therefore neatly fits the labels 
„traditional‟ or „modern‟. As it is apparent that the demarcation of knowledge as „traditional‟, 
„indigenous‟ or „modern‟ cannot be supported in practice, there must be an underlying reason for 
the insistence of both historians and indigenistas in doing so. In this regard Tamarkin and the 
indigenistas‟ efforts to promote what they have defined as „traditional‟ or „indigenous‟ is 
particular revealing. The debate regarding the validity of indigenous knowledge rephrases a 
fundamental problem in anthropology, namely how to understand people who are apparently 
clinging to beliefs judged to be false and irrational according to western criteria of truth and 
rationality.  
 
Partha Chatterjee (1986) provides an overview of the main solutions offered by anthropologists. 
Political conservatives see the matter in simplistic terms: false beliefs are errors so people 
maintaining these „errors‟ in the face of the „correct‟ explanations are irrational. This neatly 
supports conservative prejudice against the developing world. Liberals cannot accept this 
pejorative conclusion and they have therefore developed a number of alternative approaches to 
the question that enable them to attribute coherence to apparently irrational beliefs and practices. 
One option (Chatterjee calls such theorists „rationalists‟) is to argue that all people are equally 
rational in the conventional sense of the word – their actions are consistent with their beliefs and 
they believe they have sufficient motivation to consider their beliefs to be true. Also called the 
principle of charity, this theory maintains that if an action or belief seems irrational or 
inconsistent, it is because the outside observer it is not fully aware of the underlying motives for 
the action or belief. Critics of this position think it is implausible that a full description of a 















are possible. Anthropologist would therefore rarely have sufficient evidence for claiming that 




A second approach is to avoid the debate entirely by following a functionalist or structuralist 
approach. Both were popular in the middle decades of the twentieth century. Functionalism 
maintains that apparently inexplicable practices and beliefs have a hidden political or material 
function in a community that ensures its survival. Structuralists argue that such practices and 
beliefs form part of an underlying symbolic network that is logically consistent. Both approaches 
are profoundly patronising: western observers, maintaining the image of themselves as objective 
and rational, are able to discern the hidden meanings and motivations of indigenous cultural 
practices while the people studied remain unaware of the „real‟ meaning and motivations of their 
actions and beliefs. Functionalism and structuralism also beg the question: why are the people 





Thirdly, the „relativists‟ (as Chatterjee names them) argue that no universal rationality exists, but 
that different cultures have different concepts of rationality. In practice, however, different 
conceptions of rationality are difficult to define and demarcate from each other. How, for 
instance, would an observer know if an individual is an irrational member of group x or a rational 
member of group y? How can observers determine if a certain action or behaviour is „rational‟ in 
terms of a particular culture while at the same time having to construct a definition of rationality 
for that culture? It is therefore unclear how relativists will go about identifying alternative 
rationalities and in practice they seek to escape it by also adopting a principle of charity: the 
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Rationalist and relativist theorists therefore arrive at the same impasse. Chatterjee argues that the 
problem with the debate on rationality lies not in the solutions proposed but in the question posed. 
The latter is derived from the habit of the west to appropriate the prestige of science for itself as a 
central characteristic of its culture. Chatterjee argues that deciding whether a particular group of 
people are rational or not is not simply a matter of enquiring whether their beliefs are 
scientifically valid or not. He points out that few statements are unambiguously true.
62
 An 
illustration of this is easy to find in the account of the scab disease. Hutcheon and nineteenth 
century veterinarians believed the disease was simply the effect of the bite of the acari. Some 
farmers, however, believed that the disease was a blood borne ailment that expressed itself if the 
sheep became malnourished. As discussed in Chapter 2, scab does have an effect on the blood of 
sheep as bacteria borne by acari causes an immune response in the sheep that is detectable 
through blood tests. Was Hutcheon‟s version of the disease then untrue? Can one argue that the 
farmers‟ beliefs were true in some way, even if they did not understand the disease to be caused 
by bacteria? The epistemological status of beliefs (or statements of fact) can seldom be 
conclusively determined and even then this status may be limited in space and time. Truth, it 
seems, has degrees and is context dependent. 
 
In the discipline of epistemology, people are credited with knowledge it they have “true” beliefs 
and if they meet some sort of justification principle, i.e. they must know their beliefs are true and 
have valid reasons for this purported knowledge. This academic formulation is relevant here 
because both the criteria determining whether a statement or belief is true or not and what counts 
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as sufficient justification is socially mediated. After immediate sensory experience has been 
exhausted as a source of knowledge, knowledge ascription becomes dependent on social 
relationships. In everyday practice people therefore rank sources of information according to their 
reliability and trustworthiness.
63
 This returns the discussion back to Scott‟s characterisation of the 
dichotomy between „traditional‟ and „modern‟ knowledge: „Traditional‟ knowledge does not meet 
modern criteria for what counts as knowledge. Science has increasingly been granted the cultural 
authority to adjudicate on knowledge claims.  
 
Chatterjee calls this the “rationality ethic”. Rationality is not merely a matter of having true 
beliefs: “It is seen as incorporating a certain way of looking at the properties of nature, of 
ordering our knowledge of those properties in a certain consistent and coherent way, of using this 
knowledge for adaptive advantage vis-à-vis nature.”
64
 To attribute a group of people with 
rationality implies that they use natural resources to their optimal material advantage. The 
knowledge that enables this exploitation is then labelled as scientifically valid. Rationality is an 
ethic, a way of living in the world, which is said to promote scientific thinking. Chatterjee phrases 
his argument with exceptional clarity: 
It is important to note, however, that the stricter definition of scientific truth is now 
contained within the wider notion of rationality as an ethic. So much so that the ethic of 
rationality is now seen to be characteristic of „scientifically-orientated‟ or „theoretically-
orientated‟ cultures. And thus, by a conceptual sleight of hand, the epistemic privilege 
which is due to „scientific truth‟ is appropriated by entire cultures. What results is an 
essentialism: certain historically specific correspondences between certain elements in the 
structure of beliefs in European society and certain, albeit spectacular, changes in techno-
economic conditions of production are attributed the quality of essences which are said to 
characterize Western cultures as a whole. It is an essentialism which, when imposed on 
historical time, divides up the history of Western society into pre-scientific and scientific, 
and casts every other culture in the world into the darkness of unscientific traditionalism. 
Initially, this essentialism enjoys a straightforward ethnic privilege: the superiority of the 
European people. Later it is given a moral privilege, encompassing as in the post-
Enlightenment theories of progress – positivism, utilitarianism, Weberian sociology – a 
historically progressive philosophy of life. And finally, when all of these privileged 
positions are challenged with the spread of anti-colonial movements, it is the epistemic 
privilege which has become the last bastion of global supremacy for the cultural values of 
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Western industrial societies. It is a privilege which sanctions the assertion of cultural 
supremacy while assiduously denying at the same time that it has anything to do with 
cultural evaluations. Relativist or rationalist, each one is keen to outdo the other in the 
radicalness of his stand against ethnocentric bias.
65
           
 
Western academic disciplines, through an implied appeal to the authority of science, appropriate 
the right to „explain‟ other cultures in ways that makes sense in terms of the rationality ethic.
66
    
 
The project of defining and preserving indigenous knowledge suffers under the assumptions of 
this rationality ethic and its implied appeal to the authority of science. The promotion of 
indigenous knowledge is an effort to attribute rationality to indigenous knowledge practices. As 
indigenous people have not relinquished their knowledge practices, indigenistas now seek to find 
a constructive, bounded role for these practices in the developmental process with the implied 
assumption that development will eventually invalidate these practices. Agrawal reports that the 
advocates of indigenous knowledge aim to gather and archive such knowledge, presumably 
organised according to its use. Such a project then essentially amounts to evaluating indigenous 




This ethic was also visible in the progressive‟s assumption that their way of farming was „correct‟ 
as it was the most efficient. Because to be rational was seen as synonymous with economic 
efficiency, Dutch-speaking farmers‟ refusal or neglect to adopt progressive farming measures was 
seen as a sign of their irrationality and justified perceptions of them as inferior to Englishmen.
68
 
Hutcheon therefore initially had no reservations in grading responses to the scab act and the 
scientific explanation of the disease according to the level of intelligence he assumed farmers 
possessed. As can be imagined, progressives and those receptive to his gospel were judged to be 
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more intelligent than everyone else.
69
 In this climate, farmers‟ contrary beliefs were not credited 
as being knowledge. 
 
But the efforts of historians to explain the farmers‟ actions are also based on this rationality ethic. 
Therefore D‟Arcy Nell argues that the farmers were hesitant to adopt improvements (of which the 
scab act was one) out of self interest. Where this explanation falls short, elements of „unscientific‟ 
or irrational belief structures are called in to take up the slack, i.e. they had religiously grounded 
objections to scientific positivism. Religious beliefs or alternative epistemological traditions then 
function as the relativists‟ alternative rationality or can be read as a hold-over from „tradition‟ and 
judged to be irrational. Tamarkin‟s explanation is similarly mixed: the farmers‟ experiential 





According to Tamarkin, opponents of the Act professed an alternate rationality – a “moral 
economy” or “ethno-morality”. This serves to redefine their economic interests to encompass the 
communal level and so individualistic market rationality is replaced with communal economic 
rationality.
71
 Trek farmers, however, were not self-sufficient and had to interact with the market 
to acquire, for instance, wagons, firearms, clothing, worked metal and tobacco. There is therefore 
no evidence for the existence of a trek farmer moral economy that withstood market pressures 
during a purported „pre-capitalist‟ period at the Cape.
72
 Such a system also did not exist towards 
the end of the nineteenth century, as evidenced by rural enclosure and the increased pace of 
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 During droughts, landowners retrenched their bywoner dependents and 
these men, their families and livestock had to subsist on waterless land. They therefore 
disproportionately suffered the effects of drought, often losing the draught oxen which were their 
main source of income. Some of these bywoners were rehired at the end of the drought but each 





Both Tamarkin and D‟Arcy Nell therefore follow a duel strategy of ascribing rationality and 
irrationality to Dutch-speaking farmers‟ practice by turn. Accordingly, the farmers were largely 
rational and the irrationality they exhibited was due to remnants of their traditional, pre-modern 
world view. Tamarkin and D‟Arcy Nell therefore essentially return to the practice of ascribing 
character deficiencies to the rural poor. These character deficiencies are then excused by way of 
their rural isolation, lack of formal education and distrust of English-speakers, instilling in them a 
reluctance to accept „modern‟ innovations.
75
 In contrast, as argued above and in Chapters 3 and 4, 
this thesis stresses that farmers who protested against the Scab Act via testimonies before the 
Scab Commission and letters to the press did not appear to be insensible to the possible benefits 
of technological innovations; rather they argued that they could not afford to improve their land. 
Even if the farmers were as ignorant as nineteenth century progressives claimed, exposing them 
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THE CHALLENGE OF RELATIVITY 
Chatterjee is pessimistic about the ability of western academic disciplines to transcend the 
rationality ethic as it is based on the reality of western material wealth and technological power.
76
 
This is a familiar relativist conclusion: observers cannot escape their subject position as there is 
no neutral ground. This creates an impasse: by not admitting to the validity of universal standards 
of evaluation, relativism offers no guidelines for choosing between competing, mutually 
exclusive points of view. Some of these choices are prosaic but others are morally urgent.
77
 Such 
choices are then made by reverting to the rationality ethic (and the universal Enlightenment 
values it presupposes) as a standard of evaluation and the „other‟ is again presented as either 
irrational (sometimes „traditional‟ acts as euphemism here) or are charitably described as acting 
according to an alternative or hidden rationality. As this alternative rationality can seldom be 
explained in terms western observers will recognise as rational, „alternative rationality‟ also 
functions as synonym for „irrationality‟. 
 
Given that western academics cannot escape their subject positions, the anthropologist Stanley J. 
Tambiah (1990) suggests a deflationary approach for anthropology. Rather than seeking to 
describe and explain other cultures, anthropologists should aim at translating these cultures into 
terms understandable to a western audience. Such translation would be a dialectical process that 
does not aim at establishing a one-to-one correspondence between elements of different cultures, 
but approaches translation as an exercise in mapping – the degree by which concepts overlap or 
not informs the anthropologist about the culture studied and about the assumptions and ready-
made categories held by the west. Some elements of foreign cultures will have a one-on-one 
correspondence with elements in western culture while other concepts will prove to be too 
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context bound to be translated. Anthropologists are therefore tasked with identifying western 




Tambiah‟s proposal seemingly ignores how anthropologists gain the necessary cultural and 
linguistic fluency to effect such translations. There is not sufficient space to give an overview of 
the theoretical complexities involved here. Since sufficient theoretical grounds for assessing the 
accuracy of a translation have not yet been developed, the problem of translation remains 
theoretically unresolved.
79
 In practice, however, regular and confident translations between 
languages and different cultural contexts are made on a daily basis. Tambiah therefore proposes 
that the problem of translation should be solved on a case by case basis. If a translation proves 
difficult or impossible, it is evidence for cultural incommensurability. Individual „translation 
projects‟ would also be open to continuous re-evaluation. This too is evident in practice: the re-
examination and analyses of texts are the lifeblood of academic disciplines. Historians, for 
example, constantly reinvent the past by offering new „translations‟ of primary sources.    
 
Tambiah identifies three comparative categories for this translation project.  If a base of 
agreement (such as a common aim) exists between two phenomena or systems to be compared 
and the two systems are mutually exclusive, one of two situations pertains: Firstly, relativism can 
be avoided if “a straightforward decision procedure” exists by which to judge the truth or efficacy 
of the solution or explanation which are being compared. The winning theory can then be 
declared correct while entertaining the losing position becomes a sign of irrationality. Secondly, 
if the two phenomena or systems compared are true alternatives to the same problem, relativism 
truly pertains. The solutions offered by the two systems are then context dependent and neither 
position has to be abandoned or judged inferior. Lastly, anthropologists should consider whether 
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two phenomena should be compared at all. If their presuppositions are different and a comparison 
will result in an untenable imposition of principles from one phenomenon onto the other, the two 
phenomena do not have shared aims or a base of agreement and cannot be compared in a 
profitable manner. Certain concepts will prove to be untranslatable.
80
    
 
According to Tambiah‟s suggested framework, the Dutch-speaking farmers‟ alternative views on 
scab falls in the first category described above. Their views and treatment regimes had the same 
aim as those of progressives but it was mutually exclusive. The opponents of the Scab Act were 
eventually persuaded of the validity of the progressives‟ views of scab. There is therefore no need 
to explain away their temporary „error‟ (or irrationality) by theorising that they possessed 
alternative epistemological or ontological frameworks. As discussed above, both sides presented 
their views as based on empirical evidence.  
 
While Tambiah acknowledges that deciding between alternatives in the social and moral realms is 
a complex matter, he appeals to science to act as arbiter between different systems for explaining 
physical phenomena. However, such a judgment can only be made if the relativist critique of 
science can be defused. It is a common strategy for social scientists like Tambiah to reject the 
relativist critique of science by limiting its application. He argues that science may play different 
roles in different societies but that “a single science” exists as “all practitioners of a discipline in 
question share concepts, rules of the game, notions of relevant evidence and proof, and strive for 
unified consistent theories which are in principle correct for the time being.” Relativity 
encroaches on science in “what claims „scientific‟ knowledge makes in regards to matters outside 
its special provenance […] and what alliances scientists make with interest groups and wielders 
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of power and affluence.”
 81
 The scientific method itself is therefore immune from the relativist 
critique. 
 
Even when it is acknowledged that social factors impinge on scientific methodology, the threat is 
contained: it is well established that experiments do not produce evidence in a transparent, 
mechanical manner. Discussing this fact with relevance to new scientific equipment and 
procedures, William Bechtel (1990) argues: 
Rather than judging a theory by empirical evidence, which is either taken as a given or 
independently established, the claim here is that the evidence and the procedures for 
procuring it are evaluated at least in part by how sharply defined and replicable the 
evidence seemed to be and by the degree to which the evidence fits with emerging 
theoretical views. The latter criterion might be thought to undercut the objectivity of 
scientific knowledge and generate a vicious circularity: Knowledge claims are judged 





But Bechtel quickly finds a way of restoring objectivity: experiments are designed to study real 
objects and „reality‟ therefore constrains the possible and plausible interpretations that can be 




The philosopher and anthropologist David Turnball (2000) groups attempts by theorists to escape 
the impact of social relativism on science into two categories: Firstly, there is what he calls the 
“long-run argument”. This approach claims that although knowledge is indeed socially 
constructed, it is only trivially so. In the long-run, social circumstances and other contaminants in 
the production process of any theory that is accepted as correct will disappear under the burden of 
evidence and positive predictive results. The influence of social factors is therefore located in the 
rate and direction of scientific progress but does not affect the form and content of scientific 
ideas, a view shared by Tambiah above. Secondly, some appeal to the progress of science. As 
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science has greatly increased humanity‟s ability to predict and control nature, the scientific 




These two arguments are both problematic. As Tambiah stated, a particular scientific theory is 
only “correct for the time being.” The reason for this is that the “vicious circularity” of the 
scientific method cannot be escaped by reference to reality as adjudicator. Tambiah‟s phrase “the 
rules of the game” broaches an important philosophical argument regarding the nature of rule 
following originally proposed by Wittgenstein: no body of rules can encompass the rules 
governing their application. Rules would have to be devised to govern the application of the 
initial set of rules and another set of rules would be needed to govern the application of the 
second set of rules until the process is repeated ad infinitum. „Players‟ can only escape this 
infinite regress through the possibility of a vantage point external to the game being played. 
Scientists do not have such a vantage point; appealing to reality does not suffice since they claim 
it can only be reached through the methodology of science. On a purely philosophical level one 
therefore cannot determine when a scientific statement is correct. Although material efficacy 
strongly suggests fidelity between a scientific theory and the phenomenon it describes, such 
fidelity is not logically necessary. It can therefore not be determined at which point in the lifetime 
of a particular scientific theory „social contaminants‟ have finally been expunged to leave behind 
unvarnished scientific truth.
85
   
 
Beinart, Brown and Gilfoyle, the main proponents of the historiography of progressivism in the 
Cape Colony and the Union of South Africa, appear to deny the applicability of the relativist 
critique of the scientific method. Their recent review article of Africanist critiques of colonial 
science explained their interest in European colonial experts, government sponsored science and 
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government ecological and veterinary interventions. According to them, “colonial scientists and 
technical officers in Africa have received a bad academic press” as part of the post-modern 
critique of science as an instrument of colonial power. They want to detach science and 
technology from its colonial context to rather focus on the colonial experts as scientists first and 
as colonial bureaucrats second. This entails the reading of these experts‟ reports “through their 
own eyes, for their own logic” and situating them and their knowledge in the world of scientific 




In his doctorate thesis, Gilfoyle wrote that previous authors have been interested in the 
“ideological and political significance of science rather than on its content or material effects on 
the economy.”
87
 However his and his co-authors‟ work do not give a detailed analysis of the 
effects science had on the economy, nor do they critically examine the scientific methodology of 
the various colonial experts they purport to study. Rather, they produce what has been criticised 
as a form of neo-liberal revisionism - mere inventories of scientific, agricultural and 





Reading the reports of government experts „through the experts‟ own eyes‟ have caused these 
authors to view their areas of enquiry in the terms set by the various progressively minded 
colonial experts they study. The focus remains on what these experts saw as worthy of scientific 
study and presents the success or failure of such study in the experts‟ own terms. In an as yet 
unpublished volume on the history of veterinary science in South Africa, Gilfoyle and Brown 
were careful to state that their account of South African veterinary science “consists [not] of an 
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analysis or description of an orderly, rational progress towards the revelation of biological 
reality.” 
89
 They acknowledge the influence of social contingencies on the process of scientific 
discovery but deny this at the end of the same paragraph: “Nevertheless, a „social constuctivist‟ 
approach is avoided, because this would imply that outcomes [of scientific studies and debates 
between the experts and the farming public] were the result of social forces, whereas the present 




Gilfoyle and Brown do not elaborate this theoretical position further but, given the theoretical 
problems inherent to efforts to limit the applicability of relativism to science, it is incumbent upon 
them to explain how they know when „biological reality‟ has been reached. In practice they seem 
to take the doubt a particular government scientist had about the particulars of his discipline as 
the degree of correspondence a particular theory had achieved with reality. Gilfoyle‟s study of the 
office of the Chief Veterinary Surgeon‟s scientific practice in the Cape Colony between 1877 and 
1910 is a case in point. Since the CVS considered the scientific explanation of scab to be 
complete (see Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of this claim), Gilfoyle does not interrogate his 
aetiology of scab further.
91
 He is content with sketching the viewpoints of the progressives and 
their opponents in broad strokes and, together with Hutcheon, he abandons the field before the 
Scab Act of 1894 was promulgated and the anti-Scab Act movement gained momentum. In 
contrast, Gilfoyle‟s treatment of the redwater and rinderpest epizootics is much more detailed 
because the aetiology of these diseases had not yet been established and Hutcheon showed 
considerable professional interest in them.  
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As will be discussed extensively below, the scientific account of scab was not complete. In 
addition, the omissions in the account made it prejudicial to trek farmer interests. The Africanist 
critique of colonial science can therefore not be dismissed in the case of scab. 
 
THE WAY FORWARD 
As discussed, the tradition/modernity dichotomy is inchoate since what is traditional and what is 
modern cannot be adequately defined. The Dutch-speaking farmers‟ resistance to progress has to 
be explained without assuming that developing and adopting new technologies is the normative 
projection of history and without assuming that the farmers‟ resistance to progress therefore 
needs a special explanation based in their possessing alternate epistemological or moral 
frameworks that can then be attributed to either alternate rationalities or „tradition‟. 
 
It is maintained here that Tambiah‟s framework is more or less applicable. Progressives and the 
Dutch-speaking opponents to the Scab Act did not employ different epistemological frameworks 
and neither party possessed alternative forms of rationality. The conflict over scab and the scab 
acts consisted of opponents and proponents offering mutually exclusive explanations and 
solutions for what was largely a material problem. However, this does not mean that the 
coherence of the eventually hegemonic progressive view can be accepted. Tambiah‟s analysis 
needs to incorporate the consequences of scientific relativity. 
 
Turnball‟s critique of efforts to insulate science from relativism may be overly simplistic. Despite 
his philosophical reservations, certain scientific theories are supported by such a large weight of 
evidence that doubting their truth is absurd. To paraphrase Bertrand Russell: although scientists 
accept that a great deal of scientific theories and facts are not logically necessary like 
mathematical theorems and may be disproved by future scientists, a great deal of science is taken 















would require the intermediacy of some supernatural entity that played a massive confidence trick 
on humanity.
92
 Turnball‟s critique can therefore not be plausibly applied to all scientific theories 
but nineteenth century veterinary science does not number among the exempt. 
 
Tambiah‟s formulation theorises a particular, time-bound social space in which contrasting 
explanations for material phenomena could be evaluated before one side had to either 
acknowledge defeat or embrace irrationality. It will be argued in the next three chapters that space 
still existed in the late nineteenth century Cape Colony to question the scientific explanation for 
scab and the benefits of scab eradication. In addition, deciding which side was correct about scab 
and the scab acts was not a matter that could simply be referred to science for arbitration. The 
progressive‟s view of scab was not clearly scientifically „correct‟. Scab science was not complete, 
but it obtained material efficacy in eradicating scab and this efficacy seduced scientists into 
believing that the disease was fully understood.  
 
The scientific view of scab was also not presented in a manner that made its superiority a 
logically necessary conclusion. Scab science was used by the government at the Cape to convince 
farmers of the need for a Scab Act, but outside of the milieu of veterinary practice and the 
discourse of progressive farming, this science was reduced to a largely unconvincing public 
rhetoric that enabled farmers who were previously unfamiliar with scientific methodology to 
dispute scientific findings and to offer evidence that countered the scientific view.  
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CHAPTER 2: SCIENCE AND CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF PSOROPTIC 
MANGE  
As this thesis is essentially concerned with scientific practice and resistance to science in a 
politically polarized social environment, the conflict between the everyday practical experience of 
farmers and the scientifically acceptable explanations for these same experiences is of central 
importance. But historians investigating the political conflict surrounding the Cape Colony scab 
legislation and their implementation have constructed a simplistic discourse reducing the conflict 
over scab to a confrontation between progressive farmers and officials on the one hand and 
unscientific „Afrikaner‟ farmers on the other, ignoring the uncertainties in the progressives‟ 
position. A review of the scientific literature on scab, however, illustrates just how much 
uncertainty remained and still exists regarding the nature of the disease. As discussed below, 
there was and still is uncertainty as to how host specific the scab mites are and how long pastures 
and sleeping places can remain infective. Recent research also caused the scientific understanding 
of the disease and methods of controlling it to alter substantially.   
 
Of the authors who have investigated veterinary practice in the Cape Colony, Beinart and 
Gilfoyle are the only ones who have discussed the scientific practice of veterinary and 
government officials as regards scab. Beinart does not devote much space to how veterinary 
surgeons of the period conceived of scab as he saw the central difficulty in the implementation of 
the Scab Acts as the conflict surrounding transhumance and farmers‟ resistance to increasing 
government surveillance. William Catton Branford, the first CVS of the colony (1876 to 1879), 
confirmed that scab in the Colony was the same disease as elsewhere. The role of Duncan 
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Gilfoyle describes anti-progressive farmers‟ views on scab and outlines Hutcheon‟s perspective 
but he does not evaluate Hutcheon‟s scientific claims or discuss whether these were consistently 
implemented. Like Beinart, Gilfoyle does not problematise scab science since there was little 
professional veterinary interest in the disease in the late nineteenth century. Like Beinart, Gilfoyle 
focuses on Hutcheon‟s educational aims.
2
    
 
In contrast, this chapter will not only report on colonial veterinary practice but also evaluate its 
scientific claims. However, it is not the aim to adjudicate between the rival empirical claims of 
farmers and scientists. Rather, this chapter will test whether incomplete understanding of the 
nature of scab contributed to the failure of efforts to eradicate the disease or not. The argument is 
based on the evaluation of conflicting scientific findings. This is a fairly uncomplicated task as 
the scientific publications on scab are brief and experimental findings are presented concisely 
without being jargon-laden. The body of scientific literature available in English on scab is also 
not very extensive. Literature on scab published in South Africa is very limited, as evidenced by 
the few South African sources cited in both the South African and international veterinary science 
literature. It can therefore be stated with a fair amount of confidence that the scientific articles 
referenced in this chapter are a representative sample of the available literature on the subject. 
This convenient dearth of literature is due to economic factors that will be discussed later in the 
chapter. Before the 1980s researchers largely focussed on acari taxonomy, lifecycle and 
infectability. More detailed research regarding mite feeding behaviour, chemical analysis of the 
blood of infected sheep and immunological and genetic studies were only conducted in the last 
few decades.   
 
Hutcheon‟s views on scab were published in his annual reports of 1885 and 1886 and also as an 
addendum to the report of the Scab Commission of 1894. Full descriptions of the disease penned 
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by him were also published in the Agricultural Journal of the Cape of Good Hope. So regularly 
did he have to answer questions on scab that he later refused to discuss scab at length: stating that 
he and the readers of the Agricultural Journal are “quite tired of the subject”, he referred 
enquiries to the above-mentioned annual reports.
3
 But Hutcheon also faced enquiries from 
farmers disputing that scab was caused by acari mites and perhaps his „weariness‟ with scab 
derived from the irksome necessity of replying to such farmers “without appearing rude”.
4
 As 
mentioned above, he also believed that the scientific knowledge of scab was complete: 
With the exception, perhaps, of stock thefts, no subject has been so frequently discussed at 
farmers‟ meetings and in editorial columns as scab; while lecturers and essayists have also 
endeavoured to instruct the public respecting its originating cause, its effects, and the 
desirability of getting rid of it by proper remedial measures and wise legislative enactments. 
In fact, so much has been written and spoken upon this subject, both practically and 
scientifically, that very little that is new and true can be added to it.
5
    
 
In contrast, A.W. Shilston (1915), a veterinary researcher employed at Onderstepoort, introducing 
his own research on the disease, wrote that “there are, however, certain features of the disease 
which the generally accepted account of the life of the causal parasite fails to explain, and until 
exact information on these points is available the result of repressive measures must be very 
uncertain.”
6
 He claimed that his own research in the literature available on scab showed that 
authors on scab have been content to quote authorities on the disease who published their findings 
in the 1830s and 1850s. Claims had also been made by these authors about the lifecycle of the 
mites that were not supported by sufficient evidence. The result was the circulation of certain 
popular beliefs which have since been disproved.
7
    
 
The following will outline Shilston‟s research findings in broad terms and trace how these and 
other research conflicted with the views of Hutcheon and Davison. There are five main areas of 
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enquiry: difficulties with diagnosing scab; host specificity of acari mites; confusion regarding the 
lifecycle of acari mites and how this effected the eradication of the disease; the duration of the 
infectivity of mite populations if separated from sheep; mite feeding and changing perception of 
the disease. 
 
THE CLINICAL SIGNS OF SCAB AND ITS DIAGNOSIS 
Hutcheon‟s clinical description of scab is similar to that of modern authors. Scab (or psoroptic 
mange) in sheep is characterised by intense skin irritation caused by the activity of the acari mite, 
Psoroptes ovis. The affected sheep rubs itself against trees, fence posts and other surfaces and 
bites and scratches itself to relieve this irritation, causing wool to hang from the fleece in tufts. 
An examination of the sheep‟s skin where the fleece is disturbed by such unraveling wool tufts 
shows redness and the formation of small purplish-yellow pimples. These pimples exude serous 
fluid that dries to form a crust on the skin. The acari, which feed on the serous fluid, then 
multiply; causing the itching and scratching to increase. Increased exudation then takes place and 
the crusts enlarge. Eventually wool is shed or pulled from such areas and in severe cases the 
greater part of the affected sheep‟s skin may be bare and covered in scab crusts.
8
      
 
A careful farmer was expected to recognize the disease in its early stages when crust formation 
had only occurred to a limited degree by noticing the behavioural changes in the affected sheep 
and the resultant disturbance in its fleece caused by its efforts to relieve the irritation. This 
assumption of the easy recognisability of the disease, as discussed below, formed the basis of the 
sheep inspectors‟ efforts to prosecute contraventions of the Scab Act. Even today the disease is 
considered easily recognisable by some sources: an article previously published in the Landbou 
Weekblad and taken up in the publication called Kleinvee Siektes in 1994, is illustrated with 
photographs of sheep suffering the early stages of scab. These photographs are accompanied by a 
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caption stating that signs of scab on a wool sheep cannot be missed as “the smallest disturbance 




Although a disturbance in the fleece of a wool sheep is noticeable, not all such disturbances will 
be due to scab and not only wool sheep are susceptible to the disease. The beginning stages of the 
disease in hairy sheep will be much less noticeable than in wool sheep and farmers might only 
notice scab lesions on such sheep when the disease was already at an advanced stage. In addition 
to the characteristic scab lesions, however, scab was also visible in the behaviour of the sheep. G. 
Flemming (1875), a nineteenth century authority on livestock diseases, wrote that for an 
“experienced shepherd or stockman” scab is readily recognisable due to the infected animal‟s 
behaviour – “a few minutes‟ watching being sufficient to discover the existence of the disease in 
the animal‟s movements, while the condition of the fleece affords corroborative evidence.”
10
 
Flemming therefore described diagnosing scab in field conditions as being dependent on previous 
observation of the habits and movement of sheep. Diagnosis was therefore based on a series of 
visual cues – the sheep‟s movements, its lack of appetite, the resultant loss of condition, the 
disturbance of the fleece and the scab lesions itself. A modern Karoo sheep farmer, Mr. Botes 
from Merweville, diagnoses scab precisely as Flemming described almost a century and a half 
ago: according to him, scab is immediately noticeable through the restless motion of the sheep. 




In the early stages of the disease before multiple scab lesions were formed and especially if only a 
single sheep in a flock was infected, scab lesions could be mistaken for ulcers or steekgras 
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abscesses while the sheep‟s restless movement was ascribed to ticks.
12
 The former was a common 
complaint in the north western areas of the Cape Colony where the spiky seedpods of Aristidae 
grasses caused great damage. The seedpods stuck into the fleece at the throat and chest area as the 
sheep grazed and the sheep‟s efforts to dislodge the seedpod drove it into the skin were it formed 
an encrusted ulcer that could be confused with a scab lesion. Fleeces containing steekgras had 
low value and the afflicted sheep could die of infection.
13
 As the disease progressed and more 
lesions formed, a mistaken diagnosis became less likely. Mistaking scab lesions for steekgras 
abscesses was also not very plausible as the former generally started appearing on an infected 





Another unidentified sheep disease also caused wool loss in sheep and farmers feared 
inexperienced sheep inspectors might mistake it for scab.
 15
 The disease caused fever, the swelling 
of the infected animal‟s lymph nodes and slight wool loss over the swellings but no crusts formed 
and dipping was not an effective cure. Some farmers testified that this relatively rare disease 
could not be mistaken for scab. A small number, however, were uncertain about the distinction 
between it and scab, calling it “fever scab.” To such farmers fever scab and scab proper were 
caused by malnutrition – scab lesions, fever and wool loss all being outward expressions of the 
same condition.
16
 The Scab Commission therefore had to explain to farmers that the Scab Act 
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To reassure farmers that they would not be prosecuted for steekgras abscesses or fever scab and 
to ensure that farmers could not claim that they were falsely prosecuted for scab when their 
animals really suffered from the former conditions, sheep inspectors were required to produce 
acari from the infected sheep in order to „prove scab‟ in court. But finding acari on visibly 
infected sheep was sometimes difficult, especially under field conditions.
18
 Hutcheon admitted to 
embarrassing himself in public by not always being able to produce the acari. As the mites fed on 
the serous fluid, they congregated around the edges of the crusts and were therefore more likely 
to be found in skin samples taken from crust edges. However, they could also abandon heavily 
encrusted areas completely so that samples taken from the edges of scab lesions might contain no 
scab mites.
19
 The legal and political necessity of „proving scab‟ by isolating acari specimens 




Today a positive diagnosis does not require that acari be found on the infected animal as the 
clinical signs of the disease are judged to be sufficiently distinct to confirm a diagnosis. A much 
bigger diagnostic problem is that sheep may be sub-clinically infected with scab for months 
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before showing symptoms and can spread the infection to other sheep during this period. 
Hutcheon mentioned this phenomenon with scab in cattle, remarking that “it is very evident that 
these acari may live for a very indefinite time on the animal body, although no visible disease of 
the skin may become manifest on any part of the skin.”
21
 Sub-clinical scab led farmers to 
conclude that sheep recovered completely from the disease in good seasons and that the 
resumption of the disease in sheep thought to be scab-free occurred spontaneously. But Hutcheon 
insisted that the acari mites were opportunists who waited for the sheep to loose condition before 
“recommencing operations” – the disease was not spontaneous since the mites were never 
absent.
22
   
 
The long dormancy of acari on their hosts means that the duration of an acari infection cannot be 
determined, but sheep inspectors regularly testified to a particular scab infection being of a 
specific duration based on lesion size.
23
 This practice of dating the infection depended on the 
belief that the scab lesions grew bigger and that new lesions appeared at a more or less steady 
rate. This view is echoed by De Wet (1994) who claimed that scab lesions grow concentrically at 




   
 
But recent research confirms a long, variable incubation period for scab. D.J. O‟Brien (1999) 
conducted research in Ireland and Britain. He found that the incubation period of scab depends on 
the health of the sheep, if the sheep had previously been exposed to the disease and on the length 
and density of the fleece. Sheep can be infested for weeks or months before showing symptoms. 
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 CA CIS 47/33 – Administration of the Scab Act in Paarl and Stellenbosch, 1907. The failed prosecution 
of Adrian Jacobus Louw for neglecting to report scab in his flock provides an example. At the trial, held on 
25 January 1907 in the Paarl, the sheep inspector testified that the infection was at least three weeks old. 
Louw claimed that he saw his sheep on a regular basis and knew how to diagnose scab. He argued that his 
sheep were not visibly infected until shortly before the inspector visited his farm and that the seven day 
grace period for reporting a scab outbreak had not yet passed. 
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According to him some sheep are resistant to mange and never developed symptoms. Clinical 
examination of the sheep and wool samples cannot detect scab if the disease is not overt. An 
ELISA test was developed for scab in the 1970s to overcome this difficulty but the test is not 





Studies conducted in South Africa in the 1990s compared the response of Merino and Dorper 
sheep to scab infestation. Teresa Meintjies (1999) found that the disease has a longer incubation 
period on Dorpers than Merinos. Dorpers also show less signs of irritation than Merinos, their 
appetites are less affected and the lesions grow slower. She found that Dorper weight loss due to 
scab is statistically irrelevant while the Merinos in her study lost between twenty per cent and 
twenty-five per cent of body weight on average over a thirteen week period. Average lesion 
growth and wool loss were calculated for Dorpers and Merinos but she stressed that the disease 
progressed at varying rates on individual sheep in the two test groups so lesion size and wool loss 
could not be used to determine the duration of infection. The most badly infected sheep in a flock 
are therefore not necessarily the longest infected and are not necessarily the sheep that introduced 
scab into a flock.
26
         
 
L.J. Fourie and I.H. Horak (2000) do not credit reports that some sheep are totally immune to 
scab, but confirm the long dormancy of the disease. They found that the disease in Dorper sheep 
often remains sub-clinical and confirm Meintjies‟ finding of differentiated weight loss for 
Dorpers and Merinos. Dorpers were therefore identified as an infection reservoir for other sheep 
breeds.
27
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The varying incubation period of scab presents a particular challenge to researchers. If, in 
experiments, scab mites are artificially transmitted from one animal to another researchers need to 
decide on a cut-off date after which they can claim scab infection was not induced in the new 
host. On average, visible scab symptoms occur between twelve to fifty-one days when scab is 
artificially transmitted and between fifty-four to 154 days when naturally transmitted. However, 
the incubation period of the disease can vary widely in the same test conditions in different sheep. 
One sheep in an experiment conducted in the 1930s only became visibly infected after 176 days. 
There is therefore a risk that researchers terminate experiments too early, but the longer they wait 
the greater the chance that the experimental animals may have acquired the infection from 
elsewhere. As discussed above, in sub-clinical infections scab mites will only be detected if the 
mite population increases rapidly and the researchers are particularly vigilant and thorough in 
inspecting the experimental sheep.
28
 The development of the ELISA test for scab was therefore of 
great benefit to researchers as sheep show a change in blood chemistry indicating the presence of 




The different responses of individual sheep and different sheep breeds to scab mites are not only 
significant because they problematise accurate diagnosis and make tracing when and where the 
disease was introduced to a flock difficult. Different disease outcomes for different sheep breeds 
in different environmental conditions mean that the economic importance of scab may differ 
greatly between wool and mutton farming. The anti-scab legislation was based on the dogged 
insistence that scab eradication would be economically beneficial to all sheep farmers and 
Giliomee also bases his discussion of the anti-scab law agitation on this premise. Afrikaner 
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farmer‟s resistance to the law therefore becomes a sign of obdurate irrationality in the face of a 




HOST SPECIFICITY OF ACARI  
Hutcheon divided scab mites into three genera on the basis of their feeding patterns. The 
Sarcoptes burrows under the epidermis, the Psoroptes or Dermatodectes bites or pricks the skin 
but does not burrow and the Symbiotes burrows in the epidermis but does not pierce other skin 
levels. He identified seven sub-species of Sarcoptes, three species of Psoroptes (namely P. equi, 
P. bovis and P. ovis) and four species of Symbiotes. However, he was apparently uncertain as to 
whether these species were host specific and precisely which acari caused scab in which species 
of livestock.  
 
According to Hutcheon, Scabby Angora goats were infected with Symbiotes caprae and scabby 
Boer goats with Sarcoptes caprae. Boer goats were susceptible to catching Symbiotes caprae 
from Angoras and the reverse was also suspected. Horses in the colony suffered from scab caused 
by P. equi and Sarcoptes equi (the crusts of the latter infection was drier than those of the 
former). Calves were infected with Sarcoptes bovis and mature cattle by P. bovis. Pigs were 
infested by Sarcoptes suis. Sarcoptes ovis and Symbiotes ovis also infected sheep and caused 
scab, but he reported they were rare in the Cape Colony and did not explain how infection with 
these varieties differed from infection with P. ovis, the common sheep scab mite.
31
       
 
The officials serving on the Scab Commission also believed it was possible that springboks could 
transmit scab to goats but doubted reports of springboks transmitting scab to sheep.
32
 However, 
the belief that springboks could infect sheep was promoted in the print media by North West 
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farmers as a valid reason for opposition to the Act.
 33
 It is not clear if they really believed this was 
possible or if they subscribed to this view for strategic reasons. No farmer who testified before 
the Scab Commission proposed such views and the three farmers who mentioned springboks as a 




Although Hutcheon apparently did not conduct experiments to determine if different species of 
scab mites could be transmitted between different species of livestock, he found that goat scab 
sometimes spread to calves but not to sheep.
35
 Although farmers generally found that goats and 
sheep did not infect each other with scab, progressive farmers (like Davison) normally dipped any 





Several cases of what were referred to as goat scab were reported in sheep in the 1890s: A sheep 
inspector reported finding scab lesions on a sheep‟s legs and about the mouth. Apparently the 
disease resisted treatment by dipping and Hutcheon advised the inspector that it was probably a 
goat scab infection best treated by hand dressing.
37
 Similar treatment-resistant cases were 
included in the 1897 annual report of the Chief Inspector of Sheep, where it was described as 
caused by a mite that burrowed under the skin.
38
 This apparently caused some confusion 
regarding the host specificy of scab mites. Although Davison dismissed claims that springbok 
could transmit scab to sheep, the transmission of goat scab to sheep in these cases coupled with 
the successful experimental transmission of scab from a pig to a goat seemed to convince him that 
                                                 
33
 Ons Land, 1 November 1894. 
34
 CPP [G. 1 – 1894] Report of the Scab Commission, evidence of Cornelius Jansen de Jager, p. 562; 
evidence of Jacobus Nicolaas Moolman, p. 597; evidence of Sydney Fryer, p. 575.  
35
  AJCGH, 3, 9 (1890), p. 69. 
36
  AJCGH, 2, 25 (1889), p. 209. 
37
  AJCGH, 5, 12 (1892), p. 173. 
38
 CPP [G. 35 – 1898] Reports of the Chief Inspector of Sheep and of the Superintendent Sheep Inspector in 















psoroptic mange could be generally transmitted among livestock. Therefore farmers were advised 
that they should not “…be too particular to carefully examine all animals on the farm and to 
promptly treat every case of infection, whether the same appears on cattle, horses, pigs, sheep or 
goats, and if clean sheep are running with infected goats, or vice versa, the farmer should not be 




    
Fears that scab could be transmitted between domestic livestock persisted, apparently fueled by 
reports of scab infected sheep and goats running together. The return of sheep scab after often 
prolonged absences was also explained by suggestions that the acari were being harboured by 
animals other than sheep. Shilston therefore tried to artificially transmit scab between goats, 
sheep and rabbits to settle the matter once and for all. Common goat scab is caused by a 
Sarcoptes mite and Shilston found Sarcoptes mites generally less host specific than Psoroptes 
subspecies. He therefore readily transmitted Sarcoptes caprae from goats to sheep, pigs and cattle 




He also managed to transmit goat ear scab onto sheep; pustules and crusts formed like with sheep 
scab and adult acari even mated and some eggs hatched and some of the successive generation 
mated, but they died off before laying eggs. The infection in all trials died out quickly. Curiously, 
although goat ear acari were described by Shilston as being a bit bigger and darker in colour than 
sheep scab acari, the generation of goat ear acari born on the sheep was morphologically 
identical to sheep scab acari. Goat ear acari placed in sheep ears also quickly died off and sheep 
penned with scab infected goats (i.e. goats infected with Sarcoptes caprae) did not develop scab. 
Sheep acari placed on goats also died off or disappeared without establishing scab infection. 
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The same set of results was found when P. cuniculi was transmitted to sheep – scab infection 
resulted but the second generation of acari could not reproduce and the acari died out. Efforts to 
transmit common sheep scab to rabbits and rats also failed. Shilston therefore concluded that 
domestic animals like horses, pigs and cattle cannot transmit psoroptic mange to sheep and that 
sheep cannot transmit psoroptic mange to them.
41
 Meinjies transmitted scab mites from a sheep to 
both Boer and Angora goats but the animals did not develop scab while a flock of control sheep 
infected from the same sample did. She therefore concluded that the particular strain of scab she 




The Scab Act defined the term “sheep” to include goats.
43
 This conflation of goat and sheep scab 
as one disease to be treated with the same quarantine measures was problematic as it caused the 
unnecessary quarantining of healthy sheep that happened to graze with infected goats and vice 
versa. When the Scab Act was debated in Parliament, the MP for Riverdale, I.W.J. van der Vyver, 
protested the inclusion of goats in the Act as “the scab insects which infected goats were entirely 
different to those which infected sheep, and scabby sheep were not infected by scabby goats and 
vice versa.” D.J.A. van Zyl, MP for Clanwilliam, sarcastically suggested that springboks should 
be included in the definition of sheep in the Act.
44
 Instituting measures against goat scab without 
comparable measures against the disease in other domestic animals was futile in areas were horse 
mange was common. In the Transkeian Territories infected horses continually re-infected goats, 
which necessitated that all the sheep in contact with the goats also had to be treated. However, 
sheep inspectors working in the region did not have any power under the Scab Act to order the 




 Meinjies, The Bio-ecology of the Sheep Scab Mite Psoroptes ovis, pp. 76-82. 
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 The Stock Diseases Act of 1911 sought to close this loophole by including 




The entomologist attached to Onderstepoort, G.A.H. Bedford (1915), identified five Psoroptes 
subspecies on the basis of morphological differences and their different hosts. They were P. 
communis, var. ovis (common sheep scab mite), P. communis, var. caprae (goat ear scab mite), P. 
communis, var. bovis (cattle scab mite), P. communis, var. equi (horse scab mite) and P. 
communis, var. cuniculi (rabbit ear mites). Only one incidence of a var. bovis infection on cattle 
was recorded in South Africa and contrary to Hutcheon‟s findings, no infections of P. communis, 
var. equi on horses were found. Scab in goats was believed to be caused by Sarcoptes caprae and 




Hutcheon reported that the three groups of acari and their different subspecies looked very 
similar under the microscope and were mainly identified according to which host species they 
infected, where scab lesions were formed on the animal and how they spread. He insisted that 
these characteristics were due to the nature of the acari and not the nature of the host animals or 
qualities of their skin.
48
 The identification of mites by such a method is problematically circular. 
Because Hutcheon was unable to identify Psoroptes mites independently from their hosts, his 
conclusions about host specificy are unreliable. Shilston and Bedford, however, both claimed 
morphological differences between acari mites could be used to identify different subspecies, but 
subsequent researchers have disputed this claim. 
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The results of scab transmission tests were sometimes confounded by the inability of researchers 
to differentiate between different Psoroptes subspecies. So G.F. Van der Merwe (1949), who 
conducted transmission experiments using ear mites between sheep and goats, was told by the 
Director of Veterinary Services at Onderstepoort (Van der Merwe did not identify him by name), 
that the mite sample he sent for identification could not be positively identified as either P. 
communis, var. ovis or P. communis, var. caprae as the two subspecies were morphologically 
identical. It was concluded that the sample was probably P. com. var. caprae since Van der 
Merwe found the mites in the infra-orbital fossae of a sheep.
49
 All experiments conducted to see if 
sheep ear scab mites could spread to cause psoroptic mange and body scab mites could spread to 
infect ears were therefore always inconclusive. The acari causing ear and body scab are identical 
and most cases of ear mite infestation are sub-clinical and can only be detected by slaughtering 
the animal in question. It is therefore impossible to determine if the mites were present in the 




In 1958, G.K. Sweatman reviewed and simplified the classification of Psoroptes subspecies to 
five as he found that many of the subspecies were synonymic. The new classification scheme was 
not host specific but based on the general location of the mites on their hosts. The only 
taxonomical method of identifying the different subspecies established by Sweatman was by 
measuring the length of the outer opisthosomal setae (or bristles) of male mites (see illustration 2. 
1). Large samples of mites were examined by him and statistically significant differences in 
bristle length were reportedly found.
51
 The species currently recognised by science are Psoroptes 
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 F. C. Wright, „Cross-mating Studies with Psoroptes ovis (Hering) and Psoroptes cuniculi Delafond 















ovis (the common sheep and cattle scab mite), Psoroptes cuniculi, Psoroptes natalensis, 
Psoroptes cervinus and Psoroptes equi.
52
    
 
However, this classification scheme is of dubious validity. A.C. Kirkwood (1986) wrote that 
sheep scab mites “invariably” spread to the ears and that mites found on the bodies of sheep have 
successfully been transmitted to the ears of rabbits. In contradiction to Hutcheon‟s certainty that 
mites on different hosts were different species, Kirkwood concluded that the host animal governs 
the behavior of the mites.
53
 F.C. Wright et al (1983) interbred P. ovis taken from cattle with P. 
cuniculi from rabbits in the laboratory. These hybrids proved fertile, caused scab when placed on 
new rabbit and calf hosts and established successful breeding populations. Since they did not 
notice any statistically significant variation in bristle length between their P. ovis and P. cuniculi 





W. Boyce et al (1990) set out to investigate Sweatman‟s taxonomical classification scheme for 
Psoroptes mites. They examined a large number of mites taken off mule deer, big horn sheep, 
cattle and rabbits. In all, they compared nine measurements of 901 adult male mites. However, 
they found little morphological correspondence between mites based on which host animal the 
mites were taken from. This was especially noticeable with cattle as the measurements varied as 
widely in this group as it varied between these mites and the more morphologically similar mite 
groups taken from the other host animals. Confusingly, the measurements, although varied, 
placed the mites from all four host animals in the range Sweatman determined for P. ovis. 
However, correspondence was found to exist between mites from the same geographic area and 
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Source: Reproduced from US Bulletin, No. 21 in 
Hutcheon, „Scab: its Nature, Cause, Symptoms and 
Treatment‟, p. 442. 
they concluded that morphological examination of mites was more useful to identify different 
mite breeding populations than identifying mite subspecies.
55
     
 
M. Zahler et al (1998) solicited Psoroptes 
samples from different countries and 
different hosts, used Sweatman‟s 
guidelines to divide them according to 
different species, and then conducted 
genotype testing on the mites. They found 
that the genetic differences between 
individuals identified as belonging to the 
same species exceeded the genetic 
differences between purported species and 
that none of the genetic differences were 
statistically relevant. They therefore 
suggested that the classification of 





In general, researchers consider the Psoroptes subspecies to be conspecific. But different 
breeding populations or strains seem to maintain a level of host specifity as shown by Shilston 
and Meintjies. This host specificity is confirmed by the fact that the United States, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand managed to eradicate sheep scab while Psoroptes populations persist 
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in cattle, rabbits and wild animals that may share range with sheep.  The only scientist to propose 
an explanation for this phenomenon is Kirkwood who reports that tests to establish P. ovis from 
sheep on rabbits, calves and goats were successfully conducted in Britain. But the transmission of 
mites from these hosts to sheep has never been successfully performed. He speculates that this 
was a result of the differences in the serous exudation of different hosts. So cattle can support 
greater populations of P. ovis since scab crusts on cattle do not dry out and mites can therefore 
live under the crusts while mites generally cannot live underneath scab crusts on sheep. A mite 
population used to living in and feeding on serous exudation with a higher fat content can 
therefore not adapt successfully to the conditions on sheep, explaining why different Psoroptes 
hosts do not act as sheep scab reservoirs.
57
   
 
CONFUSION REGARDING THE LIFECYCLE OF ACARI MITES AND HOW THIS 
AFFECTS THE ERADICATION OF THE DISEASE  
Accurate information on the life-cycle of Psoroptes ovis was vital to successful scab eradication 
as the nineteenth century dipping preparations generally used at the Cape did not kill acari eggs 
and had limited residual activity. A second dipping after the eggs hatched and before a new batch 
of eggs could be laid was therefore essential to successfully clean a flock. However, official 
advice on the proper interval between first and second dipping was contradictory.  
 
Hutcheon did not report the incubation time for acari eggs, merely testifying before the Scab 
Commission that it took a few days. He initially advocated a ten day interval between dipping: 
any acari hatching within three days of the first dipping should die due to the lingering effects of 
the dip. Any acari hatching thereafter will start mating on the seventh day after hatching and lay 
eggs a day or so later. A ten day interval should therefore ensure that all the eggs remaining on 
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the sheep hatched while no new eggs could yet be laid.
58
 However, the Scab Commission 




This discrepancy can perhaps be explained by the disagreement between Hutcheon‟s findings and 
the duration of the mite‟s lifecycle established in Europe. In 1903 Davison proposed a fourteen to 
sixteen days dipping interval based on the understanding that eggs hatched from eight to ten days 
after being laid.
60
 Hutcheon was apparently also concerned by the practical difficulty of 
translating a scientific finding into law: he later criticised Davison‟s recommended fourteen to 
sixteen day dipping interval because allowing farmers only two days grace was deemed too 
strict.
61
 The Agriculture Department therefore recommended a twelve to sixteen days dipping 
interval, but this still differed from European standards, allowing one self-proclaimed British 
sheep dipping expert writing to the Agricultural Journal, John MacKenzie, to blame it for the 
failure of the colony to eradicate scab. According to him, many acari eggs hatched more than 
twelve days after being laid so sheep dipped a second time after twelve days could still be 
subsequently re-infected by newly hatched larvae.
62
      
 
Shilston, however, found that the acari‟s lifecycle was nine and ten days for summer and winter 
respectively. Eggs normally hatched after two days, but if hidden under scab crust, may hatch in 
four to five days. He found that all eggs that were viable hatched by day nine. This led him to 
recommend a nine to ten day interval between dipping in contrast to the twelve to sixteen day 
interval recommended by the Agricultural Department. He claimed the confusion arose because 
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, the authority still most often quoted, proposed a fourteen to fifteen day lifecycle for the 
scab mite. Other European researchers mentioned a lifecycle varying from twelve to sixteen days. 
A dipping interval of fourteen to eighteen days was therefore recommended at the time. Shilston, 
who based his findings on two years research, saw his results as justifying the need for research 
on South African mite populations.
64
   
 
Shilston‟s research therefore confirmed Hutcheon‟s disregarded findings. Much more recently De 
Wet reported the mites‟ lifecycle as eight to twelve days and recommended a seven to ten day 
interval between dipping.
65
 Kirkwood, following Sweatman, gave a figure of fourteen to nineteen 
days.
66
 Research conducted in South Africa therefore consistently reported shorter lifecycle 
duration for Psoroptes ovis than European sources. 
 
How then did any farmers manage to cure their flocks of scab in nineteenth century South Africa, 
considering that the dipping interval prescribed by the Agricultural Department was too lenient 
and that manufactured dips imported from overseas recommended an even longer dipping 
interval? The answer lies in the dip and dipping method used: dips containing arsenic, sulphur, 
tobacco and coal tar had a measure of persistence provided the active ingredients were present in 
suspension so that they could adhere to the fleece. It was therefore essential for farmers to use the 
correct dip and keep the dip stirred regularly to prevent the suspended ingredients from settling 
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DURATION OF THE INFECTIVITY OF MITE POPULATIONS IF SEPARATED FROM 
SHEEP  
The longevity of mites when separated from sheep and the duration eggs remained viable 
determined how long pastures, equipment, fence posts, sleeping places as well as trucks used to 
transport sheep remained infective. This was vital information in a period when dipping fluids 
protected sheep against re-infection for only a few days. Misconceptions regarding the duration of 
scab infectivity, especially kraal infectivity, were, however, widespread.  
 
Hutcheon found that acari could survive for three weeks or more if kept warm and moist but that 
they died after a few days if allowed to dry out. This corresponded with Gerlach‟s findings.
68
 
Shilston wrote that Hertwig and Gerlach found acari survived from ten to twenty days. Shilston‟s 
own research found that the mites had a varying survival rate depending on temperature and 
humidity. Kept moist at room temperature, they survived on average up to sixteen days with one 
individual in one trial lasting twenty days. At body temperature the mites died off within six to 
seven days, at room temperature but with low humidity they lasted six days and at zero degrees 
centigrade they survived for four days.
69
  Other researchers confirmed that temperature and 
humidity influenced mite survival rate but figures varied widely; one reported a single mite was 
kept alive at ten degrees centigrade
 
for forty-eight days. In general, however, the survival rate 
ranged from sixteen days to three weeks. Shilston‟s average does not differ much from the 
average mite survival rate obtained from these tests and the survival rate Meintjies established for 
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But mites will become too weak to be re-infective a few days before they die of starvation 
Shilston quoted the researcher S. Stockman who reported in 1913 that mites remained re-infective 
for only fourteen days. In the 1970s tests were conducted in Texas in conditions varying from a 
blizzard in the field to a simulated high summer in the laboratory. It was found that mites stored 
outside when temperatures reached a low of minus seven degrees centigrade remain infective for 
five to twelve days although mites survived up to thirteen and fourteen days. At room temperature 
mites remained infective up to ten days although they survived for thirteen days and mites 
refrigerated at between minus six and two degrees centigrade remained infective in one case up to 
seventeen days but on average only until day twelve. As mite survival at thirty-seven degrees 
centigrade was so poor (five days), no re-infection experiments were deemed necessary.
71
    
 
But the question did not depend solely on the off-host survival of mites. Hutcheon disagreed with 
Gerlach‟s recommended four week quarantine period as he believed acari eggs could remain 
viable for years. He reasoned that a good, drenching rainfall soon after the quarantine period 
began would make the eggs hatch and the acari would then all die off during quarantine, but if 
the weather remained dry or the eggs remained protected in a dry, cool place (like a crevasse in 
the wall of a stone kraal) they would hatch at a later date when conditions were favourable and so 
re-infect sheep. He thought some sheds and trucks could be disinfected but wrote that it was 




The long infectability of kraals was held as gospel by the office of the CIS and the persistence of 
scab was blamed on farmer‟s obdurate insistence on continuing to use these old kraals and 
sleeping places. Three experiments to test the infectability of sheep kraals were therefore 
conducted by Davison and his assistants in the course of 1906 and 1907: The first was on the 
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farm Karreepoortje in the Division of Jansenville. In August 1906, an old kraal formerly used for 
Angora goats was fenced off and divided into five sections. When the kraal was last used, the 
previous January, a flock of Angora goats placed in it contracted scab within two months. The 
experiment commenced in March 1907 when one hundred Angoras were separated from a clean 
flock of six hundred and placed within the kraal. The manure in the kraal was turned over 
periodically. In May, one of the Angoras in the flock was diagnosed with scab – nine months 
after the kraal was enclosed. When the experiment was concluded in June, four of the hundred 
goats were infected while none of the control animals had scab. The goats that slept in the kraal 
were kept separate from other stock for the duration of the experiment. 
  
The second experiment was conducted on the farm Swart Rivier in the Caledon district. Here a 
kraal was enclosed and a flock of scabby sheep was held in it during October 1906. The scabby 
sheep were dipped and removed to another portion of the farm and the kraal was closed on the 
15
th
 of November. On 17 May 1907, a flock of 486 sheep and goats was placed in the kraal at 
night and the dung in the kraal was turned over several times. When Assistant Chief Inspector of 
Sheep, W.J. Smuts, and the local Sheep Inspector inspected the animals on 29
 
June 1907, eleven 
animals were found to be infected. The herd who looked after the flock reported the scab 
outbreak on the 19
th
 of June. According to Davison, the kraal therefore remained infective for six 
months. The third experiment was conducted by Assistant Chief Inspector of Sheep W.J. van der 
Merwe, on the farm Ruigtevlei in the Division of Murraysburg. On the 28
th
 of March 1907, a 
flock of 110 clean Cape Sheep were allowed to sleep in a kraal that was enclosed for an estimated 
twelve months. The sheep contracted scab within three weeks and almost all the animals were 
badly infected when W.J. van der Merwe examined them on the 4
th
 of July. The rest of the 
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Davison repeated the experiment conducted at Karreepoortje in 1908 and 1909, using the 
remaining portions of the enclosed kraal with the same results. These experiments showed that 
the kraal remained infective for two years. As a portion of the presumably still-infected kraal 
remained unused in 1909, Davison confidently predicted that that kraal would prove infective for 
three years or even longer after livestock had been kept in it.
74
      
 
Davison therefore proved to his satisfaction that kraals remained infective for years after they 
housed scabby stock. However, Shilston and Bedford rejected his findings, arguing that since 
goat scab was caused by Sarcoptes caprae, an experiment conducted with Angora goats cannot 
prove that Poroptes ovis could infect kraals for long periods. Shilston found that mites do not 
survive longer if stored with sheep manure than if they were stored without and this was 
explained through microscopic analysis of their mouth parts – their funnel shaped mouths are 
adapted to take in fluids through suction so they cannot ingest solids. Mite populations can 
therefore not persist in kraals on manure as previously believed.  
 
Also, mite eggs were shown to loose viability quickly. Eggs removed from the sheep and kept at 
room temperature for up to a maximum of nine days hatched after two days when replaced on 
sheep. Eggs could be kept in an ice box for up to ten days and hatched after three to five days 
when replaced on sheep. Eggs incubated at higher temperatures hatched without being placed 
back on sheep, but the mites in such cases survived for only four days.
75
 Bedford found that eggs 
exposed to direct sunlight shriveled up in hours.
76
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Hutcheon‟s belief that acari eggs retain their vitality for indefinite periods was not solely based 
on anecdotal reports of sheep re-infection from old kraals. He also studied acari eggs under a 
light microscope and saw these showed different levels of germination, visible as gradated dark 
shadows through the egg surface. They hatched after different lengths of time when exposed to 
warmth and humidity. These eggs all hatched within a matter of days, but those that appeared 
clear under the microscope he believed to be in a very early stage of germination and, when he 
failed to hatch them artificially, he concluded that these eggs may remain viable for months or 




Shilston, in contrast, explained these unhatched eggs as dead, a deduction supported by Bedford‟s 
kraal infectivity experiments. Bedford tested how long kraals remained infective by constructing 
two stone kraals and letting infested sheep stay in them for a period of time. The kraals were then 
left empty for a number of days after which clean sheep were reintroduced to see if they 
developed scab. The experiment showed that the kraals remained infective for nine days after the 




Wilston et al, conducting their experiments during a Texas summer, found that sheep pens 
remained infective for three days. No sheep were infected in a pen left vacant for four days and as 
this experiment was repeated ten times with the same results, they did not consider it necessary to 
repeat the experiment in pens left vacant for longer. Reflecting on the difference between their 
results and those obtained by Stockman (who found pens infective for up to eight days) and 
Bedford, they proposed that quarantine periods be determined based on temperature and 
humidity. Some differences in the duration of infectivity may also be due to the different ability 
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of individual mites to survive adverse conditions.
79
 But as the different experiments all 
discovered a kraal infectivity of a few days, the old progressive shibboleth that kraals retained 
their infectivity for months and even years has been completely discredited.        
 
Davison‟s findings were therefore never replicated and it seems likely that they were the result of 
methodological error. Note that subsequent experiments were conducted using kraals and pens 
especially constructed for the purpose and that small numbers of stall-fed sheep were used. The 
researchers thus fully controlled the experimental animals‟ environment. They could also 
examine all the animals thoroughly to ensure that they were really scab-free when the experiment 
started and could also obtain more accurate data about the progression of the disease.  
 
In the three experiments conducted by Davison, the animals were placed under care of a herd and 
allowed to graze in the veld during the day. They may have come into contact with scabby 
animals or grazed on pasture used by scabby animals without the herd realising it or reporting it. 
Also, as examining hundreds of animals thoroughly was too time-consuming to be practical, the 
sheep and goats used in these experiments were unlikely to have been thoroughly examined 
before the experiments commenced. Sheep inspectors examined flocks by looking for visibly 
infected animals. When an animal showing a disturbed fleece or signs of irritation was observed, 
the animal was captured and the inspector proceeded by attempting to find scab lesions. 
Scrapings of the lesion were then examined under a magnifying glass and the animal was 
declared infected if live acari were found.
80
 This procedure would probably have missed light 
scab infections, and as discussed above, inspectors were entirely unable to detect sub-clinical 
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scab infections. The animals used in Davison‟s experiments may therefore have been lightly or 
sub-clinically infected before the experiments started.   
 
The belief that kraals and regular sleeping places could remain infective for years was old and 
persisted in the scientific literature on scab long after early twentieth century research showed 
that it was unfounded. Wilson et al argued that its persistence was due to the fact that the variable 
incubation period of the disease and the sub-clinical survival of mite populations on sheep for 
long periods were not known nor were the implications readily accepted.
81
     
 
MITE FEEDING AND PERCEPTION OF THE DISEASE 
Kirkwood wrote that in South Africa “local husbandry methods make control so difficult that 
eradication seems unlikely,”
82
 but to single out South African husbandry methods as particularly 
problematic overlooks the fact that the slow progress in South Africa in controlling scab was not 
unusual. The literature on scab proved useful in placing the problems experienced in South Africa 
with the eradication of the disease in context. The countries that managed to permanently 
eradicate sheep scab were in the minority and the reasons why the majority failed are broadly 
similar.  
 
During the period anti-scab legislation was in force in the Cape, progressive farmers and officials 
measured themselves against the Australian colonies. Unfavourable comparisons between the 
livestock and wool industries of the Cape and Australia occurred regularly in the Agricultural 
Journal. Scab eradication in Australia, however, was achieved only after legislation had been in 
place for decades. Considerable resistance from sheep farmers had to be overcome, legislation 
was gradually improved and a more efficient bureaucracy to administer the laws developed. The 
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first anti-scab legislation was passed in New South Wales in 1832 and it was followed by 
successive legislation in Victoria and the other Australian colonies. However, New South Wales, 
South Australia, Queensland and Victoria were only declared scab-free in the 1870s, Tasmania in 




In New South Wales, the premier wool producing colony of Australia, large scale progressive 
wool farmers owned the majority of the sheep flock and had considerable political and economic 
clout. Even so, they faced opposition in parliament. The 1832 Scab Act merely required the 
impounding of infected sheep found on public throughways. Later acts required the slaughter of 
infected animals (dipping infected sheep rather than slaughtering them only featured in legislation 
adopted in 1864 and after), a measure that was considered a gross breach of sheep owners‟ right 
to the enjoyment of their private property. The New South Wales progressives eventually won 
support for strict anti-scab measures by positioning the legislation as merely a formalisation of 
existing gentlemen‟s agreements between pastoralists that entailed the slaughter of infected sheep 
and compensation for such losses through private insurance schemes. Their case was considerable 
helped by the fact that they were willing and able to pay for the administration of successive scab 
acts, including compensation for destroyed animals.
84
       
 
Since Australia is an island for practical purposes and can control the entry of livestock, success 
could be maintained. But despite similar geographic circumstances, scab eradication could not be 
maintained in Britain. Initially, strict anti-scab measures like those in place in Australia were 
rejected as too invasive. Scab was made a reportable disease in 1869 but farmers were only 
obligated to dip infected sheep in 1905 and scab was only eradicated in 1952, a state of affairs 
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 England re-instituted compulsorily annual sheep dipping in 1976, but 
scab could not be eradicated again.
86
 Concern about the risks the highly neurotoxic 
organophosphate insecticides used for sheep dip posed to the environment and the health of both 
sheep and sheep handlers finally motivated the British government to abandon compulsory 
dipping in 1992. Since then scab control has become the responsibility of individual farmers and 
the incidence of the disease has increased rapidly as a result. Surveys of farming practice showed 
that since the government stopped specifying which dip should be used, farmers often dip 
inefficiently. They dip with the wrong dipping compounds for the ectoparasites they want to 




O‟Brien also recognised the use of common pasturage in some areas of Ireland and Scotland and 
the uncontrolled manner in which sheep are moved by sheep dealers from one area to another as 
risks factors increasing scab incidence. Farmers were also not prepared to take the precaution of 
quarantining or dipping newly purchased sheep before mixing them with their flocks. While 
environmental concerns made them reluctant to dip, false economy prevented them from 
achieving success with avermectins. These are a safe but expensive range of endectocides 
developed in the 1970s that are effective for both external and internal parasite infection. In an 
effort to save money, farmers tend to reduce avermectin dosages below the recommended level, 
resulting in merely a temporary repression of the disease.
88
 In 2004 scab prevalence in Britain 
was estimated to be nine per cent.
89
 Similar difficulties have been experienced in Switzerland 
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where farmers, in spite of compulsorily dipping legislation, persist in dipping inefficiently – a 




Meintjies charts a similar disease eradication profile for South Africa: after a slow start, scab 
control improved markedly after the First World War and the disease was considered eradicated 
by the 1930s. However, incidences started to increase and the disease was again seen as 
uncontrolled by the 1970s. Simultaneous dipping was attempted from October 1979 to June 1985 
with mixed results. The government could not make enough person-power available to oversee all 
dipping therefore some farmers dipped inefficiently or not at all. Some livestock speculators also 





Incidentally, the abandonment of compulsory dipping in South Africa in 1985 coincided with the 
withdrawal of organochlorines from the market. These compounds, the most well-known being 
DDT and Lindane, were successfully used from the late 1940s as their effect lasted up to 130 
days, but they were finally withdrawn after traces of organochlorines were found in mutton. The 
organophosphates that started to replace them in the 1970s have been shown to be neurotoxic, 
their residual effect lasts only a few weeks and they are less likely to work effectively if they are   




Meintjies also identified an additional obstacle to eradication that, ironically, is caused by the 
success of previous eradication efforts. Since scab incidence is relatively low, most sheep farmers 
are no longer familiar with scab. They do not notice the disease in its initial stages, do not know 
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how fast it can spread through a flock, do not understand that sheep may be sub-clinically 
infected and have little personal experience of the severe economic losses uncontrolled scab can 
cause. They are therefore resistant to compulsorily dipping campaigns that require them to dip 
sheep they consider to be perfectly healthy and when scab breaks out in their own flock, they tend 
to try stopping the disease initially by only treating the visibly infected sheep instead of treating 




But scab is not the only ectoparasitic disease that has become difficult to control. Years of 
specialist livestock breeding aimed at higher production yields have decreased sheep‟s genetic 
diversity and accordingly lowered their resistance to ectoparasite infections and other diseases. 
Simultaneously, inefficient use of insecticides has led to increased ectoparasite resistance. The 
farming industry therefore either has to use increasingly toxic compounds to eradicate 
ectoparasites or adopt alternative approaches.
94
 Should farmers immerse livestock in chemical 
compounds that people can only safely handle when wearing Hazmat suits? This scenario would 
seem ridiculous if current British environmental regulations did not make it feasible:  regulations 
already require that people handling organophosphate sheep dip should wear protective clothing 
and that the used dip should be dealt with according to local toxic waste disposal regulations.
95
 
The health risks associated with using conventional organophosphate dips contribute to the spread 
of the disease: in a recent study of Welsh farmers‟ perceptions of scab, farmers cited their fear of 
the harmful side effects of sheep dip as a reason for not treating their sheep promptly.
96
        
 
When the disease was under control and economic losses were low, there was little interest 
among scientists in studying scab or economic motivation for developing alternative strategies to 
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 Decreased sheep resistance to scab coupled with increased parasite resistance to dip 
and rising environmental concern have, however, made the traditional pesticide approach 
increasingly untenable. This has led to scab receiving renewed attention, and a radically altered 
scientific conception of its modus operandi. Psoroptes ovis, it was found, do not bite sheep.  
 
Many researchers, apparently quoting Shilston, reported that mites pierce the skin directly. The 
pathogenesis of the disease was therefore explained as being a result of the trauma of the bite and 
attendant secondary infection of the wound.
98
 Electron microscopy examinations have since 
shown that the mouth parts of Psoroptes subspecies are not adapted to piercing the skin or even to 
markedly disturbing the epidermis.
99
 The mite must therefore secrete antigenic material that 
causes the irritation but Psoroptes subspecies do not come equipped with the type of saliva glands 
or skin-piercing mandibles possessed by other arthropods whose bites cause skin irritation.
100
         
 
The availability of an ELISA test (that works by detecting enzymes associated with a particular 
immune system response in the blood) for scab since the 1970s proves scab mites cause an 
antigenic response in their hosts. However this antigenic response was not studied in detail until 
recently. Blood work done on infected sheep also confirmed that the disease does more than 
effect the epidermis. In spite of the fact that the mites cannot pierce the skin and do not suck 
blood, Meintjies found that the first signs of scab in sheep is anemia and a lower hemoglobin 
concentration. Mite infestation also directs antibodies to the skin and away from the 
gastrointestinal and respiratory tracts, leaving sheep open to secondary infection. Meintjies also 
speculates that infected sheep loose weight not because they are too preoccupied with scratching 
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Recent research in autoimmune diseases has further refined the scientific description of the 
internal effects of scab on sheep. Scab also causes sheep to develop anaemia in certain 
antioxidant enzymes (including vitamins A and C) and in minerals such as Zinc and Copper. 
Without these antioxidants to neutralize the free radicals (or oxidants) produced during cellular 
metabolism, the free radicals cause cell membranes to break up, resulting in a build-up of 
metabolic waste products in the affected individual. Significantly, recovery from oxidative stress 
is hastened with an improved diet, explaining why Cape farmers testified that their animals 
recovered spontaneously from scab if they were moved to fresh pasture.
102
   
 
A revised description of the pathogenesis of sheep scab therefore reads as follows: the scab mite 
causes some skin irritation by scraping the surface of the epidermis. The main causes of irritation, 
however, are enzymes and bacterial allergens present in the mites‟ feces, in the husks discarded 
when mites molt, and in their corpses. The enzymes may aid the bacteria to penetrate the skin or 
the bacteria may be able to do so unaided. This causes the sheep‟s immune system to produce an 
anti-body rich serum which is exuded from the skin in the infected parts, causing inflammation 
that ranges in severity.
 
Scab has therefore been re-defined as an allergic reaction. The 
differentiated response of individual sheep and different sheep breeds to scab can now be 
explained in terms of the relative strength and effectiveness of their immune systems. Some sheep 
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Researchers following this branch of research now focus on identifying the bacterial allergens in 
question so that they can develop a vaccine for scab.
104
 In the same vein, they are trying to 
identify the genetic mutation that leads to some sheep being more sensitive to scab than others. 
The FOXP3 gene, which is expressed in certain T cells commonly found in increased 
concentration in the skin of scabby sheep, were cautiously identified as the culprit. Mutations of 
this gene were shown to cause autoimmune diseases and vulnerability to parasitic infection in 
mice and humans and research has showed that different sheep breeds possess different varieties 
of FOXP3. The next stage of research is to link different FOXP3 strains with degrees of 
susceptibility to scab.
105
   
     
This account of scab developed out of blood-work analysis, but the insights gained from 
experiments on mite survival rates suggest that a more nuanced picture may be closer to the truth. 
As discussed, mite survival is connected to temperature and humidity. The prevalence of scab 
infection and increased severity of the disease amongst long wool breeds may therefore not be 
solely due to the immunological responsiveness of the different breeds. Some researchers view 
sheep fleeces as complex micro-climates – the thicker the fleece, the more protection it provides 
against fluctuations in temperature and humidity. Sheep also exude various substances on their 
skin and their fleeces harbour an assortment of fungi and bacteria. Viewing fleece as a complex 
micro-environment enables researches to consider what the effects of predation can be on certain 
micro-organisms and parasites living on sheep. Efforts to develop a strain of fungi that will attack 
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scab mites but not damage wool quality are therefore also being pursued.
106
 More prosaically, the 
sensitivity to climate explains why mite populations tend to decrease after shearing. Sheep that 
have just been sheared and short hair breeds also offer less purchase for bacteria-harbouring mite 
husks and fecal matter and grooming behaviour is more successful in dislodging mites.
107
   
 
How much of this might the veterinary establishment of the Cape Colony had known? Hutcheon, 
like other scientists and members of the progressive establishment, viewed scab as solely a matter 
of effective pest eradication. This approach was not necessarily incorrect: a number of countries 
successfully eradicated scab and others, including South Africa, successfully controlled scab for 
decades through this approach. New discoveries providing a more complete understanding of the 
disease are the product of new research technologies. Hutcheon speculated that the more intense 
irritation caused in some cases of scab may be due to some exudate of the mites. The role of yolk 
(a fatty substance exuded by sheep that gives the fleece some measure of waterproofing) to 
suppress the growth of acari populations was also discussed in some detail.
108
 But the technology 
needed to fully explore these avenues, the electron microscope and the ultracentrifuge, only 




More curious was the failure to prescribe a suitable dipping interval and to propose more accurate 
quarantine periods for kraals, pastures and various sheep handling equipment. Hutcheon also did 
not give credence to North West farmers‟ assertion that Cape fat-tailed sheep were not severely 
affected by scab although recent research conducted with short fleeced breeds suggests that the 
farmers‟ were most likely correct. These aspects of scab eradication did not depend on 
                                                 
106
 Taylor et al, „Effects of Sheep Fleece Washings on the Germination and Growth of Beauveria bassiana‟ 
(2009), p. 79. 
107
 Meintjes, „The Bio-ecology of the Sheep Scab Mite Psoroptes ovis‟, pp. 61, 72. 
108
 Hutcheon, „Scab: its Nature, Cause, Symptoms and Treatment‟, pp. 435-437. 
109
 W. Bechtel, „Scientific Evidence: Creating and Evaluating Experimental Instruments and Research 















technologically sophisticated equipment, but the replication of scab-related experiments that were 
conducted in Europe prior to 1880 and the performance of more stringent kraal infectivity tests. 
This failure suggests that Hutchean‟s science was influenced by the political and economic 

















CHAPTER 3: THE GOSPEL OF SCAB: GOVERNMENT EDUCATIONAL 
PRACTICE  
The methods through which the Cape Colonial government tried to spread acceptance of the 
scientific explanation of scab show that science was used as a rhetorical device in the 
progressive‟s campaign to have the Scab Act promulgated. Farmers opposed to the Act 
reciprocated: disputing veterinary science was seen by the latter as a viable strategy since 
veterinary science did not yet offer very effective treatments. The aetiology and treatment for a 
range of livestock diseases common to the Cape Colony were still under investigation in the late 
nineteenth century. Major challenges were lamsiekte, heartwater and redwater and the causes of 
these diseases were debated in the Agricultural Journal.
1
 Scab therefore seems to have been one 
of the few diseases where both the cause and cure were considered to be beyond dispute. Farmers 
were simply expected to accept that scab was solved while other livestock diseases were not.   
 
In his 1995 review of the historiography of medicine, Warner identified a number of factors that 
contribute to medical practices and theories gaining cultural authority. The medical profession 
cannot simply claim authority - the public has to grant this authority under specific socio-
economic conditions. New practices and explanations for disease are accepted if they conform to 
their audience‟s political, religious and economic interests. It therefore helps the medical and 
scientific profession if their practices and theories conform to existing social values. The public 
accepts scientific theories that offer support for their values – in the process science gains 
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A similar process can be discerned in Gilfoyle‟s work on heartwater, a tick-borne livestock 
disease. This disease mainly affected Eastern Cape farmers. In the absence of an official 
veterinary aetiology for the disease, they developed several theories to explain the disease that 
incorporated germ theory and environmental causes. These farmers also strongly identified the 
disease with the spread of the bont (tortoiseshell) tick, a fairly recent arrival to the area that was 
introduced from Zululand in the 1830s. Charles Lounsbury, in collaboration with the colonial 
veterinary department, discovered that heartwater is spread by the bont tick during research 
conducted in 1900-1902. This discovery was immediately accepted by Eastern Cape farmers: it 
confirmed their theory that the disease was tick-borne and the tick‟s preference for bushes over 
grassland validated the farmers‟ concern about bush encroachment and environmental 
degradation. Environmental theories of the disease that focussed on livestock malnutrition could 
be accommodated in this explanation since the expansion of the ticks‟ habitat (i.e. bush 
encroachment) was closely associated with pasture degradation. The farmers were also offered an 
acceptable solution for the disease – paddocking to prevent livestock from spreading the ticks 
further and dipping to eradicate the tick. Both technical solutions were already commonly 
advocated and practiced in the region.
3
      
 
The North West farmers‟ environmental explanation for scab could be similarly accommodated in 
the official veterinary account of the disease. Hutcheon had explanations for the long incubation 
period of the disease and for why malnourished sheep tended to contract the disease only to 
recover on fresh pasture. These explanations, however, all pointed to the acari as the cause of the 
disease with the implication that the government‟s proposed anti-scab measures like dipping and 
quarantine measures was indispensable. These farmers could not accept what they believed would 
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be the economic costs of combating scab and as consequence they refused to concede authority to 
veterinary surgeons.  
 
Farmers appeared to defend alternative explanations of scab partly out of an attempt to escape 
anti-scab legislation. Accepting that scab was a curable, infectious disease placed farmers under a 
moral obligation to protect their neighbours‟ flocks from re-infection.
4
 Alternative explanations 
for the disease were therefore propagated by the anti-Scab Act movement partly for strategic 
reasons. As discussed below, some farmers who opposed the Act were willing to blatantly 
contradict themselves in their testimonies in order to maintain their original position. Confronted 
with a progressive discourse that presented their skills as ignorance, farmers responded with 
defensive belligerence.  
 
The opponents of the Act thought that the provisions of the Scab Act cast doubt on their 
competency as farmers, while the proponents of the Act saw it as an educational opportunity. It 
was an issue of faith with progressives that if farmers accepted the scientific explanation of the 
disease, they should logically accept the prescribed cure and also perceive the recommended 
veterinary measures to eradicate scab as necessary. This proved to be overly optimistic: of the 
644 individuals who testified before the Scab Commission, 231 (including eight English-
speakers) opposed the Act and an additional 82 were cautiously in favour of legislating but had 
reservations about its workability. Only forty farmers, however, directly linked their opposition to 
the Act to their opposition to the scientific account of the disease. A small number of farmers who 
were not convinced by the scientific account of scab dipped their sheep to good effect and 
supported the Act, while 73 farmers who opposed the Act believed the scientific account of the 
disease, believed in the value of keeping their sheep clean and even dipped their sheep when 
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There were a range of sources of information on scab, its prevention and treatment and the 
disease was often discussed in the agricultural press. The rest of this chapter will focus, however, 
on the three main means through which the government attempted to educate farmers about scab. 
These were ocular demonstrations by means of microscopy; logical argument; and scientific 
experiments. These methods were tried by Hutcheon, by the Scab Commission of 1892 to 1894, 
and by the office of the CIS. All three appealed implicitly and explicitly to the authority of 
science. What follows is a discussion of these methods organised loosely around each of these 
three educational agents. 
 
MICROSCOPY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 
At the time of the sittings of the Scab Commission, Hutcheon had already conducted a series of 
microscopy tours through the sheep farming districts of the Colony. At the request of John X. 
Merriman, MP for Namaqualand, Hutcheon toured the stock farming areas of the Colony from 
1883 to 1886 to study the disease in situ. During his first tour, he mostly travelled the prosperous 
sheep farming districts of the Cape Midlands and Eastern Province. The farmers of this area were 
those that had campaigned for the appointment of a Colonial Veterinary Surgeon and were 
receptive to Hutcheon‟s recommendations to control scab. During 1886 he spent nine months on 
the road visiting districts generally opposed to anti-scab legislation. He would normally set up his 
microscope(s)
6
 in the town hall over weekends, but during circuit court sittings or on market days 
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he set up shop on weekdays to take advantage of the fact that many farmers visited town on these 
occasions. On days when there were few farmers in town, he would ride out to farms, usually 
accompanied by an interested farmer he met over the weekend or by the local Civil 
Commissioner or Resident Magistrate.
7
    
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Hutcheon chose to disassociate himself from the administration of the 
Scab Act. It is clear from his 1886 report that travelling the countryside to show acari to sheep 
farmers bored him. For example, at the hamlet of Modderfontein the farmers arrived one by one 
for his demonstration and he had to repeat the lecture for each new arrival, which, in his own 
words was “…about as monotonous a duty as ever [he] experienced.”
8 Hutcheon‟s published 
report contains long digressions describing his dissection and treatment of sheep and cattle for 
other diseases in between scab demonstrations and, as the tour progressed, these digressions 
became longer. Hutcheon was apparently incapable of letting an interesting disease or carcass 
pass him by. He even stopped to dissect his horse when the animal died shortly after he reached 
Hope Town.
9
 Because administering a scab act “would break a man from professional work”, he 
refused to allow any of his veterinary staff to serve as sheep inspectors. Veterinarians were 
needed to study new diseases, not for the purely practical matter of inspecting and dipping 
sheep.
10
     
 
Educating farmers about scab therefore fell to the office of the Chief Inspector of Sheep (CIS). 
Davison, a failed pastoralist, started working as a sheep inspector in 1887 and was appointed as 
CIS in 1890.
11
 He had no official scientific training, but had fifteen years of experience as a sheep 
farmer in the Eastern Cape. He was the privately educated son of an English naval captain and 
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came to the Cape Colony in 1872, aged sixteen, whereupon he served as an apprentice sheep 
farmer under William Hockley in Bedford for ten years before starting to farm on his own 
account. He served in the settler militia in various frontier campaigns in the late 1870s and early 
1880s and was Sir John Frost‟s aide-de-camp in what became known as the Tembu War of 
1881.
12
 He entered government service under Frost‟s patronage on which he depended for regular 
salary increases.
13
  Together with the practicalities of examining and dipping sheep, he also aped 
Hockley and Frost‟s progressive ethos and prejudice against Dutch-speaking farmers. His low 
opinion of Dutch-speaking farmers was not improved by his work as CIS.  
 
The Scab Act of 1894 was hardly what progressives had hoped for. Davison and his field officers 
met with widespread opposition to the act due to what he considered to be “misrepresentation and 
ignorance of the law”
14
 and Davison came to see the 1894 Act as an interim measure:  
I make bold to say that no one acquainted with the difficulties to be encountered ever 
expected at the brightest moments that the provisions of the Act were sufficiently stringent 
to accomplish the object for which they were framed in the more neglected and backward 
portions of the Colony, even though years might be expended in the effort. I think the 
general feeling among progressive farmers was, that, with all its faults and shortcomings, 
the law as passed in 1894 was rather an educational measure, which it was hoped would so 
conduce the improvement of wool and stock generally, that it would prove but the 
forerunner of better things, and the basis upon which to frame more stringent measures.
15
   
 
Davison was initially confident that the Act was a successful education measure and 
optimistically estimated in 1896 that “another year or two” may be needed for this purpose. This 
optimism dissipated as continued resistance against the Scab Act delayed promulgation of an 
improved act until after Union. Davison, like the Scab Commission, saw the conflict over the 
Scab Act as a struggle between ignorance and superstition on one side and scientific knowledge 
of the disease on the other. With the battle lines thus drawn, the matter of scab eradication was 
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defined in purely technical terms. Farmers must be educated that scab is caused by acari and that 
the disease can be cured completely by killing the acari. For this reason, “ocular demonstration 





From the outset this proved to be a misguided strategy. Farmers were opposed to the Act for a 
range of reasons and whether the disease was caused by acari or not was often not material to 
their opposition. So Barend Jacobus Erasmus of Hope Town stated clearly that he was not in 
favour of the Scab Act even if it could be proved that scab was caused by acari and could be 
eradicated.
17
 Jacob Johannes du Toit of Fraserburg was of the same opinion
18
 as was Martinus 
Jacobus van Wyk of Calvinia: he was convinced that scab was caused by an insect as he was 
shown the insect, but held that the expense of dipping was not worth the while.
19
 This view was 
also voiced in Parliament. J. A. D. des Vages, MP for Beaufort West, blamed merchants who 
flooded the market with Argentine and Australian wool for low wool prices. He reasoned that 
even if scab could be eradicated, wool prices would still be low due to overproduction and 
neglect in shearing.
20
 They were therefore, as Davison would soon realise, not open to being 
persuaded to either the scientific view of scab or the consequent need for a scab act. Davison 
wanted sheep inspectors to pursue “the crusade against scab [in] true missionary spirit”
21
 but he 
was unable to make many converts. He therefore developed the demeanour of a “disappointed 
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, using his annual reports to rant against the “large majority who wished to perpetuate 
the evil by acting as Freetraders in Scab.”
23    
 
Davison embarked on a microscopy tour in 1896. His aim was to make the acquaintance of the 
newly appointed sheep inspectors in order to establish “a certain comradeship” with them and to 
train them, but his microscopy demonstrations were open to the public and used by him as a 
forum to debate scab. He was given the opportunity to assess the difficulties experienced by his 
inspectors in the field, to evaluate their performance and to answer questions on the nature of 




Some farmers, however, still did not believe that scab was caused by acari in 1909. Commenting 




It is clear now, after the event, that when the Act was enforced in 1894, and for years 
afterwards, great efforts should have been made to explain thoroughly to them the 
provisions of the Act and to endeavour to win them over. In my opinion they were not 
ripe for scab legislation, and I am sorry to say there is an enormous amount of 
educational work still needed. There are widespread beliefs that scab is due to 
overheating of the blood, to poverty, to something in the air, and I found it most 
difficult to get the generally accepted views on the subject believed. There are few now 
who do not admit the existence of scab insects, but most have their own theories as to 
the origin of the insect: and their experience is to them a sufficient reply when they are 
asked to substantiate their views. In saying this, I am speaking generally, of course. 
The North-West has reason to boast of farmers who are the equals in intelligence, 




Some farmers were therefore convinced through ocular evidence of the merits of the scientific 
explanation of scab, while others were not. „Seeing‟ was not necessarily „believing‟. Hutcheon 
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and Davison‟s reports imply that looking through a microscope was simply a matter of seeing 
what was there to be seen, but the matter was altogether more complex, as evidenced by the 
lingering disbelief of some farmers in the scientific explanation of scab. As Davison did not 
provide a detailed account of his tour, Hutcheon‟s 1886 tour must serve as example to investigate 
the practice of microscopy further.  
 
In discussing Hutcheon‟s 1886 tour, Gilfoyle gives the impression that he met with such 
opposition in the North West that farmers refused him lodgings, forcing him to camp out 
instead.
26
 This was not the case, however. Hutcheon did sleep outside some nights but this was a 
consequence of his gruelling travel schedule and not due to a lack of hospitality. He tried to visit 
towns around Nachtmaal when farmers would be present and sometimes had to travel through the 
night to reach his next destination in time. As farms were large and he spent time on the journey 
examining local farmers‟ sheep, there was not always a farmhouse at hand when night fell.   
 
Hutcheon in fact often overnighted at the houses of opponents of anti-scab legislation because 
these men welcomed the opportunity to convert him to their views. For example, he was asked to 
stay overnight at a certain Mr. Hugo‟s farm after a microscopy demonstration in Beaufort West to 
show Hugo and his neighbours acari from their own sheep. They spent the whole evening 
discussing scab. As someone insisted that insects could be found on clean sheep, a clean sheep 
was caught and wool was taken off it and teased out, but the dust showed no scab even though 
“the search was kept up with zeal for some considerable time.”
27
 Hutcheon seems to have had the 
most success with these house visits as it gave him the opportunity to engage individually with 
influential farmers. In this way he managed to gain the support of a certain Mr. Vos, a Carnarvon 
farmer. After an enjoyable argument Vos still refused to believe acari caused scab, but Hutcheon 
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managed to convince Vos to let him artificially infect one of Vos‟s pet sheep. After the animal 
contracted scab, Vos was converted.
28
    
 
Since it was not practically possible for Hutcheon to conduct home visits throughout the Karoo, 
he had to rely on public microscopy demonstrations to convey his educational message. These 
demonstrations were used by proponents of a compulsory scab act to champion their cause and 
civil commissioners often arranged public meetings on scab to coincide with his visits. At 
Victoria West, local wool merchants brought farmers to his demonstration. The local DRC 
minister, a Mr. Meader, also brought along farmers the whole Saturday until the late evening and 
made a point of becoming conversant with Hutcheon‟s demonstration so that he could prompt 
Hutcheon to explain the disease fully with carefully phrased questions. At Fraserburg farmers 
who supported anti-scab legislation arrived early to familiarise themselves with Hutcheon‟s 
demonstration so that they could serve as translators for those who arrived later and his 
demonstration became an impromptu public meeting through which proponents and opponents 
tried to lobby for support for their respective positions. The meeting at Hope Town was similarly 




At the conclusion of this tour, Hutcheon reported mixed results. In addition to conversion, he 
identified other responses to his message. Some farmers were apathetic: “[He] was, however, 
made conscious of a certain feeling that existed in the minds of some, from whom [he] expected 
some assistance in the way of bringing [him] in contact with their less intelligent brethren, that 
there was nothing which [he] could tell the farmers about stock or their diseases that they did not 
know much better themselves; hence they took no interest in [his] visit.” At the stock sale in the 
Carnarvon district, “most of [the farmers] had a look at the insects, but very few of them took any 
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intelligent interest in the matter.” He also reported that “a large percentage of farmers would not 
entertain [his] doctrine respecting scab at all, and resolutely shut their eyes against the revelations 
of the microscope.” Some farmers, as already discussed, theorised away the existence of acari by 
arguing that the arachnid did not cause scab. As Hutcheon could not follow each of them home to 
artificially infect their sheep and had to acknowledge that it is impossible to prove a negative (that 
scab is sometimes not caused by acari), he could not do much to convince these farmers.  
 
Some who believed scab was caused by acari also proposed a theory of evolution. They reasoned 
that since the insect came into existence spontaneously sometime in the past, the same could 
happen again shortly after the acari were eradicated. Hutcheon marveled at this:  
From these and similar arguments which I heard daily in my travels, I am persuaded that an 
unconscious belief in the doctrine of the „Evolution of Species‟ is innate to the untrained 
and unbiased human mind, and yet it is strange that the doctrine should have met with such 
opposition when it was first formally introduced, when an erroneous and greatly 





In addition to the farmers who would not look through the microscope farmers “who were equally 
sceptical, but a little more curious, would look through the microscope, see the insects moving 
about amongst the scabs, but solemnly declare that the whole thing was simply a process of 
legerdemain – that what they saw were not scabs, &c., lying on the slide, but something that [he 
had] placed in the microscope.”
 31
 Hutcheon, who apparently believed that microscopy was a 
transparent visual technology, was unable to deal effectively with these farmers as they exhibited 
mistrust in microscopy that he could not fathom. 
 
Whereas Hutcheon was willing to acknowledge that recent discoveries in entomology were not 
yet firmly established in the scientific world and were thus unlikely to have been widely accepted 
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in the Cape countryside, he did not exhibit a similar awareness in the case of microscopy. 
Proponents of microscopy struggled to get their ocular technology accepted as a source of valid 
scientific knowledge in the early and mid-nineteenth century. Naturalists argued that the proper 
way to study animals and plants was in situ to gain insight into the behaviour of creatures 
unattainable when studying a preserved specimen and that the process of decay and the methods 
of preparing samples for study distorted the results of microscopy examinations. Naturalist 
championing fieldwork and scientists advocating the pre-eminent value of laboratory work waged 
a battle for precedence through opposing journals and a variety of public appeals. The laboratory 
scientists won largely due to factors tangential to the debate: the successes and the esteem that the 
laboratories of Pasteur and Koch garnered and the perceived need to professionalise science. 
Busying oneself with specialist equipment inside a building was seen as more „work-like‟ and 
was less vulnerable to intrusion by non-specialists while running around in the countryside was 
seen more akin to recreation and, as anyone could wield a butterfly net or sample jar, more open 




The correct method of preparing a microscopy sample and how to visually represent it was 
debated for decades before a set of conventions was established. It was difficult to know initially 
what was significant in the new visual world revealed by the microscope and how to represent it. 
Samples were distorted by the methods used to prepare them – they were boiled, flattened, 
artificially coloured and impregnated with resin and other fixatives. A convention governing the 
preparation of samples developed slowly in the 1850s and 1860s through comparing different 
methods with each other.
33
 This process implied that scientists had some standard of comparison 
against which to evaluate the processes and this standard could not be „nature‟ as it was the nature 
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of „nature‟ that was being queried. In practice, the standard was often a theory that informed 




This had implication for how microscopy findings were visually presented: writers of microscopy 
textbooks like Lionel Beale, professor of Physiology at King‟s College, London (1853-1869), 
included rigorous instructions on how to interpret and draw the samples studied. Of crucial 
import was the need to teach students what was essential in the image and what was not and this 
could only be determined through prior theorising.
35
 This posed another challenge for 
microscopists as the image produced by this technology could not be considered objective. To 
overcome this, anatomists sometimes hired non-scientists to make the drawings for them in the 
hope that such images would be free from distorting bias. This problem was only solved by the 
development of conventions to govern microscopy photography, which only became possible 
once conventions for the preparation of microscopy slides were developed. Microscopy 
photographs could not by themselves show what was significant in a particular sample but they 
produced standardised representations that could be used to standardise the preparation of slides 
and critique their visual interpretation.
36
 After these debates had been settled, microscopists 
confidently stated that when they were looking through a microscope they were looking not at a 




Michael Lynch (1985) argues that the objects studied in laboratories are highly artificial and that 
their visibility depends on complex instruments and complex preparatory procedures. Such 
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specimens are modified for purposes of investigation and are then standardised through 
established laboratory practice.
38
 But this was often disingenuously denied by 19
th
 century 
microscopists: T.H. Huxley, one of the directors at the teacher training college attached to the 
South Kensington Institute established by Prince Albert in the 1850s, was frustrated by what he 
considered to be his students‟ inability to observe directly from „nature‟. When presented with a 
standardised microscope slide, the students would copy what Huxley drew on the black board and 
not what they saw. The problem was not that they could not draw from observation, but that they 
did not know how to interpret what they were looking at. What was required was not that students 
must see the sample and reproduce it exactly (as Huxley seems to suggest), but that they should 
master the conventions for themselves and produce their own schematic images. Their drawings 





The practice of microscopy therefore developed techniques to discipline practitioners‟ visual 
faculty. In fact, it had to do so before microscopy could become a useful technique. This is not to 
say that there is some form of vision that is not influenced by preconceptions or that can be 
„objective‟. The relationship b tween an object and a seeing subject is not mediated through the 
visual apparatus in a transparently mechanical way with the „self‟ looking at visual data as if 
watching a cinematic projection. Rather, the brain orders and interprets the neurological signals 
from the eyes according to individual mood, expectations, knowledge and desires.
40
 If the brain 
does not order visual information in this manner, human beings would experience everyday 
vision like Huxley‟s students confronting a new microscope slide. As a consequence, vision is a 
form of deductive reasoning and is shaped by the same factors that shape thought.   
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When an enthusiastic microscopist set up his equipment in a room at Oxford university in the 
1850s, most professors were not interested in his demonstrations and the few who did come did 
not believe what they were shown. They did not understand how the lenses of the microscope 
magnified the sample and how the sample was prepared and they did not take the demonstrator‟s 
explanation at face value.
 
One of the dons broke one of the microscope lenses through careless 
handling, another wanted to know if what he was seeing was „true‟: “Evidently individuals who 
had not been inculcated […] in how to procure and interpret microscopical evidence could easily 
contest the veracity of the microscope...”
41
 If Oxford dons could suspect trickery then Cape 
farmers should not be reviled for accusing Hutcheon of conjury. 
 
As discussed above, microscopy was made scientifically acceptable through the establishment of 
conventions of preparation, interpretation and representation. Crucially, this process happened in 
an institutional setting where the teacher‟s authority could be legitimised by nearly invisible 
pedagogical techniques. Students were conducted through a series of increasingly complex 
demonstrations during which their room to question the knowledge imparted by their instructors 
was carefully prescribed. A teaching laboratory or classroom had expected standards of behaviour 
and a student was allowed only a limited range of responses. The teacher‟s authority might be 
reinforced by a textbook written by a renowned scientist or she might have been a renowned 
scientist herself. Usually students were not allowed to prepare their own samples or to even adjust 
the microscope lenses for themselves until they were well into the course. And students came 
with prior educational experience that predisposed them to act in the required manner and accept 
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Few (if any) Cape farmers were exposed to the education process necessary to take microscopy at 
face value. When Hutcheon showed acari to Cape farmers, he was therefore met with a response 
similar to the enthusiastic Oxford microscopist. Hutcheon was used to seeing acari under a 
microscope and was familiar with the conventional microscopy representations of acari in 
circulation in the late nineteenth century. Publications of scab in this period seem to have used the 
same stock images or else illustrators followed the same conventions. The illustrations of acari in 
Wallace‟s Farming Industries of the Cape Colony were obtained from the 1890 U.S.A. Report 
Animal Parasites in Sheep and Hutcheon‟s posthumous article on scab in the Agricultural 
Journal was illustrated by similar reproductions from an undated US Bulletin. These beautifully 
detailed illustrations show representational conventions: the mites have fingerprint-like grooves 
on their backs, they are drawn symmetrically with legs and tentacles evenly distributed and their 
reproductive organs are symbolized with circular shapes (see illustration 3.1). In Hutcheon‟s 
description of how he prepared microscopy samples, he mentions that a „good‟ sample could be 
fixed and preserved with some gum, indicating that he had preconceived notions of what, for 
instance, a typical mature male Psoroptes ovis should look like.
43
 Despite Hutcheon‟s own 
training in representative conventions, he apparently believed that visual information is 
immediately accessible in an unproblematic way. Wallace shared this belief: He included ten 
illustrations of cross sections of hair and wool in Farming Industries of Cape Colony (illustration 
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Source: Reproduced from US Bulletin, No. 21, in Hutcheon, „Scab: its Nature, Cause, Symptoms and 








1. Adult Female, dorsal view.  









Source: Reproduced from U.S.A. 
Report Animal Parasites in Sheep 
(1890), in Wallace, Farming 
























At the magnification acari were illustrated they were recognisable as lice-like arachnids. 
However, the resolution of Hutcheon‟s travelling microscope was unlikely to have matched the 
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(unknown) magnification of the illustrations. Hutcheon did not show the farmers isolated 
specimens in fixative but live acari. He prepared samples by combing out a piece of wool taken 
from a scabby sheep over a piece of paper and then transferring some of the dust onto a 
microscope slide. What farmers saw therefore was bit of matter creeping about stationery bits of 
matter, either dirt or scab crust, and the creeping oval-shaped bits were then pointed out to them 
as acari. Hutcheon was particularly concerned that the acari he showed farmers should move 
about on the slide and this necessitated him finding fresh samples every few days. The extreme 
cold of the Karoo winter also drove the mites into hibernation. On a sunny day, he could    show 
farmers the acari with the naked eye because they were livelier or he could prod them into 
motion with a porcupine quill, but in winter this was difficult. When he visited Victoria West 
during a cold spell he set up his equipment in the hotel parlour where the proprietor graciously 
kept the fire burning for the duration of his demonstration.
46
   
 
Hutcheon rarely took scab samples from sheep in the presence of farmers. Sheep left their 
sleeping places or kraals in the early morning and returned (or were herded back) in the evening 
so Hutcheon either had to ride out to get samples very early or very late in the day. The poor light 
at these times made it difficult to identify scabby sheep. Indeed on one occasion he had to find a 
scabby sheep and take samples after dark by feel. Farmers therefore rarely saw Hutcheon 
gathering samples and preparing them. When they arrived in the meeting hall, the scab was 
already on the glass. It is therefore not surprising that they disputed that the acari Hutcheon 
showed them had been taken from sheep. They even disputed that the acari were real live acari 
and accused Hutcheon of showing them a picture that moves through some form of sleight of 
hand involving the glass slide of the microscope. Hutcheon was insulted but unable to win them 
over: “If I argued further, that I have no interest in deceiving them, as I charged nothing for the 
exhibition, they were equally ready with their reply that the Government wanted to impose a Scab 
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Act upon them, and sent me round to try to make them believe that the scab were due to an insect, 
so that the Government might be able to carry it through.”
47
 And they were correct: Hutcheon had 
come to town specifically to advocate for a scab act and so did have a vested interest in putting on 
a good show.    
 
The farmers who disputed the practice of microscopy were not conditioned through formal 
education to automatically accept the claims of scientists. They were even less disposed to accept 
statements made by government agents at face value. Similarly, they were not amenable to be 
converted by „ocular demonstration‟. Farmers were convinced by the microscopy demonstrations 
if they were predisposed to be convinced. In addition, the demonstrator had no way of knowing if 
a farmer had been convinced or not. J.R. Leech, a medical doctor, wrote to the Agricultural 
Journal to recount his experience of showing the acari to farmers. According to him, many 
farmers humoured him by seeming to accept his demonstration at face value but despite their 
response of “Ja Mijnheer” they were in reality as unconvinced by the argument that acari caused 
scab as they had been before.
48
 So Tilman Carel Nieuwoudt, a Kenhardt sheep farmer, testified 
that a microscopy demonstration of acari left him unmoved: “The veterinary surgeon once 
showed it to me, but I cannot say whether it is the cause of scab. I believe very little in it.”
49
 
Davison‟s initial optimism regarding the success of his educational tour shows that he too was 
humoured in this fashion. It also explains why such demonstrations had to be conducted on a 
continuous basis.  
 
THE SCAB COMMISSION 
The Scab Commission travelled throughout Cape sheep farming districts during 1892-1894, 
gathering evidence to use in the design of the Scab Act of 1894. Sir John Frost, sheep farmer and 
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MP for Queenstown, chaired the Commission until his appointment as Minister of Agriculture in 
September 1893. Another sheep farmer, Dr. Thomas William Smartt, MP for Wodehouse and a 
future Colonial Secretary and Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works, succeeded Frost 
as chairman. Yet another sheep farmer, William Henry Hockley, the MP for Somerset East, also 
served on the Commission. Hockley and Frost had been involved with the 1874 and 1886 Scab 
Acts, giving evidence to the commissions in their capacity as sheep farmers with Frost serving as 
member of the 1874 commission and Hockley as a member in 1884. All three were well known 
progressives who dedicated their parliamentary careers to lobby for government support for 
agricultural improvement.  
 
To create an impression of evenhandedness some Dutch-speakers served on the Commission. 
However, these men did not significantly alter the findings of the Commission. Pieter Jacobus du 
Toit, MP for Richmond, chairman of the Afrikaner Bond and self-confessed opponent of a 
general scab act, served as a member but was swayed by the evidence he heard. He became 
convinced that scab, although worsened by malnutrition, was caused by the acari mite. He also 
came to realise that farmers who complained that dipping did not work were dipping incorrectly. 
As scab was a contagious disease, he came to believe that measures against it were justified.
50
 Du 
Toit‟s defection was characteristic of the position of the Bond‟s leaders regarding the disease and 
the political crisis this caused for the Afrikaner Bond is fully discussed by Tamarkin and 
Davenport. With the Afrikaner Bond members of the Commission convinced of the validity of 
the scientific explanation for scab, the commissioners‟ report therefore came out unanimously in 
favour of a general scab act although not all the commissioners favoured the same anti-scab 
measures.    
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The commissioners noted that there was widespread opposition to a scab act but considered the 
opposition as mainly motivated by ignorance. They remained optimistic about the possibility that 
once farmers were instructed in the benefits of the Act they would change their minds as in the 
case of Du Toit:  
In fact almost all over the country some witnesses were found who stated that they believed 
treatment was useless; that drought, poverty, blood-impurities, and bad shepherding were 
the causes of the disease; so long as these occurred it was useless doing anything; and that 
any legislation on the subject simply meant ruination to the farmers. So convinced did some 
witnesses wish us to be on these matters that they went so far as to state that, not only did 
their experience prove to them the fallacy of the theory of scab being contagious, but that 
they had no objection, if their flocks happened to be clean, to have scabby sheep or goats 
freely mix with theirs, as they knew positively scab never was contagious. From the 
evidence of a large number of witnesses living outside the area at present under the scab 
act, it appears that a vast want of knowledge as to the conditions imposed by and the 
general workings of the present act exist among a large section of the farming community, 
and that all sorts of vague and unfounded rumours are freely circulated as to the hardships 
wrought by it, the severity of its penalties, and its inoperativeness in coping with the spread 
of scab disease, with the results of prejudicing many against the present act or against 
legislation of any sort on the subject; however, we are pleased to be able to state that 
numbers who held these erroneous views, when acquainted with the real provisions of the 
act, at once altered their opinions, and seemed to be in favour of the scab legislation.
51     
 
The Commission sat in fifty-seven towns scattered throughout the major sheep farming districts 
of the colony, including the North West districts of Calvinia, Fraserburg, Carnarvon and 
Kenhardt. It also met in the cities of Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East London to hear 
testimonies from merchants. The aim of a sitting was not merely to gather opinions from the 
farming community, but to provide an educating medium through public debate. Every sitting 
was therefore widely publicised beforehand and hence well attended and the commissioners took 
care to give a wide range of ordinary people and delegates from political groups, farmers‟ 
associations and merchant firms the chance to speak. They believed that their sittings reflected 
the full range of opinions in the farming community. In fact, the commissioners cautiously 
congratulated themselves on their evenhanded method of gathering opinions. They also ensured 
that the proceedings were fully translated into Dutch if necessary.
52
 It is not clear, however, from 
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the Commission proceedings whether the translators were able to overcome successfully the 
language barrier between the probably monolingual English progressives like Frost, Hockley and 
Smartt and the members of the Dutch-speaking farming community who testified.     
 
To ensure that the correct information about scab was transmitted in any particular sitting, the 
commissioners asked witnesses leading questions intended to explicitly state the scientific claims 
regarding the causes and treatment of scab. The published report states that “…it was often found 
necessary minutely to cross-examine witnesses for the purpose of elucidating statements, often 
made without sufficient forethought, or to bear out preconceived notions which had no foundation 
in fact, and which on more minute examination were constantly found to be untenable.”
53
 The 
commissioners apparently thought once an opinion was exposed as groundless, the public would 
change their minds, evidencing a positivist faith in the power of logic.  
 
In practice these situations were more ambiguous. The commissioners erred in assuming their 
badgering of witnesses into admitting that some method of preventing careless neighbours from 
infecting clean flocks with scab was an indication that their witnesses had accepted the need for 
some form of anti-scab regulation. It is not clear that the commissioners‟ pointed questions 
convinced farmers and delegates who opposed the Scab Act that their position was untenable. For 
example Dr Smartt was unsuccessful in making Johannes Bernardus Nigrini, an Afrikaner Bond 
delegate from Fraserburg, admit that an act compelling people to dip their sheep was the 
necessary conclusion from his acknowledgment that in his personal experience dipping cured 
scab and was beneficial.
54
 A Bond delegate from Hope Town, Barend Jacobus Erasmus, was 
similarly resolute. He also acknowledged that he was concerned about the possibility that farmers 
travelling with scabby sheep could infect his clean flocks and that some farmers in the district 
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were negligent, but for him the logical conclusion to be drawn from these concerns was not that 
farmers must be compelled to clean their sheep by government edict, even if scab could be 
eradicated.
55
 Neither of these men offered any alternative solution to the problem.  
 
Opponents of the Scab Act saw the benefit of having clean sheep but opposed compulsory 
legislation on the basis that it would entail unwanted government interference in their farming 
practice and that it was unworkable in their areas due to environmental factors. The views of 
Nicolaas Badenhorst senior, also from Hope Town, provided another example. He went as far as 
to acknowledge that his negligent neighbours should be compelled by some means to dip their 




Julius Albertus Voskule, a storekeeper and livestock speculator from Kenhardt, testified that he 
believed that there must be prohibitions against the removal of scab infected goats and that such 
animals should be quarantined and dipped no matter the condition of the pasture they were on. He 
also said that infected goats should be slaughtered if they could not be cured.  When asked if he 
was aware of the fact that his testimony was the strongest in favour of a scab act that the 
commission had heard so far, he retorted: “What I have said I mean, whatever the consequences 
are, and this is what I say, that the district cannot do with a scab act, and the meaning you draw 
from my words has nothing to do with me.”
57
 Even Voskule‟s own words and opinions regarding 
scab could not convince him of the benefits of anti-scab legislation. Or in the words of William 
Diederick Snyman, a progressive Barkley East wool farmer, “there are a good many people who 
are opposed to a scab act by nature. It is not that they cannot be convinced, but that they are 
simply opposed to it and nothing can convince them.”
58
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From the proceedings of the Scab Commission it appears that the majority of farmers who were 
convinced that scab was a contagious disease caused by an arachnid that could be cured through 
dipping were in favour of anti-scab regulations, but they still had deep reservations that the 
proposed legislation would be suitable. Christoffel Jacobus Liebenberg, Hope Town farmer and 
Afrikaner Bond delegate, was in favour of a scab act but he was concerned about the cost of 
dipping and if the legislation would make enough provision for farmers‟ need to trek.
59
 Johannes 
Fredrikus van Wyk, a farmer and Bond delegate from Fraserburg, wanted the government to 
protect farmers who dipped from those who did not, but he had deep reservations about the 
proposed scab legislation. According to him “most people” were against it but “…on all sides the 
scab act or something in favour of it, is pressed on them…” He was specifically delegated to 
argue for permissive and lenient anti-scab legislation, reasoning that if farmers did not engage 
with government to develop an act they thought workable, government might impose a stricter act 
prejudicial to their interests. He was also concerned about the cost of dipping and that provision 
should be made for the necessity of trekking.
60
   
    
Both Liebenberg and Van Wyk considered ignorance about the correct dipping procedure and the 
nature of scab as the main contributory factors to the resistance of farmers in their districts to the 
Scab Act. Liebenberg even suggested that the sheep inspectors should have magnifying glasses to 
show the acari to doubting farmers. This assurance from more progressive farmers, because it 
fitted in so neatly with the commissioners‟ positivist faith in the value of reasoned argument and 
practical illustration to persuade doubters to their cause, must have confirmed their belief that 
opposition to the Act was not as deeply entrenched as it would prove to be once their findings 
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were presented to parliament in the form of a bill. They were therefore surprised by the stridency 




The commissioners specifically sought to expose poor dipping practices, firstly to show that 
farmers‟ low opinion of the efficacy of dipping was mistaken because they had been dipping 
incorrectly, secondly to publicly explain the correct dipping method, and lastly to demonstrate 
that farmers were not doing all they could to clean their sheep. Farmers who indicated they were 
in favour of the act and dipped regularly were interrogated to establish their impression of their 
neighbour‟s dipping practices. The testimony of Johannes Fredrikus van Wyk of Fraserburg 
provides a good example of the leading questions that were asked in the process: “When a farmer 
tells you that he has carefully dipped his sheep, but that there are times when dipping will not 
help, does it not prove to you that he does not understand the system of dipping?” He answered in 
the affirmative.
62
 Would Van Wyk have expressed himself this way if he was simply asked for his 
opinion on his neighbour‟s dipping practices? This question emboldened him into stating outright 
that many farmers were ignorant of the scab disease and that this prejudiced them against dipping. 
He even expressed himself in favour of supervised dipping.
63
 As mentioned above, he came to the 
sitting to argue for a lenient scab act but as his testimony progressed he increasingly made 
statements that closely accorded with the official position on scab and the shape that a colony-
wide scab act should take.  
 
An example of the opposite kind is the testimony of Barend Jacobus Erasmus, already mentioned 
above. Through a series of questions Erasmus was first informed that the correct interval between 
dipping was ten to fourteen days and that dipping a second time after eighteen days as he did was 
ineffectual and contrary to the instruction of the Department of Agriculture, experience in 
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Australia and the opinion of the CVS. His statement that “some say 14 to 18 days” and that he 
therefore thought an eighteen day interval was still acceptable was not interrogated by the 
commissioners to ascertain its source, making Erasmus appear to be a man prepared to follow 
hearsay above professional advice.
64
   
 
When the Commission repeated this line of questioning at Fraserburg during the testimony of 
Jacob Johannes du Toit, they stated that the dipping interval recommended by the manufacturers 
of patent dips on their packaging was fourteen to eighteen days and that the CVS‟s prescription 
was similar.
65
 The object of their interrogation was to stress the need to dip twice within the 
recommended time period as the dip did not kill the acari eggs. The contradiction between the 
dipping interval they prescribed at Hope Town and that prescribed at Fraserburg illustrates the 
official confusion that existed regarding dipping in the Cape. Erasmus may therefore have simply 
been following the instructions on the packaging of the patent dip he used. 
 
It must be noted that Erasmus was a well-established farmer with fourteen years experience and 
his fellows respected him enough to appoint him as their spokesman. He also mentioned reading 
about scab in the Government Gazette and the Cape Argus and presented his own experience in 
the sitting, outlining the difficulty of dipping sheep while they were infected with internal 
parasites like wire worm, in a persuasive manner. Being made to look like he dipped inefficiently 
would have offended a man like Erasmus and other witnesses might have been similarly 
humiliated. 
 
In spite of priding themselves in being even handed, the Commission refused to hear some 
testimonies that did not accord with the line of argument it was pursuing. While at Fraserburg, the 
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commissioners were looking for a farmer with some experience of dipping in order to clearly 
state the official position on dipping as they did with Erasmus‟s testimony at Hope Town. When 
Hendrik Louwrens van der Westhuizen, a stock owner with forty-five years experience, wanted to 
testify he was asked if he dipped his sheep. When he responded negatively, Smartt asked: 
“Consequently, never having dipped, you are not in a position to give an opinion upon dipping?” 
He had to respond that he had no opinion to offer and was consequently passed over in favour of 




The commissioners routine practice of pressing witnesses into revealing themselves as inefficient 
farmers who did not know how to dip had the opposite effect to the one intended: instead of 
farmers realising that their own opinions were untenable and being persuaded by the logic of the 
official scientific position, the commissioners and specifically Smartt acquired a reputation for 
arrogance during these sittings. Herman Johan Dempers, MP for Caledon, accused Smartt of not 





The testimony of Martin Hollander provides an example of such hostile cross-examining. 
Hollander, a successful farmer living near Williston, initially supported anti-scab legislation, but 
he experienced too many obstacles in keeping his own sheep clean during dry seasons. Smartt 
therefore saw him as an ideal target and insistently pressed him to divulge the exact concentration 
of a tobacco dip he used eight years previously. When Hollander could not remember the exact 
dipping procedure he followed, Smartt called his farming expertise in question. Hollander 
concluded his testimony with a sarcastic retort in defence of his „memory lapse‟: he did not 
memorise the procedure since he “…did not know then that [he] should be asked to-day to 
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explain how it was done."
68
 The commissioners‟ hostile interrogation techniques confirmed 
farmers‟ opinion that progressives in government were prejudiced against them and wanted to 
interfere in their farming practice.   
 
In cases where the commissioners decided to pursue a witness‟s statement that scab was 
spontaneous, the witness was often exposed as holding opinions that had not been well reasoned. 
For example Stephan Vermeulen from Hope Town believed that scab was spontaneous and 
caused the acari. When asked whether he knew of “other diseases which will create a living 
organism” he answered: “I know so little about insects that I cannot say.” To the commissioners‟ 
minds, he thereby declared his ignorance in public. It is not clear if Vermeulen understood his 
testimony this way. Nor was he the only witness whose „ignorance‟ was exposed in this manner. 
Voskule testified (perhaps with sarcastic belligerence?) that he believed that it was possible for 
acari to be created by winter dew. When asked if he knew of other animals which were created in 
this manner he answered in the negative and when pressed on whether scab is therefore an 




But the Commission was selective in which farmers to badger in this way. Nigrini believed scab 
was caused by drought and malnutrition and that the acari was caused by the disease. When 
asked if he knew of any other insect that came from nothing he cited the well-known 
phenomenon of an apparently spontaneous flea infestation in a recently cleaned room or in a 
house that stood empty. The commissioners chose not to pursue the matter by explaining that 
fleas also hatched from eggs, realising perhaps that Nigrini was not amenable to argument.
70
 As a 
resolute opponent of the Scab Act, he challenged Hutcheon‟s scientific explanation of scab as 
discussed below. Indeed, he emerged as one of the leaders of the anti-Scab Act movement, 
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travelling personally to Cape Town to plead for the Scab Act to be scrapped, writing often and at 




Sometimes the strategy of discrediting the claims of opponents backfired as it exposed 
contradictions and uncertainties in the scientific view of scab. Jacob Coenraad de Klerk, a Bond 
delegate for Victoria West who opposed the Scab Act, testified that his sheep were scabby but 
that Hutcheon could not find the acari on them. As he apparently did not want to dispute the 
validity of the Veterinary Surgeon finding acari on other farmers‟ sheep in his district, he had 
resolved the contradiction by theorising that there were two types of scab – the one spontaneous, 
internal and to be cured through dosing sheep with various concoctions, and the other contagious, 
caused by the acari and curable by dipping. As will be discussed below, Hutcheon‟s answer as to 
why De Klerk was able to cure individual scabby sheep through internal remedies did not satisfy 
him. He thought his sheep were liable to contract both types of scab so he occasionally fed them a 
mixture of sulfur and lime and also dipped them in sulfur and tobacco. He was therefore not in 
favour of a scab act, even though he believed scab could be cured, since he believed that the 




Believing scab was caused by an arachnid thus did not automatically convert opponents to the 
progressives‟ opinion. Arguing from common sense, Jan Stapelberg, a farmer from Barkley East, 
was sceptical that scab was contagious and that he needed to refuse his neighbours‟ scabby sheep 
entry onto his land: “I have seen the acarus and I don‟t think it would drop to such an extent as to 
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Opponents‟ lack of scientific credibility was perhaps also not established as clearly as the 
commission wished. Erasmus, for example, was not convinced that acari mites caused scab. He 
argued that scab was an internal disease that was driven to the surface in the presence of bad 
water and malnutrition. Dosing the sheep with internal remedies like sulfur and lime drove the 
disease outwards but weakened the sheep temporarily and this weakness attracted the acari. The 
presence of acari on the sheep was therefore a result of the cure and a sign that the sheep was 
recovering.
74
 This account was coherent and had significant explanatory power. It accounted for 
why scab broke out when the sheep lost condition without having to resort to the belief that scab 
was somehow spontaneous as many farmers insisted. By stating that scab was „internal‟ Erasmus 
further accounted for its varying and often long incubation period. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
scientific account of the disease also acknowledged that acari could be present on sheep for 
months without the animal showing any symptoms, but in practice this fact was obscured by the 
official focus on kraals and sleeping places as a source of re-infection.  
 
Lastly, Erasmus‟s theory also explained the occasional success of dipping: when the disease was 
„driven out‟ to manifest as scab lesions, it could be cured externally through dipping. However, as 
the internal causes of the disease could linger, the disease might return later, especially when the 
sheep were made vulnerable through drought.  
 
It was a coherent explanation and it closely resembled the prevailing medical theory of disease 
during the mid-nineteenth century. An illness like measles was seen as an internal malady that 
was „driven out‟ in the form of the characteristic rash through the application of purgatives and 
other remedies to the patient, the internal malady being a predisposed weakness brought to the 
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fore through malnutrition and unhygienic, crowded living conditions.
75
 A similar theory, but with 
added emphasis on the inborn nature of the disease, explained the progress of pulmonary 
tuberculosis. The argument that a tendency to develop tuberculosis was inborn explained why 
individuals of the same family were often stricken with the disease and served as convenient 
justification for arguments that the poor, who suffered disproportionately from the disease, were 
of inferior breeding stock.
76
   
 
It should also be noted that such explanations of disease were not immediately discarded with the 
advent of germ theory as older doctors were not trained in the new field of bacteriology and did 
not automatically accept it. The successes of germ theory in the field of aetiology also did not 
greatly improve the general practitioner‟s medicine cabinet. Infectious diseases were still 
incurable at the beginning of the twentieth century, serious conditions were not treatable and 
doctors‟ remedies consisted mostly of purgatives, narcotics and assorted poisons.
77
 Erasmus‟s 
views on scab therefore did not make him ignorant and unscientific. He would likely have 
acquired the building blocks of his theory through his literacy. Popular medical texts, in addition 
to expounding on the causes and cures of particular diseases, were known to disparage the 
authority of the medical profession. By arguing that doctors were using academic theorising to 
bamboozle the public into paying often outrageous fees for inefficient and even harmful 
treatments, they taught their readers a lack of respect for the medical profession and its scientific 
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 If Erasmus had access to such discourse it would have further disinclined him to 
accept the scientific authority of the CVS and the commissioners.  
 
Philosophers of science recommend that valid scientific theories be differentiated from 
pseudoscience by employing the principle of „Occam‟s razor‟ (derived from William of Occam‟s 
famous dictum that “varieties of entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity”).
79
 This 
principle states that the most elegant or simplest theory is normally closest to the truth since 
proper scientific method is believed to move theories towards simplicity. Any theory containing 
apparent ad hoc additions, also known as „secondary elaboration‟, is therefore immediately 
suspect.
80
 It is not clear, however, if it is always easy to identify secondary elaboration in 
practice. Whether a theory possesses „elegance‟ and „simplicity‟ is a value judgment – a 





Indeed, some opponents of the Scab Act of 1894 believed that the explanation for scab offered by 
veterinary science contained ad hoc elaborations intended to hide its weaknesses. So farmers 
believed that the fact that some lambs were born with dry patches of skin was an indication that 
scab was an inherited disease. Hutcheon explained to them that the dry patches indicated the 
lambs‟ skin did not produce enough yolk. Such lambs would contract scab easier and the first 
scab lesions would naturally appear on these dry patches. Samples of scab mites could also 
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readily be taken from these lesions. But the farmers believed that the scab mites were attracted by 
the scab lesions, not that they caused them and Hutcheon could not convince them otherwise.
82
      
 
There was some evidence for the farmers‟ hypothesis that scab was an internal, blood-borne 
disease. Sheep spontaneously recovered from the disease if the pasture improved, simply shearing 
sheep without dressing the scab lesions cured scab and so did feeding them sulfur. According to 
Hutcheon, all of these were easy to explain. Any condition that induced debility in an animal 
made it more susceptible to disease: bad pasture weakened them; cold rain washed out the yolk 
from the wool; heat caused by thick, long fleeces melted out the yolk from the surface of the skin, 
leaving it unprotected; lambs being weaned lost condition and became vulnerable to diseases; and 
young animals were generally more susceptible to parasitic infections. The progression of the 
disease was naturally arrested if sheep were taken to better pasture or experienced conditions that 
improved their ability to extrude and maintain yoke.  
 
Ordinary farmers‟ experience, however, confirmed their theories of scab, not the explanation 
offered by veterinary science. This did not surprise Hutcheon:  
Taking these facts into consideration, it is not to be wondered at that these farmers, having 
merely observation and experience to guide them, should arrive at the conclusion that it is 
the unhealthy condition of the animal which generates and breeds these insects. It is only a 
few years since the foremost scientific men of the day were fighting out the battle of 
spontaneous generation; and it is somewhat doubtful whether the matter is finally settled 
even yet. At any rate, it must take some years before the conquests gained by science in that 
battle can be known and appreciated in the household of the average stock farmer of this 
Colony.
83
   
 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EXPERIMENTS 
As mentioned above, Hutcheon was more successful if he could take the acari from sheep in 
front of farmers and they could witness his method of preparing a microscopy slide. However, the 
educational tours also had the unforeseen consequence of giving opponents of anti-scab 
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legislation a glancing familiarity with the form of scientific experiments. Educated in 
Hutcheon‟s method of isolating acari samples and armed with magnifying glasses, farmers now 
had the confidence to design and execute their own experiments. The results of these experiments 
was aired at sittings of the Scab Commission of 1892 to 1894 and published in the press. 
 
Jacob Coenraad de Klerk of Victoria West believed that scab was partly inherited. He suggested 
that enclosing a group of infected ewes in good pasture would prove this, because the lambs 
would be born scabby. De Klerk had met Hutcheon and Hutcheon suffered the embarrassment of 
not being able to locate acari on his infected sheep. Hutcheon was also not able to explain to him 





As discussed above, Stapelberg could not believe that the tiny scab mites he was shown were 
mobile and hardy enough to spread between flocks. Nigrini tested this common sense intuition. 
He claimed that Hutcheon helped him to design an experiment that convinced him that scab, if it 
is really caused by acari, had low infectability. Armed with his magnifying glass, he removed 
some acari from an infected sheep and, firstly, placed one acarus in the sun. The acarus died in 
an hour. Secondly, he placed some acari on the ground near where he tied a clean sheep. The 
sheep did not develop scab and after he sheared the sheep he examined the wool carefully with 
his magnifying glass but could not discover a single arachnid. He concluded that acari are not 
very mobile and could not survive long when separated from their host and so refused to believe 
that his sheep would be likely to catch scab by merely sharing pasture with an infected flock. The 
only necessary restriction was that clean sheep should not mix with an infected flock.
85
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Nigrini also challenged Hutcheon in 1886 through the popular press to prove to him that acari 
caused scab and made fifty of his sheep available for infection. When Hutcheon arrived at 
Fraserburg, they renegotiated the terms of the challenge so that the CVS would have the 
opportunity to try to infect ten of Nigrini‟s sheep. Hutcheon carefully gathered and prepared 
specimens but Nigrini did not allow him to pick the sheep to infect as they had agreed. Instead 
Nigrini presented him with ten healthy ewes that had recently lambed (ewes that recently lambed 
were apparently less likely to contract scab). When challenged, Nigrini substituted the ewes with 
nine of his fattest sheep.  
 
The experiment was also interrupted by Mr. Le Roux, MP for Victoria West and an opponent of 
anti-scab legislation, who insisted that Hutcheon only be allowed to put two or three acari on 
each sheep on grounds that they could eat through the skin of the sheep. Hutcheon protested to 
Nigrini that this violated their agreement but he eventually agreed to proceed. He was therefore 
forced to separate individual acari from his sample material under field conditions and could not 
ensure that he placed a breeding pair on each sheep. Some of the insects might have been maimed 
during this process. He was also required to place them on opposite ends of the sheep so they had 
little chance of finding each other and breeding. None of Nigrini‟s sheep contracted scab, 
resulting in a complete failure for Hutcheon and giving Nigrini and Le Roux ammunition against 
the Scab Act. Hutcheon subsequently blamed himself for letting them lure him into performing 
the experiment on such unfavourable terms.
86
 It is unlikely that Le Roux really feared that the 
acari could eat through skin. His intervention was calculated to ensure that the experiment failed 
and discredited Hutcheon. Hutcheon, perhaps angered by Le Roux‟s intervention, allowed his 
opponents to fatally proscribe the methodology to be used. 
 
                                                 
86















Proponents of the Scab Act also engaged in experiments and came to contrary conclusions. So a 
certain Mr. W. N. Allen proposed that farmers place some acari on a piece of wood under their 
roof thatching to see how long acari survived if separated from their host. However, he 
complained that the magnifying glasses issued to sheep inspectors were not sufficiently strong to 
show if acari were alive or not. He nonetheless concluded that acari did not survive very long 
when separated from the sheep and so kraals could not remain infective. In his own experience, 
sheep did not contract scab if placed in kraals previously used by scab-infected sheep.
87
 Sheep 
Inspector F. P. Fincham strongly disagreed with Allen‟s position. He claimed that he regularly 
traced scab outbreaks in his area to infected kraals and sleeping places. He also claimed to have 





Hutcheon intervened: the magnifying glasses issued to sheep inspectors were not strong enough 
to differentiate between different acari species. The acari Fincham found were a type commonly 
found in sheep dung and not Psoroptes ovis. Personally, Hutcheon had only managed to keep 
acari alive for fourteen days, but he acknowledged that his methodology was faulty. He was 
traveling at the time and to maintain the acari at an even temperature he kept the acari wrapped 
in a flannel cloth either in his pocket or under his pillow at night. As discussed in Chapter 2, he 
believed kraals stayed infective for long periods not due to the survival of acari mites but because 




Allan pointed out that arguing kraals harboured scab made eradication seem too difficult since it 
added the unnecessary cost of cleaning or destroying infected kraals and sleeping places to the 
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 His fears proved justified as at least one sheep farmer based his opposition 
against the Scab Act on the re-infectability of kraals. Johannes Daniel Naude of Barkley East 
testified before the Scab Commission that “no-one knows how deep under the ground the louse is, 
waiting for a suitable time for reappearance, no-one knows how long the louse lives.” As a 




The conflict that arose over the design of scab experiments and the interpretation of experimental 
data reflects a well-trodden debate in the history and philosophy of science. Experiments do not 
produce factual evidence in a transparent or mechanical manner nor do experiments determine 
theory. Experiments are indeterminate because scientists do not evaluate experimental data in a 
purely objective manner: the philosopher Catherine Z. Elgin (2002) sees the process by which 
evidence is interpreted as a process of exemplification with the results of the experiment ordered 
according to the orientation of the investigator.
92
 Mary Midgely theorises that scientists are 
motivated to design a particular experiment and interpret the findings of the experiment from 
inside a particular world picture. The world picture determines how the evidence is ranked.
93
 As 
discussed above, Bechtel concluded that theories are not judged solely by empirical evidence; 
instead empirical evidence is often evaluated through the lens of theory.94  
 
Experiments conducted by Hutcheon or Davison therefore confirmed to them that acari caused 
scab, dipping worked and scab was infectious because they were predisposed to interpret the 
experimental data in this way. The presence of the mites on scabby sheep did not, however, prove 
that acari caused scab to the satisfaction of sceptics. They developed alternative theories that 
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reversed the causal relationship between the disease and acari. Similarly, farmers‟ beliefs, arising 
from bitter personal experience, that dipping caused scab infection to worsen could not easily be 
countered by the scientific explanation offered by Hutcheon and Davison. As explained in 
Chapter 2, ineffective dipping resulted in some of the acari surviving while dipping only once 
allowed the eggs to hatch and the new generation of acari to re-establish the infestation. During 
the dipping process the protective yolk was also stripped from the fleece and so dipping impacted 
negatively on the sheep‟s ability to resist the disease. The acari were therefore able to multiply 
relatively unhindered and the disease was exacerbated instead of cured. For this view to be 
accepted, however, farmers needed to be convinced that the yolk in wool hindered acari from 




Ideally in the world of science the apparent vicious circularity (or a regression into relativism) 
caused by the indeterminacy of experimental results is avoided because science purports to study 
real phenomena. The particular properties of a phenomenon – be it a microbe, virus or insect – 
limit the number of plausible interpretations available to scientists.
96
 In addition, the practical 
results achieved by a theory do much to confirm its worth as practical successes are seen by 
scientists as an indicator of the degree of fidelity between the theory and the phenomena it 
describes.
97
 But in the world of science consensus on the interpretation of experiments occurs 
through social processes – interchange of ideas within the researchers‟ own laboratory or 
institute, exchanges with colleagues, peer reviews and scrutiny from professional rivals. This 
social mediation of experimental results is not a flawless system and in practice is sometimes 
accompanied by considerable acrimony. But it seems to proceed smoothly in general and social 
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scientists seem more excited by how the results of this social process are later presented as the 




In the case of scab in the Cape Colony the practical efficacy of government advice on how to cure 
scab was disputed by farmers or followed only selectively. Political grievances and economic 
concerns of the farming community were aggravated by the South African War. The office of the 
CIS also experienced continual difficulties finding sheep inspectors who possessed the necessary 
skills and respectability. This meant that the social climate in which scab was contested was not 
conducive to the necessary compromises for the establishment of a consensus. The official 
discourse surrounding scab positioned veterinary science as a tool for instruction, but as has been 
suggested, the practice of veterinary science did not lend itself to such usage.  
 
Farmers opposing the Scab Act constantly disputed the official scientific position regarding scab 
and demanded that experiments be conducted to prove, for instance, that hand-dressing sheep 
could not cure them completely before they would proceed with dipping.
 99
 Such demonstrations 
had to be repeated again and again. As the opponents of the Act became familiar with scientific 
procedure, they also challenged scientific methodology, as Hutcheon‟s disastrous experience with 
Le Roux and Nigrini attests.  
 
Davison contributed to the range of methodologically flawed „experiments‟ that were being 
conducted by both the proponents and opponents of the Act through the dubious kraal 
experiments described in Chapter 2. He saw the removal of infected sheep in near-apocalyptic 
terms: “The insidious nature of the evil remains, however, in the fact that any place on which the 
flock has slept or grazed, as well as any watering place at which the stock has drunk, also 
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constitute a means for disseminating the disease, and this accounts for many outbreaks of scab 
which occur long after the infected stock have passed.”
100
  Trekking with infected sheep therefore 
created “a chain of infected centers”, with cases of the disease radiating from each. Infected sheep 
were perceived to render the land infectious for an unspecified length of time. Note that this claim 
was not based on any scientific explanation regarding the viability of acari and their eggs as the 
“centers of infection” mentioned were not only kraals but also ordinary pasture. Davison 
therefore did not doubt the results of his kraal experiments as the results were exactly what he 
expected. 
 
Before the office of the Chief Inspector of Sheep was removed to Cape Town in 1894, Davison 
shared office space with Hutcheon and Prof. Abraham Fisher, the first Secretary of Agriculture, 
when they visited Bedford.
101
 When Hutcheon was appointed as Under Secretary of Agriculture 
in 1902 he became Davison‟s direct superior.
102
 There was therefore ample time for Hutcheon to 
advise Davison on proper scientific method. However, as discussed above, Hutcheon‟s own 
experimental design was often lax as neither he nor Davison saw themselves as engaging in 
scientific experiments. Rather, they were demonstrating what they believed to be well-established 
facts. 
 
After the unfortunate rumour was spread that ked (or sheep louse) was the natural predator of 
acari, some farmers believed they could infect their sheep with ked as an alternative to dipping. 
Once again they needed „ocular demonstration‟ that ked did not cure scab. The ked experiment 
was conducted in Cradock and started on the 29
th
 of December 1909. Davison, H. J. van Heerden, 
progressive MP for Cradock, Mr. Martyn, the Resident Magistrate, Assistant Chief Sheep 
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Inspector S. Keightly and Mr. Heathcote, a reporter for the Midland News were present, amongst 
others. The experiment, conducted on the farm of the Sheep Inspector De Wet, consisted of, 
firstly, placing scab on a ked infected sheep and, secondly, placing ked on a scab infected sheep 
and leaving these two animals in a pen until the next stock fair thirty-seven days later. As 




The accompanying article in the Midlands News opened by clearly stating the terms of the 
conflict as Davison and progressives saw it: “Superstition died hard, and men often reconstruct 
and cling to exploded theories with a tenacity which is pathetic.” Revealingly the author insisted 
that the occasion was not an experiment. Rather it was “…a demonstration for the conversion of 
these who still believe in the efficacy of the sheep louse to keep down scab, and must not be 
regarded at all as an experiment, for science years ago demonstrated the facts surrounding the 




The Cape government‟s educational campaign sought to convince farmers of the necessity for a 
scab act by appealing to the authority of science. Since veterinary science had not yet gained 
cultural authority with the intended audience of this campaign, doubts about the official 
explanation for scab was not laid to rest. As a consequence of these campaigns, the farming 
community began questioning the veterinary surgeon‟s authority through independent 
experimentation. In the process veterinary science became a public performance accompanied by 
certain elements of showmanship and political rhetoric. While the Cape countryside was filled 
with eager experimenters, neither progressives nor their opponents were willing to question their 
beliefs on scab.  
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CHAPTER 4: ECONOMIC REALITIES OF SHEEP FARMING IN THE LATE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY CAPE COLONY 
This chapter examines the economics of scab eradication. Its arguments are necessarily 
speculative as the Cape government did not record the kinds of data that would allow historians to 
discuss the topic with certainty. General export figures and livestock censuses give an impression 
of how different pastoral activities were spatially distributed, but do not help answer the types of 
questions raised by the anti-Scab Act movement. Data for the production and prices of pastoral 
products such as hides, mohair, wool, mutton and fat by district is only available for census years 
and, as discussed in the introduction, such data is of dubious accuracy. Even if these data sets 
were complete and trustworthy, they would not indicate how much profit was absorbed by wool 
merchants, sundry middlemen and transportation costs. Economic evidence is therefore largely 
derived from the Agricultural Journal, debates in the House of Assembly, the few contemporary 
published sources on sheep farming and farmers‟ opinion as encapsulated in various government 
reports. 
 
Many farmers complained that eradicating scab would not increase their profits. I will argue that 
they were essentially correct. The Cape Colony wool market was organised in such a manner that 
farmers were not sufficiently rewarded for improving the quality of their clip.  Producers of low 
quality wool might also farm under adverse environmental conditions. These could only be 
overcome through investment in expensive agricultural technologies. Improving the colonial 
wool clip therefore entailed much more than simply eradicating scab. In addition, farmers who 
only raised mutton sheep and Boer goats would derive no monetary benefit at all from scab 
eradication. They were included in the Act because their livestock were scab reservoirs but anti-
















THE COST OF SCAB 
There is no reliable monetary figure for what scab cost the Cape Colony or individual farmers. 
The wool buyer Thomas Plewman, testifying before the 1884 Scab Commission, estimated the 
loss to the Cape Colony from scab as one million pounds sterling per annum. Since this figure 
was a “general computation from [his] knowledge of the wool trade”, it is of very dubious 
accuracy.
1
 A number of estimates were floated in parliament in the run-up to the promulgation of 
the Scab Act of 1886. A Scab Bill was proposed by E. Y. Brabant, MP for East London, in 1884. 
He initially calculated the cost of scab at £250 000 per annum, the average annual decrease in 
wool exports suffered by the colony for an unspecified period.
2
 In 1885 Brabant resubmitted his 
Scab Bill but now alleged that scab cost the colony £800 000 per annum, an amount he did not 
substantiate.
3
 In 1884, W. J. Warren, Stutterheim farmer and MP for King Williamstown, 
calculated the cost of scab at £730 536 10s 8d per annum, a sum derived by calculating the recent 
decrease in the quantity of the wool exports and adding estimates of decreased wool quality and 
increased sheep mortality. Since the last livestock census in the Cape Colony was conducted in 
1865, Warren admitted his figures were speculative.
4
 William Hockley, MP for Somerset East, 
believed wool lost one pence per pound weight due to scab and therefore calculated the loss 




It was pointed out by opponents that the decreased wool exports for the first few years of the 
1880s were caused by the severe drought affecting the colony and that lower wool prices were the 
result of Britain‟s economic depression.
6
 Due to the confusion regarding the cost of scab, 
Hutcheon was requested by parliament to calculate the annual losses suffered by the colony due 
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to the disease. He estimated it at £500 000 per annum in 1886, a figure subsequently treated as 
authoritative by progressives.
7
 The figure most commonly bandied about during the mid-1890s 
was also a loss of £500 000 per annum, a figure concocted by the president of the East London 
Chamber of Commerce. The losses per pound for sheepskin and wool were calculated as 1.5d and 




The farmers who opposed anti-scab legislation, however, were not convinced that they were 
losing significant income due to scab. Thus the Barkley East farmer, Johannes Daniel Naude, 
estimated his annual losses due to scab as less than £1 and stated that he was not aware that the 
hides of scabby sheep fetched lower prices. He mainly lost sheep due to cold rains, not scab.
9
 
Parliamentary opinion was also sceptical. Louis Abrahamson, Somerset East MP, thought that the 
estimates of scab losses were gross overestimations. If losses due to scab accounted for 20% (in 
his opinion a liberal figure) of the export prices of wool, skins and mohair it would have 
amounted to only £80 000, £30 000 and £83 000 respectively – totaling £193 000. In addition, 
only a small proportion of the sheep and goats that died annually died due to scab. In his opinion, 
overstocking was the greatest danger that faced the Cape sheep farming industry, not scab. J. 
Sivewright, MP for Griqualand East, was similarly doubtful. He was concerned about the extra 
tax burden that the Act would place on farmers. According to his calculations the Scab Act would 
profit the pastoral sector only £150 000 per annum so the merchants and ordinary tax payers 
would “have to pay the piper.”
10
  G. M. Palmer, another Somerset East MP, disputed 
Abrahamson‟s conclusions: he asserted that losses for sheep skins at Somerset East ranged from 
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There is insufficient data to determine what dipping cost farmers. According to Brabant, it was 
between £50 and £100 per year.
12
 John Laing, sheep farmer and Fort Beaufort MP, spent £50 to 
£60 on dipping per annum. For him dipping was an economic burden that would be removed by a 
successful scab act.
13
 W.J. Warren testified before the 1884 Scab Commission that dipping sheep 
with lime and sulphur cost 1d per sheep while dipping with manufactured dips cost 2d. Tobacco 
cost 3d per pound and was considered too expensive to use, although he considered it the best dip 
available.
14
 The wool buyer Thomas Plewman estimated that wool lost between 2.5d and 1.5d in 
value per fleece. Spending 2 - 4d per sheep on chemicals (sheep had to be dipped twice), 
excluding the extra labour cost, may therefore not have repaid farmers who produced only 
average quality clip.
15
 Warren revised his dipping estimate downwards in 1885, reporting in 
parliament that after an initial £12 investment in a dipping tank between 4500 and 4600 sheep 
could be dipped twice for £4 10s including labour cost.
 16
 This estimate brought dipping cost 




Only one estimate for the cost of hand dipping is available. Jacobus Swartz, a Bredasdorp Merino 
farmer, testified before the 1892-1894 Scab Commission that he spend between £12 and  £15 to 
hand dress his flock of 1800 sheep and that he managed to clean his flock to his satisfaction. This 
worked out at between 1.6d to 2d per sheep.
18
 Progressives claimed hand dressing was false 
economy since it allowed scab to spread, but if other farmers had the same experience as Swartz, 
hand dressing only visibly infected sheep could easily have appeared to be more cost effective to 
farmers than dipping their whole flock.  
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For many farmers dipping would not have been profitable. In addition, some could simply not 
afford to dip. Plewman advised the government to provide free dip as dipping was simply too 
expensive for poorer farmers.
19
 Hutcheon also reported that many farmers could not afford to dip 
their sheep
20
 and it was a complaint of the opponents of the Scab Act in parliament. However, the 
proponents of the Scab Act did not manage to get parliamentarians with no direct interest in sheep 
farming and already leery of the Act‟s projected cost to agree to support a motion that 




As a compromise the Scab Act provided that dipping stuff, imported tax free since 1888, would 
be transported on the railways free of charge and that the government dipping depots would sell 
dip at cost price.
22
 However, pressure from parliamentarians representing merchant interests 
ensured that the Agricultural Department could not only stock the dips it judged to be most 
effective. The dip depots therefore had to carry more than twenty scheduled dips in equal 
quantities. As farmers were brand loyal, great quantities of dip remained unsold annually and the 
government had to reimburse shop keepers for their outlay on the unwanted stock.
23
 The dip 
depot system was therefore an early victim of the 1908 government retrenchments.
24
    
 
The decision to not supply farmers with free dip was reviewed in 1899 with similar results. 
Davison testified before the 1898 Select Committee on the Scab Act that although a case could be 
made that the deserving poor amongst the farming population should be supplied with free dip, 
this would not help eradicate scab as many farmers who could afford to dip practised false 
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economy and dipped ineffectively as a result. The government also simply did not have sufficient 




THE WOOL SECTOR 
The wool marketing system 
Dr. T.W. Smartt, MP for Wodehouse, regarded the £500 000 purportedly lost annually to scab as 
money taken directly from farmers‟ pockets.
26
  Opponents of the Scab Act, however, not only 
disputed the scale of scab losses but doubted the benefits of scab legislation to ordinary farmers. 
Contemporary commentators on the Cape wool farming sector claimed that merchants did not 
price wool according to its quality.
27
 Indeed, this concern loomed large in the parliamentary 
debate over the 1884 Scab Bill when its opponents argued that eradicating scab would not 
improve Cape wool.
28
 Fluctuations in price might also negate the quality dividend accruing to 
careful farmers. 
 
There is evidence that Cape wool producers tried to improve the quality of their product in this 
period. The estimated wool yield for the Cape Colony in 1888 was 6.36 pounds per fleece and 
this figure rose steadily over the next two decades, to 10.85 pounds per fleece by 1909.
29
 Figure 
4.1 shows that the wool production of the Cape Colony increased in the late 1880s and again after 
the end of South African War in 1902.  However, an analysis of the census data for small 
ruminants between 1888 and 1911 shows that wool sheep declined as a proportion of the total 
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small stock flock of the colony between 1903 and 1907. The numbers of wool sheep therefore 
increased slowly in proportion to the increase in wool exports after the end of the South African 




From debates in the Agricultural Journal it is also clear that farmers experimented with new 
sheep breeds to increase their wool yield. They imported Vermont Merinos, a breed known for 
having a thick greasy fleece, to improve the Cape Merino‟s yolk as the latter tended to produce 
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quantity exported wool price
Source: Statistical Register (1909), p. xix. The average wool price per pound weight was calculated by dividing 
annual wool earnings (converted from pound sterling to pence) with annual wool exports. Farmers generally 
used this measure as it helped them to calculate their average earnings per sheep sheared and it was also used in 
















None of these efforts markedly improved the price Cape wool farmers received for their clip. As 
the international wool price had been in decline due to overproduction for decades by the mid-
1890s (see figure 4.1), improved wool quality did not lead to improved prices. The price of wool 
peaked in 1875 and thereafter lost 60% of its peak value. An opponent of the Scab Act, J.A.D. 
des Vages, MP for Beaufort West, blamed merchants who flooded the market with Argentine and 
Australian wool for the low wool prices. The wool price, he bluntly declared, would remain low 





The cost of scab could not be reduced to a simple equation, subtracting the price of scabby from 
the price of scab free produce and sheep. The presence of scab in Cape flocks gave Cape wool, 
mohair and skins a bad reputation. Plewman testified that Cape wool fetched lower prices on the 
London market not because of the quality of individual bales, but because the colony was 
associated with scab.
32
 Dr. Smartt stated that if scab was found in one bale of wool the whole lot 
was “tabooed”.
33
 Such arguments were repeated in 1911. General Louis Botha, the first Prime 
Minister and Minister of Agriculture for the Union of South Africa, complained that South 
African wool still obtained lower prices than Australian wool due to the persistence of scab in the 
Union. He claimed that if an Australian sheep were to be imported into the Union and kept in 
isolation, its wool would still be sold at a lower price in London solely because it was sheared in 
the Union.
34
 Scab legislation was therefore also a marketing effort aimed at improving the image 
of Cape wool as a brand. Global wool overproduction and increased competition for market share 
forced wool producers to improve their product. The achievement of the Australian colonies in 
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eradicating scab set the standard and gave London wool buyers an excuse to discount the Cape 
product.  
 
Although the incidence of scab decreased in the Cape Colony from an estimated 15% infected in 
1894 to below 4% in 1911, the wool price did not recover.
 
 Figure 4.2 shows the scab incidence 
for districts grouped according to their primary holdings of small ruminants, an indication of 
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Figure 4.2: Scab incidence according to economic activity  
 
 
Source: compiled from the annual reports of the CIS, 1897-1911. The Scab Acts did not resume operation 
after the war in an even manner. The figures for 1902 are therefore incomplete. The high scab incidence in 








































It shows that districts that specialised in wool production, districts that still specialised in wool 
but with increased mutton production and areas that primarily raised goats had a much lower scab 
incidence than those that specialised in mutton and those that abandoned wool production after 
the South African War in favour of mutton. 
 
Districts specialising in mutton production were primarily located in the North West. Figure 4.3 
shows the scab incidence of the North West districts against prosecutions under the Scab Act. 
Although prosecutions increased and conviction rate averaged above 80%, the scab act apparently 
provided enough loopholes for farmers that they did not feel compelled to clean their sheep.  
 
 
      Figure 4.3: Scab incidence and prosecutions under the Scab Act of 1894  
 
Sources: compiled from the Statistical Register (1895-1909) and the annual reports of the CIS (1910-1911). 
The North West here includes all the districts in which farmers undersigned a 1908 petition protesting 
against the Scab Act, namely Ceres, Sutherland, Namaqualand, Kenhardt, Fraserburg, Carnarvon, 
Clanwilliam, Van Rhynsdorp, Calvinia, Beaufort West and Prieska. 1904 prosecution data is for half year 
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The districts specialising in Boer goats, mohair and wool therefore achieved a scab incidence of 
less than 2% while areas specialising in mutton and those that had switched to mutton production 
had scab incidences of 12.11% and 10.84% respectively. Since wool sheep still made up almost 
half of the total small ruminant holdings of the colony, the average scab incidence of the colony 
was therefore considerably lower than that for the mutton-producing regions. These figures 
indicate that Cape wool, although not scab free, was much closer to that goal than before the Act 
was passed. But scab was not the only problem of the Cape Colony wool sector. 
 
Thomas Plewman‟s liberal estimate of the losses suffered by the colony was based on what he 
considered exports would have been had the Cape “progressed in the ordinary way.” According 
to him, the Cape should have had double the annual wool exports it achieved by 1884 and scab 
was arbitrarily designated as causing half of this loss. Scab was therefore only one of a range of 
factors contributing to what was perceived by progressives as underdevelopment in the wool 
sector.
36
 This broader „underdevelopment‟ helped make scab eradication unprofitable. 
 
The ‘getting up’ of wool  
Accompanying the discourse about the damage scab did to the reputation of Cape wool was a 
parallel discourse on the need to increase the professionalism of Cape wool farmers. The 
production of woollens became increasingly specialized in the late nineteenth century as the 
machines used became more efficient in dealing with wool of different textures and lengths to 
create a greater range of woollen cloth. However, the greater specialization in manufacture 
required a concomitant specialization in preparing top (washed, scoured and combed wool 
bundled in even lengths). This required that more attention be paid to classing wool according to 
texture, length and strength. As Australian wool producers were capable of taking up the extra 
labour cost involved in classing wool, and since Australia produced more than half of the wool of 
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the world, its farmers again set the standard. The cost involved in classifying wool was therefore 




A certain Mr. J.T. Drake described the sheep handling and shearing process at a large Australian 
sheep station to the Cradock Farmer‟s Association in 1892: professional sheep classers visited 
farms annually to sort the young ewes and rams into different flocks according to quality. As 
most of the large farming operations were paddocked, different classes of sheep were kept and 
sheared separately. Sheep were branded to denote ownership and their ears were notched to 
indicate their age. Shearing took place in a purpose-built building that could accommodate 2000 
sheep at a time and forty or more shearers were normally employed during the shearing season. 
For every ten shearers a “picker-up” and a sweeper were employed, the first to take the fleece to a 
table to be skirted and the second to keep the shearing area clean. At the skirting table, fleece 
“skirters” pinched off the belly wool lining the edge of the fleece. As the belly wool was often 
longer than the back and side wool and also often tangled or dirty, the skirtings were classed and 
baled separately. From the skirters, the fleece was taken to a professional wool classer. There the 
clip was sorted into about twelve different qualities and distinctions were made between wool that 




The operation Drake described represented a substantial capital investment that only big wool 
producers could have afforded. However, in the early 1900s, the practice of contract shearing 
developed in Australia as large operations took to renting out their facilities. Small-scale 
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The elaborate grading process followed in Australia reduced the need for London wool buyers to 
sort Australian wool. In London wool was bought not by manufacturers but washers who 
supplied „top‟ to manufacturers. Because the washers needed to spend more time and labour on 
cleaning and classing Cape wool they paid less for it at London auctions. However, they sold 
Cape and Australian „top‟ for similar prices.
40
 Some commentators even argued that because the 
Cape specialised in fine Merino wool which was used to manufacture more expensive cloth, Cape 
wool should by right be more valuable than the Australian article. Few Cape farmers, however, 
derived any benefit from this due to their poor standard of wool presentation.
41
    
 
The average Cape clip was normally not skirted or classed and the majority of farmers apparently 
made little effort to clean dust or dung from the wool before baling.
42
 „Baling‟ usually consisted 
of the fleece being rolled and tied with a cheap hemp rope and then trampled into the bale by a 
hefty worker – often wearing dirty shoes. In the process the fleece broke up and hemp fibers were 
mixed in with the wool staple. Because the hemp was not always visible, it could not be removed 
before the wool was woven and dyed. The hemp, however, did not take dye like wool staple, 
causing discolourations in the finished cloth.
 
Even worse, some farmers added dirt and extraneous 




It was seldom practical for Cape wool producers to class their product. As discussed above, this 
required the services of a specialist wool classer. Few farmers had the necessary expertise to class 
their own wool and the service of an expert was expensive and, in isolated country districts, 
unobtainable. Also, farming units in Australia were much bigger on average than farms in the 
Cape. Cape farmers simply did not shear enough sheep to make a steam wool press, steam 
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shearing machines, the services of a wool classer and an elaborate grading system cost effective. 
London wool buyers wanted to buy wool of uniform quality in as large quantities as possible. A 
Cape farmer with, for instance, 5000 sheep could deliver far fewer bales of a particular class of 
wool than an Australian farmer with 30 000 sheep. London wool buyers therefore accused Cape 
farmers of producing “samples”.
44
 Small lots of wool on the London market were removed from 





The remedy for the quality problem was a less elaborate grading system and the breeding of more 
uniform sheep. In a large flock an elaborate wool classing system could accommodate differences 
in fleece density and length. Sheep breeding standards in Australia could therefore afford to be 
more relaxed but farmers with small flocks did not have this luxury.
46
 Unfortunately, Cape 
farmers were not always particular about the standard of their breeding stock. Classing sheep for 
stud potential, just like wool classing, required a degree of expert knowledge that many farmers 
simply did not possess. Farmers interested in improving their flocks needed capital (a resource 
often in short supply) and advice from reputable experts. However, there was no governing body 
to set breed standards, certify sheep classers or offer authoritative advice on how best to employ 





Merchant capital and the average pricing system   
The wool price was determined by global wool supply and demand. Wool prices therefore tended 
to fluxuate and wool farmers generally had little incentive to produce standard quality wool from 
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one season to the next. The Cape, however, had to struggle with more than just the consequences 
of commodification. The wool marketing system was blamed for many of the wool farmers‟ other 
tribulations. Cape wool merchants apparently bought wool at average prices without regard to 
quality and then sold it as mixed lots in London. Indeed, this was the main economic objection to 
anti-scab legislation during the final parliamentary debate on the Scab Act of 1886: as long as 
merchants continued to buy wool at average prices, farmers did not have an incentive to increase 




Saul Dubow (1982) described this system in detail: coastal merchant firms extended credit to 
storekeepers who purchased wool from farmers at average prices. The average wool price was set 
according to forecasts of merchant profits at the London auctions, of which there were five a year. 
Any sudden dip in the wool price meant that merchants suffered losses they recouped by offering 
low prices the following season. Dubow argued that the price of low quality wool declined more 
during slumps than that of good quality wool. The system of averages therefore resulted in 
farmers producing good wool subsidising the farmers producing low quality wool. In the 
prevailing wool marketing system, progressive farmers producing quality wool would only reap 




Dubow argued that this state of affairs was characteristic of the level of development towards 
capitalist economic relations achieved by the Cape Colony. According to Dubow‟s analysis, the 
Cape, like other colonies, was reorganized in the nineteenth century to produce raw material for 
British industry. However, British industrial capital did not own the means of production at the 
Cape (i.e. the wool farms). Industrial capital could therefore not intervene directly in wool 
farmers‟ production methods. The geographical distance between the Cape and the British market 
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created the space for merchant capital to act as intermediaries between producers at the Cape and 




Dubow argued that there was an oversupply of merchant capital (i.e. there were too many 
merchants operating at the Cape relative to the size of the colonial wool sector). This oversupply 
meant that merchants competed with each other for farmers‟ custom. This competition pushed up 
the purchase price of wool, leading to merchants even buying six months clip from farmers at 
good prices.
51
 At only six months growth, wool fibres were too short to spin into high quality 
thread. In addition, countryside merchants, being general dealers and produce buyers, often did 
not have expert knowledge of the wool market and wool production. Farmers therefore had no 
feedback on the quality or real price of their wool. These storekeepers also lacked knowledge of 
the wool market so they could not advise farmers on improved techniques of wool presentation. 





As discussed, due to the general decline of the wool price at the turn of the century farmers either 
had to produce more wool to maintain their income level or had to disinvest from wool 
production and find other sources of income. As will be discussed below, farmers in several 
districts disinvested in wool production between the 1891 and 1911 agricultural censuses to focus 
on meat production while farmers in other districts increased their wool production. The average 
pricing system meant that farmers who took pains to improve their wool yield were not 
remunerated in accordance to the improved quality of their produce. Debates in the Agricultural 
Journal showed that progressive wool producers were aware of this and actively sought to 
challenge the average pricing system by marketing their wool directly. Farmers were encouraged 
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to sell their wool directly to produce export firms headquartered on the coast rather than to 
countryside merchants or other middlemen, but these produce exporters claimed that their profit 
margin could not extend to sorting and classing wool at the Cape. They therefore did not 
challenge the average pricing system.
53
 There was therefore a move among wealthier wool 
farmers to develop their own wool brand and sell it independently on the London markets.
54
 Few 
Cape wool farmers, however, had the necessary knowledge or capital to market their own wool.  
  
The low prices offered for Cape wool were therefore due to the low quality of Cape wool but this 
in turn was caused by the way the wool market in the Cape Colony was structured. Farmers 
imbued with the progressive ethos placed considerable importance on improving wool quality, 
but were frustrated in the lack of returns realized by their labour in this regard. The progressive 
ethos imbued greater wool quality with intrinsic value, but this intrinsic value was difficult to 
translate into cash value. The system of average pricing did not encourage investment in 
improved wool quality. These structural conditions were not altered with the advent of 
industrialisation. The influx of mining capital into South Africa would not have altered the 
existing terms of trade between the Cape countryside and the London wool markets. The Cape 
still supplied raw wool to the London market and manufactured goods were still imported from 
industrial centers in Europe and America to be sold at inflated prices by country storekeepers. In 
short, the wool market was still controlled by merchant capital even after the mining revolution.  
 
The averaging of wool prices therefore persisted into the 20
th
 century. The Report of the Chief 
Inspector of Sheep of the Union of South Africa for 1913/14 provided the following comparative 
price data: South African wool in the grease priced from 5d to 11.5d per pound when exported 
and received prices in London ranging from 6d to 13d. In contrast, Australian wool in the grease 
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received between 7.5d and 17.5d per pound in London. South African wool was therefore still 
discounted, in spite of the reduced incidence of scab, increased concern with improving the 
quality of wool sheep and increased efforts to class and prepare wool according to international 
standards. The solution suggested was the by now familiar advice that farmers should invest in 
increasing the quality of their wool and that they should not sell their wool to local country 




Countryside merchants and tanners complained that a similar offhand purchase system for skins 
harmed their trade. Unfortunately, the Cape Government did not record the prices skins fetched 
so testimonies from traders and tanners before the 1892-1894 Scab Commission must suffice. 
Skins from scabby sheep and goats had thick calluses and weak places that made the skins tan 
unevenly. Such skin would either crack or the finished leather had lumps in it that rendered it 
unsuitable for anything except blacksmiths‟ aprons, glue or low quality shoes.
 56
 Such skins could 




Countryside merchants, however, were contracted to buy skins offhand from large butcheries at 
set prices.
58
 Since there was no export market for damaged skins (shipping cost exceeded profit), 
large merchant houses based in Port Elizabeth refused to buy skins offhand. They paid for skins 
according to quality, causing losses to countryside merchants.
59
 In Port Elizabeth in 1892, scabby 
sheep, goat and Angora skins sold at 3.5d, 3d and 2d each while clean skins earned 4.75d, 7,75d 
and 4.75d respectively. Boer goat and Angora skins therefore lost more than fifty per cent of their 
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value due to scab while sheep skins lost approximately twenty-six per cent.
60
 In order to recoup 
their losses, countryside produce buyers preferred to sell skins offhand to local tanners, causing 
them to suffer losses in turn.
61
 Since these merchants were in competition with each other, they 
were in a weak bargaining position with the butcheries. They therefore saw anti-scab legislation 
as the only means for increasing their profits.    
 
Sheep farming and the environment 
While the average price system forced farmers producing good quality wool to subsidise farmers 
producing low quality wool, Cape wool farmers would not have been able to recoup the capital 
investment needed to improve wool quality. The reason for this was that so many wool sheep 
were pastured on land that was environmentally marginal for small stock. Notwithstanding the 
challenges involved in marketing wool, wool production remained the most profitable sheep 
farming industry at the Cape. A mutton sheep provided income only once (i.e. when it was sold 
for slaughter) while a Merino could provide wool for several seasons before being sold for 
slaughter. But Merinos, although very hardy, needed more pasture than Cape fat-tailed sheep. 
Farmers tempted by the Merino‟s greater profitability therefore stocked them on unsuitable 
pasture. 
 
There were a number of environmental challenges that limited wool production and discouraged 
investment. Farmers kraaled their sheep at night due to the threat posed by predators, especially 
jackal, and farms often had few permanent water sources. Sheep were therefore driven great 
distances each day between pasture, kraal and water. This exhausted the sheep and trampled the 
pasture. Due to the practice of kraaling, Cape wool was reputedly dirty. As the Karoo provide 
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very few opportunities for arable farming, sheep dung was left to accumulate in the kraals and 




During times of strain due to disease or malnutrition, wool grows out slightly weaker. The 
weaknesses or striations in individual wool fibers (a measure of the wool‟s strength), together 
with the texture of the wool and the thickness and length of the fleece determine its quality. 
Assessors used to test for strength by pulling at a fleece by hand to gain a „feel‟ for when 
individual fibers started to break. Microscopy, however, introduced a new „objective‟ method for 
assessing strength. Wool was now graded for strength according to how many striations were 
found in a fleece per square inch, leading to stricter guidelines for judging wool quality. By the 
mid-1890s, this new wool grading system was adopted at international agricultural fairs and Cape 




As kraaling was not conducive to producing high quality wool, progressives advocated the 
paddocking system. Paddocking entailed dividing a farm into separate camps, each with its own 
water source. Pasture could be managed through rotation and as sheep were no longer kraaled, 
trampling would no longer occur. Enclosure, however, required a substantial capital investment. 
Fencing material had to be imported and the size of farming units in dryer districts meant that the 
cost of fencing was prohibitive, even sometimes exceeding the value of the land to be fenced.
64
 
Farmers without perennial water on their farms were required to invest in periodic well digging or 
had to bore for water (an expensive undertaking) and then had to install imported windmill pumps 
in each camp or paddock. Beinart argued that the persistence of predators, particularly jackal, 
initially inhibited paddocking as ordinary fences did not keep the jackal out. Even if farmers 
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could afford paddocking, few could afford to absorb the losses they expected to suffer due to 
predation if they fenced their land instead of kraaling their sheep. Wire mesh was introduced as 




Although new technologies to overcome the environmental constraints of lack of a perennial 
water supply and predators became available, certain areas of the country were simply too dry for 
quality wool production. Even if farmers could ensure sufficient drinking water for their sheep, 
lack of sufficient pasture during the dry season meant that sheep would suffer a degree of 
malnutrition each year that would reduce wool quality. Robert Wallace therefore advised that 
farmers in the western Karoo should focus instead on producing mutton. The lack of pasture 
could be ameliorated in some districts in the Cape Midlands by planting crops like lucerne and 
turnips or ensilaging natural grasslands, but the North West was too dry to grow such crops and 




As the mutton price was generally low before the rinderpest (1896-97), many farmers turned to 
wool production in unsuitable areas. Poorer wool producers and those in environmentally 
marginal districts would not have been able to improve the quality of their wool. The average 
wool price system would therefore have benefited them. They would not have profited if this 
system was challenged by the eradication of scab since their wool would still be of low quality 
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 both suggest that many farmers opposing scab legislation did so 
because they were primarily meat producers and thus did not see the benefit of scab eradication. 
This assertion is not fully investigated by either of the authors and to do so is difficult. Much less 
is known about the Cape Colony meat sector than its wool industry. As wool was the primary 
export article of the colony for many decades, the wool industry received copious government 
attention and a wide range of authors commented on it. During these years, meat was primarily 
produced for the domestic market and demand was limited. Due to low demand, mutton 
production provided little scope for investment. Thom argues that Cape farmers took up wool 
production in order to have a product to sell in the international market so that they could escape 
the limitations of the domestic meat market.
69
 Domestic demand for mutton grew after the 
rinderpest in 1896 devastated cattle numbers while the influx of people to the mining centers 
increased the market for Cape mutton. Archer suggests that this rise in demand spurred farmers to 




Farmers in a number of districts switched over to mutton production when the Scab Act was 
promulgated. The districts of Sutherland, Prince Albert, Fraserburg, Carnarvon, Beaufort West 
and Prieska mainly stocked wool sheep in 1895 but were mutton farming regions by the end of 
the South African War in 1902. Wool production in the North West (the region were the Scab Act 
could be suspended) declined between the 1891 and 1911 censuses from almost eleven percent to 
just over four percent of the total clip of the colony. Wool production for the Colony declined by 
almost eight percent during these years, but declined by more than 63 percent in the North 
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 North West farmers argued that they switched to mutton because the Scab Act, by 
requiring them to keep their wool sheep clean, made wool farming unprofitable.
72
 The switch was 
facilitated by a sharp rinderpest-induced rise in mutton prices after 1896. The average price for a 
mutton sheep in 1887 was 9s 9d.
73
 By 1895 it was still only 10s 11d. This improved in 1896 to 
14s 4d
74
 and prices reached a high of 26s 2d for an average slaughter sheep by 1903.
75
 Higher 
mutton prices, in combination with low wool prices, also prompted farmers in a number of wool 
producing districts to increase their holdings of mutton sheep and Boer goats. Holdings of cross-
bred mutton sheep increased in a number of Midland regions after the South African War but as 
the mutton price declined, the proportion of wool sheep in these districts rose again.
76
      
 
Mutton production therefore gradually became more profitable but there was a tendency amongst 
proponents of wool farming to see mutton production as „unprogressive‟ sheep farming. 
Producing wool for the international market had symbolic importance for progressives, perhaps 
because wool farmers were involved in the „progressive‟ and „modern‟ arena of international 
trade and industry. In contrast, Cape fat-tailed sheep were maligned as an unprofitable breed. The 
change to mutton farming was applauded by some commentators in the wool sector who hoped 
that poorer sheep farmers would concentrate on mutton as their inferior wool damaged the 
reputation of the Cape clip,
77
 but Davison believed that farmers should stick to wool production 
irrespective of low wool prices and increased demand for mutton. He bemoaned the importation 
of Persian studs and other investments in mutton production because, he believed, the pursuit of 
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short term profit fuelled by a temporary upward trend in the mutton price would damage 
investment in wool quality.
78
 Barney Enslin, first CIS for the Union of South Africa, agreed. For 
these officials, progress in sheep farming was measured in the decline in number of Cape fat-




Progressives‟ low opinion of mutton production meant that little was done to „improve‟ the 
productivity of mutton sheep. The Cape fat-tailed sheep was not a particularly prized mutton 
breed. Their shoulder meat was bony while their haunches had too much fat. Since Merino 
carcasses were generally smaller than those of Cape sheep, they were little better. Merino ewes 
also had a lower lambing rate than Cape ewes. As both breeds were used for extensive farming 
and farmers generally could not afford to provide their sheep with extra feed, neither was bred to 




Cape fat-tailed sheep did not mature quickly and sheep farmers still needed to transport their 
stock to market on the hoof. Young lambs could not make this journey and wethers were only 
sold for slaughter at three years of age when they were judged to have the necessary stamina for 
the long trek to market.
81
 Non-breeding stock was meat on the hoof for mutton farmers – they 
were so much unrealised profit. These animals, by also competing with breeding stock for 
pasture, limited how many of the latter could be kept on a farm. This practice meant that mutton 
farmers were especially vulnerable to drought. Because they needed to maintain a large non-
breeding sheep population, they tended to overgraze their pasture or were unable to save pasture 
for dry seasons. Droughts thus caused great losses amongst sheep flocks in general but wool 
sheep at least generated an income before succumbing to drought. In addition, mutton farming 
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was concentrated in the more drought prone north western divisions that were unsuitable for wool 
farming. 
 
There were few immediate options available to improve the Cape mutton sheep. European mutton 
breeds demanded more pasture than was generally available in the Karoo. They were also long 
wool breeds with open fleeces and it was suggested that farmers interested in combining wool 
and mutton production should choose one such breed for stud. However, importing flocks of 
European mutton sheep was impractical as they required stall feeding except in the wetter 
Western Cape and East Coast regions. Farmers practising mixed farming in coastal Australia and 
in New Zealand imported them and could produce wool of a respectable quality while supplying 
good quality mutton to the international frozen meat market.
82
 Cape sheep farmers had to find 
another way to increase mutton production. Persian sheep were the best alternative but, apart 
from greater resistance to heartwater,
83
 they did not enjoy any advantages over Cape sheep. 




More productive mutton breeds with more evenly distributed body fat would push the Cape fat-
tailed sheep out of the mutton market and into virtual extinction in the twentieth century, but in 
the period in question, poorer farmers could still compete with their wealthier counterparts in 
terms of mutton quality, whereas they could not compete in terms of wool quality. Systematic 
efforts to develop a mutton breed suitable for the arid regions of South Africa were only 
embarked on in the 1930s, resulting in the Dorper. The humble Boer goat, an indigenous species 
like the Cape fat-tailed sheep, had a happier fate. Being indiscriminate grazers they gained a 
reputation for environmental destructiveness in progressive discourse, but farmers started to breed 
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them to standard in the 1930s. Currently their ability to subsist on any type of pasture is seen as 




As discussed in Chapter 2, short fleeced mutton breeds are generally less susceptible to scab. 
While farmers selling Merino sheep as mutton were concerned about scab due to the substantial 
weight loss it caused, farmers keeping Cape fat-tailed or Persian sheep (the latter became popular 
in the 1890s) gained no economic advantage from scab eradication. Thus Jacobus Nicolaas 
Moolman, a Carnarvon mutton farmer with approximately 6000 Cape sheep, could blatantly state 
that the Scab Act was of no importance to him because he “…does not concern himself about the 
interest of the Merino farmers in his district.”
86
   
 
As shown in figure 4.2, districts specialising in wool production but with greater holdings of 
cross-bred mutton sheep maintained a low scab incidence. This was due to a particular farming 
strategy: Merino and Cape fat-tailed sheep cross-breeds were well proportioned, attractive 
animals with a greater carcass weight than Merinos. Wool farmers wanting to take advantage of 
higher mutton prices mated older Merino ewes and younger Merino ewes that were not 
successfully covered by the Merino rams with Cape fat-tailed rams. These cross-bred sheep were 




This explains why Cape Midland districts could increase their proportion of wool sheep quickly 
once the mutton price started to decline. Because these farmers still ran large flocks of wool 
sheep and the cross-breeds did not have the same resistance against scab that the Cape sheep did, 
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they benefited from keeping their flocks clean. Farmers in North West districts who abandoned 
wool farming entirely for mutton sheep (a decision they came to regret when mutton prices 
declined
88
) had little financial interest in keeping their flocks free from scab. The result was that 
the mutton flocks kept by North West trek farmers continued to act as a re-infection reservoir for 
the wool flock. 
  
Marketing conditions for mutton  
Unfortunately the Cape Government did not track domestic meat consumption and the export 
data for the period indicates that the Cape Colony meat exports were negligible before 1906. The 
findings of the 1905 Select Committee on Cold Storage, however, provides valuable insight into 
the meat market and suggests that the mutton market had structural difficulties similar to those of 
the wool market. Mutton farmers could therefore not escape the consequences of the penetration 
of merchant capital into the Cape countryside. 
 
The relative lack of investment in mutton production meant that Cape farmers could not profit 
from the developing international market for frozen meat. There were no cold storage facilities or 
railway lines in mutton producing areas and the business model of the cold storage companies 
headquartered in Cape Town and Port Elizabeth precluded them from exporting colonial mutton. 
The Cape imported frozen meat from Argentina and Australia from the early 1890s onwards, but 
this trade increased after the rinderpest epizootic in 1896/7. As seen in figure 4.4, the increased 
demand for meat during the South African War, combined with the war‟s disruptive effect on the 
internal supply routes of the colony, caused frozen meat imports to increase exponentially. The 
frozen mutton trade was further spurred by the droughts of 1897/8 and 1903/4.  
 
                                                 
88
 CPP [G. 11 - 1909] Report of the Scab Acts and their Administration in the North-western District of the 
















The consequence of this trade was that Cape mutton farmers struggled to find a local market for 
their slaughter stock, despite the increased demand for meat.
89
 The premier wool producing areas 
of Australia experienced a great drought, intensified by overstocking, from 1895 to 1903. 
Australian sheep flocks were therefore culled during this period, greatly increasing the supply of 




The Select Committee on Cold Storage was proposed and chaired by Frank William Powrie, 
Wodehouse MP and sheep farmer, to explore the feasibility of establishing a government funded 
network of abattoirs and cold storage facilities at railway hubs. Powrie was especially concerned 
that sheep farmers could not find adequate markets for their mutton due to competition from the 
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 The latter dominated the national urban meat market and also supplied 
meat to the mines. Imported frozen mutton priced Cape mutton out of these markets and fresh, 
chilled colonial mutton became a luxury article, preferred for its richer, juicier taste but 




Here the Cape was again out-competed by Australia. Since the late 1880s the government of New 
South Wales had erected cold storage facilities to warehouse farmers‟ fresh produce for a 
minimal fee and other Australian colonies quickly followed suite. Cold storage facilitated the 
development of a fresh produce market in Australia and made smaller farming units profitable. It 
was hoped that a similar system at the Cape would enable dairy farmers to reach urban markets 
and help fruit farmers to export their produce. It was also hoped that such a network would enable 
Cape mutton farmers to increase their share of the domestic meat market: local cold storage 
facilities would enable them to slaughter and freeze sheep when they were in prime condition, 
thereby shielding them against dry season losses and reducing the consumer price of local 
mutton.
 93
   
 
The cold storage companies complained that they could not get a regular supply of colonial meat 
as farmers normally only sold sheep when they were at their fattest. As the demand for mutton 
was year round, they were forced to source their mutton from freezing works in Australia and 
Argentina. As cold stores had credit arrangements and long term contracts with these bulk foreign 
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The cold storage companies, however, did not source all their meat internationally as they were 
not always certain of the market. Excess stock could be stored longer or be marketed in Europe 
but both options entailed reduced profits. The companies therefore did occasionally buy extra 
stock from passing freighters or local producers. The latter were apparently the least attractive 
option: Ryno Johannes Verster, manager of the Federal Cold Storage Company, testified that only 
a quarter of the mutton sold by his company per annum was local produce
95
 and Thomas 





The cold storage companies, however, maintained an absolute monopoly over the Cape meat 
trade. At stock fairs, the largest buyers were the representatives of these large butchering 
concerns and they colluded to fix prices. Farmers, unwilling to accept these low prices, sold only 
a small portion of their excess stock and returned home with the rest. These surplus sheep could 
not be adequately supported during the dry season and accommodating them forced farmers to 




In 1905 colonial meat was priced at 7.8d to 8.1d per pound (a carcass averaging forty pounds in 
weight was sold at 26s to 27s) while frozen mutton was landed at the Cape at 3.75d and sold by 
the cold storage companies to butchers at 5.5d per pound.
98
 Rail freight was two shillings per 
sheep and sheep lost weight during rail transit – on journeys from the inland districts a sheep 
could loose between four and five pounds.
99
 Cold storage companies were willing to buy colonial 
meat but preferred that farmers pay the transportation costs. So Verster offered to buy colonial 
sheep at 26s 3d per head after he had heard that the monopolistic practices of his company were 
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discussed in parliament, but he expected such sheep to produce carcasses weighing forty-five 
pounds on average and wanted them delivered to his abattoir at Tulbagh Road. No domestic 




The Cold Storage Commission recommended the establishment of government cold storage 
facilities. The failure of a similar system in Natal, however, weighed heavily against the adoption 
of this recommendation in the Cape.
101
 It was found that such a system would be too expensive to 
be practical and the government eventually imposed a tax on imported mutton and raised anti-
trust legislation to break the monopoly of the cold storage companies on the market.
102
 Dr Smartt, 
then Minister for Public Works, proposed that the government railways should reserve a number 
of cold cars for colonial produce and that Cape farmers should be charged lower freight rates, 
measures that were apparently implemented.
103
 Perhaps due to these measures, mutton imports 
started to decrease. This came too late to save mutton farmers, however, as the mutton price 
declined sharply from 1906 onwards. In 1907 it had fallen from its 1903 high of 26s 2d to an 
average of just 18s 2d per sheep.
104




It should be noted that the Cold Storage Commission was proposed by an Eastern Cape MP and 
that most witnesses testifying before it were cold storage company employees, MPs or Eastern 
Cape and Midland farmers. The Cold Storage Commission therefore represented an effort by 
wool farmers who had diversified into mutton to improve the mutton market, much as the Scab 
Act was an effort by the same wool farmers to improve the wool market. Wool farmers who 
increased their mutton holdings could marginalise North West mutton farmers because they had 
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better access to markets and transportation. Witnesses before of the Cold Storage Committee 
acknowledged that the provision of shambles at large railway stations and inland cold storage 
facilities would not improve the lot of farmers living far from the railway line as they would still 




 Due to the great size and low population density of the North West districts, an extensive railway 
network there was and remains unprofitable. As illustrated in map 1, the region was bypassed by 
the trans-Karoo line. The railway line from De Aar to Prieska, planned years earlier, was only 
constructed in 1903/4 because government used the public work as drought relief for ruined 
farmers and destitute poor whites.
107
 The geographically isolated North West farmers therefore 
had to wait for the advent of cheap motorised transport before they could profit from better 
mutton marketing conditions. The lack of market access also contributed to trek farmers‟ 
overstocking and the losses they suffered during droughts and dry seasons, which reinforced the 
region‟s economic and environmental marginality.  
 
THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF THE SCAB ACT  
The Implementation of the Scab Act 
In this economic environment, poorer farmers‟ goal more often was subsistence than profit. Their 
fears that the forced dipping and quarantine of their sheep would ruin them were real, not 
imagined. Trek farmers were able to win concessions to delay the cleaning of their sheep and to 
break quarantine for reasons of pasture change. Even these weak measures, however, were seen 
by North West farmers as an unsupportable burden.  
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Farmers without the wherewithal to construct dipping tanks and dipping kraals (an enclosure with 
sliding gates to funnel sheep to the dipping tank) had to dip sheep by wrestling them to the 
ground and throwing them bodily into a washtub or clay-lined hole dug for dipping. As mutton 
sheep were not used to being handled, this rough treatment caused them to panic and trample 
each other. Lambs were therefore often killed during dipping.
108
 The sheep were also often not 
immersed in the dipping fluid for a sufficient length of time and the dip stuff was not mixed to the 
right concentration.
 109
 Davison believed such half-hearted dipping was conducted for reasons of 
false economy. Farmers, believing that the manufacturers‟ indications contained a margin of 
error, experimented with lowering the concentration of manufactured dips to save money.
110
 This 
did not cure scab but it enabled farmers with quarantined sheep to claim that they had made an 
effort to clean their sheep, allowing them to postpone further dipping until the dry season when 




The Scab Act allowed for the removal of clean sheep under owners‟ passes without the 
permission of an inspector, provided they certified their sheep as clean. Farmers were, however, 
obligated to give the name of their destination on these passes. In addition, farmers with 
quarantined sheep needed to procure removal passes from a sheep inspector.
112
 The Act therefore 
accommodated pre-arranged removals of sheep like that practised by farmers with farms (or 
rental agreements for the use of pasture) in both summer and winter pasture. Sneeuberg, 
Wodehouse and Barkley East farmers who trekked to pastures on lower elevation in the winter 
trekked at set times to predetermined destinations. They could therefore ensure their sheep were 
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clean before trekking or arrange for the supervised dipping of their sheep. The Act therefore did 




By contrast, trek farmers grazing their sheep on marginal pasture often arranged the hire of 
pasture while trekking so they did not always know their destination before they started out. 
Trekkers sometimes needed to trek at the spur of the moment. A particular pasture might be good 
but its only water source was a shallow pan of rainwater. A few days of unanticipated hot, windy 





Dipping when the only source of water on a farm was a few rapidly drying pools of rainwater was 
impossible. On farms with only a single well, a farmer might have found it necessary to spend 
hours daily drawing water for their sheep to drink. Dipping in such circumstances would be a 
major undertaking and farmers also had no assurance that the well might not dry up. Farmers 
were therefore not willing to use precious water resources to dip their sheep.
115
 Indeed, a Prieska 
farmer testified that he had to ration water to such an extent during droughts that his wife could 





If sheep were under quarantine when their drinking water literally evaporated, farmers were 
required to contact a sheep inspector and engage him to inspect and treat their sheep before 
trekking. The great distances between farms and towns in the North West, however, made 
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contacting a travelling sheep inspector difficult at the best of times. Certain pastures contained 
poisonous bushes causing a fatal condition called dikkop. A farmer had to remove his sheep from 
such contaminated pasture at the first sign that his sheep were being poisoned or risk losing the 
greater portion of his flock. Again, trek farmers could not wait for quarantine to be lifted or for 




Similarly, if scab broke out in the flock of a trek farmer, he might simply not have been able to 
report the outbreak within the required time period. When Parliament discussed what constituted 
a reasonable interval between noticing a scab outbreak and reporting it, John X. Merriman, MP 
for Namaqualand, protested that some fieldcornetcies in his district were a hundred miles across. 
Farmers would therefore not have a chance of reporting a scab outbreak within 48 hours as the 
Scab Bill proposed. He suggested fourteen days as an alternative. Progressives demurred and 
eventually a seven day period was agreed to.
118
 This was insufficient for the needs of the North 
West as many farmers may have been days away from the nearest sheep inspector or without any 
trusted labourers to send or leave in charge of their flock.
 119
   
 
These were difficulties that only affected trek farmers or poor farmers. Considerable animosity 
was therefore engendered by the administration of the Scab Act in the North West. Davison, 
however, was indifferent to such complaints. As discussed in Chapter 1, he was of the opinion 
that scab would be easy to eradicate in the North West. Davison and other progressives sincerely 
believed that North West farmers could clean their sheep during the rainy season and so avoid 
experiencing subsequent difficulties in obtaining passes or facing prosecution for trekking with 
scabby sheep. Davison testified before the 1898 Scab Commission that he “…would like it to be 
                                                 
117
 CPP [G. 11 – 1909] Report of the Scab Acts and their Administration in the North-western District of 
the Cape Colony, p. 6.   
118
 Debates in the House of Assembly (13 July 1894), p. 286. 
119
 CPP [G. 11 – 1909] Report of the Scab Acts and their administration in the North-western District of the 















understood that the want of water is not a reasonable excuse at all; and in [Davison‟s] own 
opinion where a farmer complains of not having enough water to dip, it is his own fault, 
carelessness and neglect.”
120
  He therefore continued to campaign for stricter anti-scab legislation 




Explanations for the demise of transhumance 
The spectre of white poverty and the urbanisation of the rural poor hovered over all discussions of 
the scab acts. Farming units were being consolidated and the poor expelled from the rural 
economy. Beinart argues that innovation in fencing and irrigation technologies opened the way 
for increased productivity in the pastoral sector.
122
 There were therefore more investment 
opportunities. With sufficient capital investment for fencing and hydrological engineering works, 
formerly marginal land inhabited by squatters could be farmed profitably. The paddocking system 
enabled farmers to preserve pasture for the dry season through rotational grazing while reducing 
labour requirements. Marginal land that was formerly rented to bywoners could now be farmed 
productively. Bywoners and trek farmers who squatted on crown land were therefore squeezed 
out of the rural economy. 
 
This analysis is supported by the Carnegie Commission report on poor-whiteism in the 1930s. 
The report highlights the increased capital investment in agriculture after 1880 as the driving 
force behind urbanisation. This investment was made possible, it argued, by the availability of 
jackal-proof fencing and the expansion of the railway network which made transportation cheaper 
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and faster. As a consequence “…suitable lands became scarcer or more expensive, causing 
trekking to weaker areas but also migration to non-rural work circles.”
123 
 
Dubow argues that because there were few investment opportunities for merchant capital to 
increase the production or quality of wool, merchant capital invested in land. Merchants also 
increasingly acted as money lenders. They extended long-term credit to farmers on easy terms to 
secure their custom. Dips in the wool price caused merchants to tighten credit, driving indebted 
farmers into bankruptcy. The penetration of merchant capital into the rural economy resulted in 
land speculation accompanied by a boom-and-bust cycle in land prices. The resultant land 
shortage and fluctuating land prices pushed poorer farmers from the rural economy.
 
He also 
argued that the mineral revolution caused a demand for labour and this spurred the government to 
adopt stronger measures against squatting. Ownership of the means of production (i.e. 
agricultural land) was therefore increasingly concentrated in the hands of wealthier land owners 




The impact of the influx of merchant capital and the introduction of new agricultural 
technologies, however, should not be overstated. As discussed in Chapter 1, trek farmers were not 
self-sufficient and were therefore never cushioned from market forces. Trek farmers were 
exposed to poverty and the effects of commercialism before the Cape was incorporated in the 
global economy.
 125
 Economic developments in the second half of the nineteenth century 
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P.J. van der Merwe (1945) described the demise of trek farming as the inevitable consequence of 
population increase. Extensive farming, as practised on the ever-shifting South African colonial 
frontier, was only profitable as long as land prices and the population remained low. Poorer 
farmers could not acquire land in more settled areas and were expelled to the frontier, driving 
expansion. As soon as a particular area drew more settlers (or as the population increased), land 
prices rose, farmers became more assertive of their property rights and it became necessary to 
invest in improved production methods. Those who lacked capital to buy land or to invest in 
agricultural technologies were then expelled to the new frontier. However, when the frontier 
closed, such farmers were expelled from the rural economy entirely and became poor whites in 
South Africa‟s towns and cities.
127
 Merchant capital and new agricultural technologies were 
merely incidental to this process.  
 
Competition for pasture therefore predates the advent of British rule at the Cape. VOC officials 
allowed farmers who wanted to protect their trek pasture from encroachment by newcomers to 
include their customary Karoo encampments, then situated beyond the boundaries of the colony, 
in the deeds for their loan farms. Such competition for pasture drove frontier expansion.
 128
 The 
British government honoured such documented claims, but did not grant farmers title solely on 
the basis of customary usage.
 
Hantam, Bokkeveld and Roggeveld farmers successfully appealed 
to the government to stop trek pasture around Zak River in Calvinia from being surveyed and 
auctioned in 1848 and attempted to repeat this success after the promulgation of the 1860 Crown 
Land Act.
129
 The 1864 committee on Crown land, however, saw “…no sufficient reason for 
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treating those lands otherwise than as ordinary Crown property.”
130
 Land utilized as trek pasture 
by generations of North West farmers was therefore auctioned off to the highest bidder under 
various acts governing the disposal of Crown land. At such events the competition for land often 
drove farmers to offer overly high amounts for marginal land that could only be improved with 
difficulty. Burdened subsequently with high mortgages, farmers were unable to invest in 
agricultural improvement.
131
 According to testimony before the 1892-4 Scab Commission, a 
group of Calvinia farmers managed to protect their trek pasture by forming a land syndicate for 
the lease and subletting of back country Crown land. It is not known how widely their example 
was emulated, but no other witnesses mentioned a similar arrangement.
132
   
 
In this economic climate, landowners could no longer afford charity towards trek farmers and 
bywoners. Some landowners were opposed to the Act not because they wanted their own dry-
season trekking accommodated or because they were concerned about poorer farmers who could 
not afford to dip. Rather, they were concerned about the provisions in the Scab Act for the 
quarantine of livestock. As mentioned in the introduction, landowners with public roads crossing 
their farms could not prohibit trek farmers from crossing their land. These farmers were afraid 
that scabby sheep belonging to trek farmers or bywoners would be quarantined on their property, 
leaving them to bear the cost for supporting and dipping the animals. A Prince Albert sheep 
farmer therefore wanted the Scab Act to give him the right to refuse trek farmers access to his 
land. He also warned that he would need to use more pasture for his own flock if he was to keep 
them scab free, which would necessitate him to expel the bywoners on his farm.
133
 Reverent 
Gustav Adolf Mader, a German missionary working in Victoria West, accused farmer 
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representatives who claimed they were opposing the Scab Act for the sake of the poor of 
hypocrisy. If they were really concerned with the poor, he argued, they would assist them in 
cleaning their sheep. Instead they sought to escape their obligations towards their bywoners and 
increasingly set them off of their land.
134
     
 
The testimony before the Scab Commission of Daniel Gabriel de Villiers provides proof of this 
hypocrisy. De Villiers, a member of the Beaufort West Divisional Council and owner of 30 000 
sheep spread over several farms (he had the largest livestock holdings of all the farmers who 
testified), initially stated that he was opposed to the Scab Act because of the need to 
accommodate trek farmers. But he was confronted with the fact that he had recently ordered his 
attorney to enquire if one of his farms, which were bisected by a major trek route, could be placed 
under the 1886 Scab Act. His concern for the plight of drought stricken trekkers was therefore the 
public position his Divisional Council constituents expected him to hold and was exposed as 
such. Further questioning revealed that De Villiers was a local dipping advocate who helped his 
neighbours to dip. He also believed that only a scab act will help to root out poor dipping 




Little direct statistical evidence exists to substantiate the argument that trek farmers were 
increasingly impoverished. Unfortunately government censuses did not record the average sizes 
or prices of agricultural holdings. It also did not track household income. In addition, there is no 
district level breakdown for the number of people who identified themselves as pastoralists. Per 
capita livestock holdings can therefore not be used to determine the economic wellbeing of the 
average North West sheep farmer. Comparative data on wire fencing and boreholes shows, 
however, that the North West was under represented in these visible signs of agricultural 
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progress: The North West consisted of almost 39 percent of the surface area of the colony but 
possessed only 455 (or 6.25%) of the 7285 boreholes recorded in the 1911 census (the first census 
to record boreholes). Similarly, while 29.59% of the surface area of the colony was fenced by 
1911, only 2.88% of the North West was fenced.
136
 There was also a decline of 3430 bywoners 
(2030 of which were listed as European men) from the1904 census to that of 1911.This figure 
may indicate a change in definition since the number of farm overseers, agriculturalists and 
pastoralists shows increases during the period. More revealing is the district-based statistics for 
direct farm employment. In the period between 1891 and 1911, direct employment on farms 
declined as a proportion of total European male employment. The number of European males in 
the Cape Colony increased by 53.12% while those occupied on farms only increased by 15.93%. 
During the same period the number of European males employed on farms in the North West 
increased by 43.82%. The number of European males who indicated they were directly occupied 
on farms declined slightly from 1904 to 1911, while census returns for the North West showed 
that European male farm employment increased by 12.52% for the same time period. The farms 





In the nineteenth and early twentieth century evidence for pasture degradation was primarily 
derived from the massive losses suffered by farmers during drought. Progressive commentators 
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therefore developed Malthusian fears for the future of Cape livestock farming.
138
 The practice of 
transhumance allowed farmers to own more livestock than their home farms could sustain, but 
was only an effective pasture management system as long as farmers could reserve sufficient 
pasture in different rainfall zones. By the end of the nineteenth century increased land shortages 
meant that transhumance was no longer an effective strategy to mitigate the effects of drought. 
Farmers therefore lost great numbers of stock to malnutrition annually. Loosing half of one‟s 
livestock during a drought became an accepted risk of sheep farming.
139
 Above and beyond 
progressive fears about long-term pasture damage, these massive losses were seen as wasteful and 
preventable. According to T.D. Hall (1934) trekkers left “…the animals for provender to 
Providence and their own devices – which in many cases were starvation and death.”
140
 
Hutcheon, commenting in 1895 on this wastage, advocated that farmers decrease their livestock 
numbers in favour of breeding more productive animals.
141
   
 
 When the North West was thinly populated and land was more easily acquired, farmers could 
eventually recover from devastating drought losses but by the late nineteenth century increased 
land prices and higher interest rates on mortgages meant that drought-ruined farmers had no 
opportunity to recover. Such impoverished farmers lost their land and started living yearlong in 
tents on pasture formerly reserved for summer grazing.
142
 The resultant overgrazing increased 
their vulnerability to drought and also increased the progressives‟ distaste for transhumance.  
 
The sale of Crown lands was not only linked to increased dry season livestock losses, but also to 
increased scab incidence. In Aberdeen, a Midlands region containing large tracks of marginal 
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pasture rented out by absentee landlords to poorer sheep farmers, the office of the CIS recorded 
drought related livestock losses proportionally comparable to that of the North West. In the words 
of H.J. Weideman, an Aberdeen farmer, "…when there was plenty of Government ground, there 
was great scope for trekking; there was no dipping, but with a little scope [i.e. fresh pasture] the 
scab cured itself." As his neighbours no longer tolerated trespass, Weideman, unable to afford 




In the light of the above, Davison and other progressives‟ lack of sympathy with trek farmers‟ 
economic grievances against the Scab Act can be re-evaluated. Their contempt for trek farmers 
was underpinned by their belief that trek farmer poverty was caused by their own negligent 
farming practices. A prize-winning essay submitted to the Wynberg Agricultural Society by one 
Harold Hignell expressed progressive sentiment succinctly: 
Social evolution and political economy alike, demand that the efficiency of the progressive 
moiety of the community should not be crippled or restrained by the necessity of bearing 
the burdens shirked by the inefficient and inert portion of the population at present in the 
Cape Colony. The clean man has to pay part of the dirty man‟s washing bill in the case of 
scab, and as largely, by reason of his dirt, the unclean citizen is often incapable of 
contributing equally with the clean to the public funds, it follows that the lion‟s share of the 




Progressive farmers were also urged to see forbearance towards the „unclean‟, based on their 
supposed ignorance, as the extension of charity towards the undeserving poor. It was believed 
that these farmers‟ ignorance, like the perceived economic backwardness of the Cape, was caused 
by trek farmers‟ supine inertia. Hignell proposed that the „unclean‟ should be publicly shamed 






                                                 
143
 CPP [G.1 – 1894] Report of the Scab Commission, evidence of H.J Weideman, p. 188. 
144
 H. Hignell, „The Erradication of Scab‟ in AJCCGH, 34, 3 (1909), pp. 264-268. 
145















THE ECOMOMIC REALITIES OF SHEEP FARMING SUMMARISED 
Progressives billed anti-scab legislation as the panacea for the struggling wool sector of the Cape 
Colony, but, as discussed above, their claims were dubious as they overstated the economic 
impact of scab. Due to the smaller sizes of farming units in the Cape, wool farmers were unable 
to adopt the wool presentation techniques of their Australian counterparts. Cape wool, apart from 
the presence of scab, was therefore generally inferior to the Australian article. The average 
pricing system by which merchants bought wool also discouraged investment in improving wool 
quality. Progressive wool farmers therefore effectively subsidized farmers who produced low 
quality wool. The latter would not substantially benefit from scab eradication while the cost of 
dipping sheep would consume their profits.  
 
Mutton farmers were not merely disinterested in scab eradication; the legislation presented a 
substantial threat to them. Scab did not affect the profitability of mutton farming because the 
Cape fat-tailed sheep was resistant to the disease. As the cost of dipping their sheep would not be 
offset by increased profits, anti-scab regulations requiring them to clean their sheep were a 
considerable economic burden. A combination of environmental and economic factors also meant 
that the economic position of mutton farmers was strained: mutton farming was predominantly 
practised in drought-prone areas and mutton farmers therefore suffered greater losses due to 
environmental scarcity. In addition, the lack of transportation infrastructure in the North West and 
the monopoly of the cold storage companies over the Cape meat market meant that North West 
mutton farmers were disadvantaged in the colonial mutton market.  
 
The progressives who advocated anti-scab legislation, however, stigmatized mutton farming as 
unprogressive and refused to accept that the economic objections to the Scab Act were valid. 















pasture. It is therefore not surprising that the opponents of the Scab Act saw it as a piece of class 
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This dissertation has depicted the Scab Act of 1894 as class legislation serving the needs of 
progressive wool farmers and merchants. The achievements of the Australian colonies in the area 
of wool production and in eradicating scab were seen as the gold standard of sheep farming. The 
presence of scab in the Cape Colony did not only devalue colonial wool and sheep skins in the 
international market, but stigmatised Cape farmers as backwards. The object of anti-scab 
legislation was not merely to protect farmers who wanted to clean their sheep from re-infection, 
but to eradicate scab in the Cape Colony. A colony-wide scab act was therefore seen by 
progressives as an important signifier that the Cape Colony was modern and progressive. 
 
It was not self-evident, however, that the material benefits of eradicating scab would outweigh the 
cost. Progressive arguments that eradicating scab would benefit the sheep farming sector as a 
whole rang hollow since it was premised on a normative understanding of sheep farming. Non-
wool farmers and arid region wool farmers had nothing to gain from dipping their sheep, but anti-
scab measures affected them disproportionately. They therefore strenuously protested against the 
legislation and managed to delay implementation of a colony-wide scab act to 1894. They also 
managed to weaken its measures. 
 
The fate of the 1894 Scab Act highlights the difficulty of policing unpopular legislation. Since its 
success depended on farmers voluntarily reporting scab and refraining from trekking with 
infected animals, it was unsuccessful in districts where the population opposed it. Despite 
increasing prosecutions and a high conviction rate, scab was not eradicated, but merely 
suppressed. Farmers were able to take advantage of loopholes in the Act to remove scabby sheep 

















As discussed in Chapter 1, historians who have focussed on depicting trek farmer objections to 
progressive initiatives have focused on trek farmer character instead of on their economic 
position. They ascribe various „traditional‟ traits to trek farmers that, upon closer analysis, are 
revealed as euphemisms for ignorance and superstition. As discussed, this attempt bogs down in 
the theoretical problems associated with defining traditional knowledge and differentiating it 
from science. At the heart of the problem is a problematic definition of irrationality: The 
„irrationality‟ displayed by „traditional people‟ are not the irrationality of holding „false beliefs‟ in 
the face of contrary empirical evidence, rather it is the irrationality of practicing „false economy‟.  
 
In the world economy created in the nineteenth century through European colonial expansion, the 
refusal or inability to accumulate capital marked people as „irrational‟. Cape Colony Progressives 
was slow to credit trek farmers with farming knowledge where this conflicted with their 
economic interests. The report of the 1892-1894 Scab Commission is one of the few archival 
sources in which trek farmer voices were recorded.  
 
I have argued in this dissertation that the opponents of the Scab Act shared economic interests. 
The anti-scab act movement tried casting the conflict surrounding the Scab Act in ethnic terms in 
order to gain broader support in the Cape Dutch community. This attempt largely failed since 
there was no simple dichotomy between English Eastern Province progressives and Dutch-
speaking traditionalists that could be exploited to drum up wider support for the aims of the 
movement. The pastoral community was divided by the differing interests of wool and mutton 
farmers and class divisions between landlords, bywoners and transhumant pastoralists. The anti-
scab act movement could therefore not manage to gain the support of the wider Dutch-speaking 
pastoralist community, let alone the support of Dutch-speaking agriculturalist and urban 
















This attempt at ethnic mobilization would eventually backfire. While the main political division 
of the Colony was interpreted as the ethnic divide between English and Dutch speakers, 
sophisticated economic arguments against progressive policies were not developed. As the value 
of scientific progress was adopted more generally in the Colony, government scientific 
intervention could be depicted as politically neutral. The Union government had ambitious plans 
for agricultural improvement and North West sheep farmer representatives were placed in the 
difficult position of having to argue that their constituents could not afford progress. Since 
condoning this would result in the spread of scab, non-North West MPs‟ charity did not extend to 
accommodating trek farmers.  
 
The failure of the anti-scab act movement to mobilize support along ethnic lines should raise 
caution about the possibility of identifying an Afrikaner trek farmer sub-ethnicity. The category 
of „traditional knowledge‟ cannot be used to demarcate this proposed ethnic identity: Not only is 
this category theoretically incoherent, but opposition to the Act did not correlate with opposition 
to the scientific explanation for the disease. As shown, some farmers constructed alternative 
theories for scab that were sophisticated and drew on mid-nineteenth century medical theories 
like the environmental explanation for epidemic diseases and ideas of spontaneous generation to 
explain the reproduction of insects and arachnids. But these ideas were heterogeneous and cannot 
be used to exemplify aspects of a distinct „traditional‟ epistemology. There is also not sufficient 
evidence for the so-called trek farmer moral economy based on shared ideals about social justice 
for this idea to withstand historical scrutiny.  
 
The failure of the Scab Act hardened progressives‟ opinion against the opponents of the Act. This 
negative opinion was underpinned by a contemporary discourse that blamed the poor for their 
poverty. Progressives therefore persistently discounted the valid economic grievances of farmers 















scab legislation was recognized as class legislation by its proponents and opponents alike. This 
recognition was the space that gave the anti-scab act movement room to manoeuvre and it was the 
progressives‟ main avenue for attack. While progressives acknowledged that a general colony-
wide scab act would cause hardship, they were diligent in depicting their opponents as irrational 
and unable to recognize their own economic interests. The economic interests of Midlands and 
Eastern Cape wool farmers were judged to be the common good while the economic interests of 
mutton farmers and trek farmers were largely ignored. It was implied that these farmers had a 
civic duty to make sacrifices for the benefit of wool farmers. Scientific theories that connected 
drought with overgrazing helped progressives undermine trek farmers‟ arguments that the Act 
was not suitable for the North West. Since they believed that the environmental challenges faced 
by trek farmers were caused by the trek farmers‟ wasteful system of pasture management, 
progressives did not give credence to claims of North West exceptionalism. The progressives‟ 
depiction of their opponents eroded their platform for protesting against anti-scab legislation. The 
difficulties they experienced in curing their sheep were seen as a symptom of their negligence 
while their alternative views on scab were seen as symptomatic of their backwardness.  
 
As shown above, Hutcheon and progressives‟ scab science served the class interests of wool 
farmers. The long incubation period of the disease was not emphasized while the infectability of 
the disease was exaggerated through the official focus on the dangers of kraaling, shared drinking 
holes and sleeping places. The scientific explanation for scab was therefore clearly influenced by 
the progressive prejudice against transhumance. The assertion of mutton farmers that Cape fat-
tailed sheep was largely immune to scab was also not scientifically investigated. Because 
progressives attempted to use veterinary science to downplay the economic concerns of the anti-
scab act movement, veterinary science became a point of contention between proponents and 
opponents of the Act. It is not merely that the interests of wool farmers determined the topic (i.e. 















interests. This example shows that it is necessary for historians not merely to report on a 
particular scientist‟s career, but to evaluate the content of her science.  
 
Because the efficacy of veterinary science had not yet gained widespread recognition and its 
methods (so far as the investigation of scab was concerned) was not technologically sophisticated, 
the scientific explanation for scab could be challenged. Attempts by the government and 
progressives to convert the anti-scab act movement to their cause through an appeal to the 
authority of science were therefore not successful. This blunt appeal to the authority of science 
contrasts with the approach of the CVS to livestock diseases like heartwater that affected a 
narrower Eastern Cape progressive constituency. This constituency‟s ideas regarding livestock 
diseases was investigated by government experts at the Cape, but Hutcheon‟s scientific curiosity 
was not stirred by the claims of the anti-scab act movement. Since he considered the aetiology of 
the disease to be scientifically complete, his experiments with acari, like that of Davison, were 
conducted only to confirm the established account of the disease. As discussed in Chapter 2, this 
neglect helped delay the development of a richer scientific account of the disease in South Africa.   
 
Hutcheon was in contact with the broader scientific community of the USA and Europe. He was 
also more open to challenges from farmers like the Eastern Province progressives who shared his 
cultural background. But Hutcheon and the colonial veterinary establishment seemingly ignored 
the field experience of a large proportion of the settler community. This concern becomes even 
more urgent to historians investigating scientific intervention in the Transkeian Territories and 
other native reserves in South Africa. In the case of anti-scab legislation, the settler community 
were divided about the need for a scab act; they argued about its scientific description and argued 
about what particular form this legislation should take. This served to ameliorate the impact of the 
Scab Act in the Colony Proper. As discussed, the Agriculture Department was not concerned 















scientific account of the disease or the particular anti-scab measures that would be enforced in the 
area. The scientific account of scab was similarly closed to challenges from Africans‟ practical 
sheep farming experience.  
 
The Cape was a settler colony and its economy was organized to privilege its ability to supply 
primary products (wool and minerals) to the industrialised world. Considering that the Scab Act 
was intended to improve the quality of Cape wool exports at the expense of economically 
marginal pastoralists and of mutton farmers who supplied the domestic market, the scientific 
account of scab cannot be detached from its colonial context. In the light of this example, can 
historians of veterinary science afford to detach Cape veterinary science from its colonial context 
in general? The Africanists critique of colonial science cannot be dismissed for the Cape Colony 
– scientific bias existed at the Cape despite the fact that colonial scientists had to serve an 
established settler economy. Science was used to defend the interests of capitalist settler farming 
within the broader settler community. Settler capitalism also had to be defended against the 
interests of the indigenous inhabitants of the colony and science was also employed to this end. 
There should therefore be a middle way between dismissing colonial science as an instrument of 
colonial power and writing a history of science that, in its attempt to depict this science first and 
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APPENDIX A: THE 1894 SCAB BILL, THE SCAB ACT OF 1894 AND THE SCAB ACT OF 1899 
 
































APPENDIX A: A SUMMARY OF THE 1894 SCAB BILL, THE SCAB ACT OF 1894 AND THE SCAB ACT OF 1899 
 
 
Bill to Amend the Laws Relating to Scab 
in Sheep, May 1894 (proposed by Sir John 
Frost, Minister of Agriculture) 
Act 20 of 1894 (or the Scab Act of 1894) 
Act 28 of 1899 (or the Scab Act 
Amendment Act of 1899) 
Kraals 
Inspector had right to disinfected or destroy all 
kraals  
 during period of simultaneous dipping  
 if a flock was under quarantine 
Inspector could disinfect kraals only  
 during period of simultaneous dipping.  
 with owner's permission if a flock was under 
quarantine 
Note: Since infected kraals were blamed for spreading 





 Simultaneous dipping for two consecutive years 
over a three month period from December to 
February, 1895 and 1896. 
 During the three months, individual districts 
were to be placed under a six week quarantine 
fitted to their climatic conditions and shearing 
schedule. 
 No sheep to be removed during simultaneous 
dipping from an area were dipping has not yet 
taken place. 
 Government reserved right to call for 
simultaneous dipping of selected areas in future. 
 
Simultaneous dipping for two consecutive years over a 
four month period from November to February, 1895 
and 1896.  
 Dipping arrangements repeated the Bill.  
 Government did not gain right to schedule 
additional simultaneous dipping. 
 
Note: Simultaneous dipping was seen as key to 
eradicating scab. Staffing problems and government 
inability to ensure that farmers could obtain sufficient 
sheep dip in the North West caused both the 1895 and 
1896 dipping to fail, demolishing progressive hopes 
for speedy scab eradication. 
Simultaneous dipping for two consecutive years over 
a four month period from February to May, 1900 and 
1901.  
 Government to supply the dip. 
 Government reserved right to call for 
simultaneous dipping of selected areas in future. 
 
Note: The outbreak of the South African War made 
the proposed simultaneous dipping impossible. 
Simultaneous dipping occurred thereafter only in 


















All sheep farmers to built and maintain their own 
dipping tank on their property, whether said 
property were rented or owned outright. 
Sheep farmers could arrange to use a neighbour's 
dipping tank.  
Note: Scab-infested sheep were moved for dipping, 
spreading the disease. This provided a loophole for 





Sheep owners could issue passes to shepherds for 
the removal of their clean flocks.  
 have to provide herder with sheep dip  
 herd has to report scab outbreak and dip 
immediately  
Sheep owners could issue passes to shepherds for the 
removal of their clean flocks.     
 did not have to provide herder with sheep dip 
 scab outbreak had to be reported but hand dressing 






Note: The long reporting time and system of owners 
passes facilitated farmers in removing scabby sheep. 
They merely had to claim that 1) they did not notice 
scab amongst their flock before they started trekking 
and 2) that the scab infection broke out within the last 
seven days. The CIS‟s annual reports tracked the 
removal of scabby flock under owner‟s passes. So, for 
instance, a total of 827 infected flocks were removed 
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Six weeks quarantine period.  
 Had to dip within 14 days and them from 10 to 
14 days thereafter, otherwise in contravention of 
the act.  
 After six weeks quarantine expired and sheep 
still not clean, inspector had right to dip the 
sheep at owner's expense. 
Six weeks quarantine period 
 No instructions how soon farmers should dip after 
being placed under cleansing order. 
 Dipping interval: 10 to 14 days 
 If inspector judged farmer did not attempt to clean 
his flock and the sheep were still infected, the 
inspector could dip the sheep at the owners‟ 
expense. 
 
Different quarantine periods for winter and summer: 
1st November to 30th April 
 sheep to be dipped within seven days of being 
placed under cleansing order (except if impractical 
or sheep inspector judged it dangerous).  
 Dipping interval: 10 to 14 days 
1st May to 31 October  
 order could be renewed for four weeks after 
expiration,  
 If cleansing order expired and sheep inspector 
judged dipping to be impossible or dangerous, 
visibly infected sheep could hand be dressed or 
hand dipped only. 
 
Note: This provision accommodated farmers‟ fears 
of and difficulties experienced with dipping in 
winter,
545
 but with the collusion of a lenient 
inspector, a sheep farmer could entirely avoid 
cleaning his sheep during winter, the dry season in 
the Karoo. 
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 CPP [A. 21 – 1898] Report of the Select Committee on the Scab Act, pp. 216-225. A number of farmers complained to the commission that their sheep died due to being dipped in 
winter. Malnutrition (which was common in dry winter months), the presence of other parasites like wire worm, and sudden cold spells (causing hypothermia in wet sheep) could cause 
sheep to die after being dipped. Many farmers dipped in winter without mishap but others were less fortunate. It is not clear from the farmers‟ testimonies whether those whose animals 
died due to winter dipping were careless or if they were simply overtaken by unexpected bad weather. Some farmers testified that their sheep died some time after dipping so it is not clear 


















 Sheep had to be dipped once under supervision 
of a sheep inspector 
 Sheep inspector to issue special license (or pass), 
giving the date sheep were dipped, the date of 
the removal and the destination. 
 Sheep to be given special brand, to be noted on 
the pass.  
 Sheep to be dipped again after 10 days of arrival 
at destination, except if they were to be 
slaughtered within 14 days of arrival. 
Repeat of the Scab Bill.  
Note: This seems like a harsh measure against mutton 
farmers but it was easy to circumvent in practice. 
Mutton farmers could simply remove their livestock 
under owners‟ passes. In addition, it gave stock 
speculators (perhaps needing to remove sheep to 
market or to move sheep after the rental period on a 
particular pasture expired) the opportunity to break 
quarantine after dipping their sheep only once by 






 Colony-wide simultaneous dipping (to be done 
for first two years of the working of the Act from 
December to March) to be suspended in 
Carnarvon, Calvinia, Clanwilliam, 
Namaqualand, Ceres, Sutherland, Kenhardt, Van 
Rhynsdorp and Fraserburg. 
 Quarantines to be suspended (and sheep 
removed) on a case-by-case basis at the owner‟s 
request and on the judgment of the sheep 
inspector. Sheep to be dipped once under 
inspector‟s supervision. Sheep to be issued 
special pass, to be dipped by owner at new 
location within 10-14 days of first dip.  
 All sections of the Scab Act (except those 
governing removal from areas in which Act is 
suspended) to be suspended during drought in 
Carnarvon, Calvinia, Clanwilliam, Namaqualand, 
Ceres, Sutherland, Kenhardt, Van Rhynsdorp and 
Fraserburg. 
 No removal from the suspended area unless the 
sheep was dipped twice (if infected or not) within 
14 days of removal under supervision of a sheep 
inspector.  
 If sheep was judged to be in a bad condition, the 
sheep inspector could hand dress the visibly 
infected sheep before the removal and forego 
dipping.  
The North West was seen as one district or division 
for the purposes of the Act. This meant: no special 
permission/ pass required to break quarantine for trek 
between and in North West districts during period the 
Act was suspended. Farmers still needed to acquire 
special passes to remove sheep from the area in 
which the Act was suspended.    
Note: During drought, scab spread uncontrollably in 
the North West, obliterating any progress made in 
proceeding years. 
 
                                                 
546














 Sheep to be dipped as soon as could bear after 
arrival at new location.  
 No removals of undipped sheep out of the 
suspended area. 
 Removal of undipped sheep between districts where 
the Act was suspended only with permission from 
sheep inspectors in the district the sheep were to be 
moved to. Needed to inform the inspectors of 
proposed route and destination. 
Note: Lenient inspectors also issued hand dressing 
passes to sheep that could have been dipped. Such 






Four levels: 1) one CIS; 2) inspectors over regions; 
3) one sub-inspector for each district; and 4) 
dipping inspectors for each ward. Dipping 
inspectors to be elected by majority of the farmers 
in the district, other officials to be appointed by the 
government. 
Note: Dipping inspectors were subordinate to sub-
inspectors and could not work independently. This 
four-tier system was expensive, all the different 
inspectors‟ duties were not clearly deliminated and 
advocates of locally administered anti-scab 
Three levels: 1) One CIS; 2) a number of assistant for 
the CIS; and 3) one sheep inspector per ward or 
location, voted in by sheep owners with 100 or more 
sheep for 3-year period. (Could combine two or more 
wards if a ward did not contain many sheep.) The CIS 
could inspect all sheep in the Colony but his assistants 
could only enter private property to inspect sheep if 
accompanied by the CIS or a ward inspector or if they 
were filling in as ward inspector in areas temporary 
without sheep inspectors. 
Note: Sheep farmers in areas opposed to the Act 
A three member scab board, chaired by the Civil 
Commissioner, to nominate three candidate sheep 
inspectors for pre-determined administrative areas. 
Government to make final decision. The divisional 
council appointed one member of the board. The rest 
appointed through vote by Divisional Council voters. 
Board members needed to be residents of the district, 
own more than 250 sheep. They were appointed for 3 
years. Insolvency and contravention of Scab Acts 
disqualified sheep farmers from the board. 
Note: In areas opposed to the Act, elected scab 
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legislation were not satisfied with the subordinate 
position granted to dipping inspectors.
548
 
deliberately appointed incompetent inspectors or 
appointed men opposed to the Act.  Inspectors were 
lenient in order to be re-elected.
549
 
boards also opposed the Act and nominated men they 






Maximum penalty of £20 
Note: In his annual reports, Davison records an 
average fine for contravention of the Scab Act ranging 
between £2 and £4 for the Colony and £1 and £2 for 
the Transkeian Territories (the maximum fine in 
Transkei was £10). As noted in the introduction, these 
„low‟ fines were seen as an insufficient deterrent.  
The progressives were not able to increase the fine in 
1899 since the main difficulty rested in the 
unwillingness of magistrates to impose the maximum 
penalty. Under the 1911 Stock Diseases Act, 
penalties ranged from £50, £100, £250 and 
(depending on the severity of the contravention and 
the contravener‟s ability to pay) 6 months, 12 months 
and 2 years imprisonment for first, second and third 
contraventions of the Act respectively. In contrast, 
contravention of an anti-scab measure under the Act 
carried a £50 fine while not reporting a scab outbreak 
carried a £20 fine. Contraveners were only to be 
imprisoned if they were unable to pay the fine. This 
was the last legislative success of the anti-scab act 
movement.    
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 Debates in the House of Assembly (20 July 1894), pp. 323-324. 
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 CPP [A. 21 – 1898] Report of the Select Committee on the Scab Act, evidence of A.G. Davison, pp. 5-6. 
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APPENDIX B: SCAB PERCENTAGES FOR THE CAPE COLONY, 1895-1911            
 








Aberdeen 37.86 4.23 12.53 n/a 21.52 25.81 9.90 1.07 5.79 7.02 4.35 2.36 4.91 11.45 MG 
Albany 3.75 2.06 0.65 n/a 3.88 5.67 0.83 3.79 4.13 0.72 1.15 0.49 0.68 2.32 W & M 
Albert 6.50 18.59 5.96 43.09 37.40 7.24 9.48 0.50 1.34 1.73 2.31 2.01 0.65 10.52 W 
Alexandria 9.07 21.22 3.10 1.86 6.66 1.24 0.00 clean clean 2.37 1.32 clean clean 3.60 M 
Aliwal North 12.07 19.71 6.62 10.80 28.50 2.04 1.77 5.63 1.24 1.65 1.42 1.57 0.79 7.22 W 
Barkley East 25.29 11.63 11.07 n/a 39.89 7.13 0.89 0.90 1.37 0.93 1.15 3.10 2.75 8.84 W 
Barkley West 15.34 2.17 clean 10.37 3.09 7.87 1.80 clean 0.98 11.72 1.91 1.07 0.44 4.37 BG 
Bathurst 0.55 1.07 clean clean 0.83 0.36 2.29 1.76 1.43 0.62 0.56 clean clean 0.73 BG 
Beaufort W. 19.79 3.58 17.95 23.70 29.96 5.72 4.88 8.36 6.45 10.28 1.69 8.82 2.75 11.07 W & M 
Bedford 0.54 0.84 0.58 6.68 3.62 1.81 2.63 0.86 1.21 0.47 0.98 0.08 0.78 1.62 W & M 
Bredasdorp 8.91 3.84 6.75 7.65 10.46 9.75 8.27 3.77 4.31 1.69 clean 0.55 clean 5.07 W 
Britstown 30.89 39.66 6.20 20.67 42.62 1.53 9.37 2.68 7.17 2.75 1.19 8.73 7.05 13.89 W & M 
Caledon 6.50 4.48 5.82 2.22 9.48 16.45 11.61 2.92 1.26 2.77 1.16 4.54 1.29 5.42 W 
Calvinia 63.96 4.13 6.33 2.09 2.12 8.96 18.94 9.15 7.08 11.77 12.86 7.85 10.71 12.77 M 
Cape 45.70 5.82 10.39 7.63 7.05 14.14 1.57 2.90 4.29 3.55 clean 2.86 2.76 8.36 W 
Carnarvon 43.49 4.60 15.31 8.59 21.14 3.02 36.81 19.41 2.07 0.69 14.16 17.77 17.14 15.71 W to M 
Cathcart 2.57 0.84 0.61 1.81 0.37 0.36 clean 0.04 0.49 clean 0.16 0.20 clean 0.57 W 
Ceres 13.35 0.11 9.69 28.69 11.75 8.11 5.83 1.55 0.76 4.76 5.14 4.75 4.23 7.59 W 


















Cradock 2.89 8.05 3.49 5.87 8.18 2.46 2.05 1.89 2.30 2.46 2.84 1.47 1.24 3.48 MG 
East London 0.40 0.40 clean clean clean clean clean clean clean 0.15 0.10 0.57 1.84 0.27 BG 
Fort Beaufort 6.09 4.71 0.95 3.13 2.90 3.50 0.61 0.66 0.30 1.01 3.93 0.37 clean 2.17 W 
Fraserburg 48.41 9.30 7.25 8.53 9.92 1.74 6.83 4.23 5.44 6.26 14.09 14.62 18.01 11.89 W to M 
George 16.25 24.25 3.89 3.87 11.20 8.03 clean 1.46 clean 1.48 0.96 0.40 1.13 5.61 W 
Glen Grey 0.70 5.60 1.62 4.14 2.33 3.35 0.25 1.03 2.18 0.87 1.39 2.16 3.28 2.22 W 
Graaff Reinet 5.41 8.79 9.10 7.48 12.88 2.15 6.24 0.87 3.12 0.70 0.30 0.43 2.02 4.58 MG 
Hanover 8.04 26.00 13.58 n/a 52.30 1.85 4.41 1.55 1.75 0.47 0.64 0.35 0.80 9.31 W & M 
Hay 41.99 5.57 2.19 n/a 5.83 1.72 2.92 0.64 0.35 0.28 0.11 0.97 1.23 5.32 BG 
Herbert 8.34 6.08 1.45 6.61 6.33 0.24 2.07 clean clean clean 1.10 8.67 1.99 3.30 W to M 
Herschel 4.49 5.95 2.11 10.80 6.57 2.76 0.42 0.29 0.11 2.67 11.53 7.42 0.05 4.24 W 
Hopetown 45.73 22.44 11.20 n/a 21.96 6.66 13.34 6.36 3.13 4.79 0.19 27.28 2.18 13.77 M 
Humansdorp 3.98 1.02 1.08 0.74 0.99 0.77 0.27 clean 0.56 0.42 0.00 0.07 0.20 0.78 W & M 
Jansenville 21.59 0.72 5.86 1.25 6.77 1.54 0.66 1.05 2.69 1.79 1.97 0.23 1.08 3.63 MG 
Kenhardt 12.00 8.28 1.62 0.40 0.89 0.83 0.05 0.15 0.11 0.21 1.01 1.61 25.06 4.02 M 
Kimberley 42.93 10.79 1.25 14.61 6.75 6.69 5.16 clean 1.77 0.48 0.55 1.58 1.26 7.22 W to M 
King Wllmst. 5.91 2.28 0.14 2.43 2.63 1.12 0.14 0.23 0.02 0.56 0.34 0.32 0.44 1.27 W 
Knysna clean clean clean 10.17 6.81 2.23 clean 0.59 clean 1.17 1.93 clean clean 1.76 W 
Komgha clean clean 4.48 n/a clean clean clean clean 1.97 clean clean 0.64 clean 0.59 W & M 
Ladismith 19.76 0.09 3.74 n/a 8.09 1.24 0.05 0.50 0.14 0.71 2.68 2.25 1.31 3.38 BG 


















Middelburg 7.63 12.00 6.65 23.35 39.01 11.16 1.69 1.48 1.50 1.02 0.44 0.50 0.36 8.22 W & M 
Molteno n/a n/a n/a n/a 35.29 7.94 97.06 8.09 2.20 4.01 1.51 0.49 0.47 17.45 W 
Montagu n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.41 clean clean 0.14 BG 
Mossel Bay 17.79 0.83 8.82 n/a 13.47 5.91 4.59 n/a 5.06 clean clean 0.54 clean 4.85 W 
Murraysburg 6.41 21.36 25.85 n/a 23.36 16.27 8.23 0.26 2.83 2.62 1.96 0.11 0.09 9.11 W & M 
Namaqualnd. 14.39 3.64 0.68 1.92 1.47 4.31 3.88 3.91 clean clean clean 0.65 6.91 3.22 M 
Oudtshoorn 0.47 1.79 clean 10.74 2.15 1.05 0.93 0.98 0.96 0.48 clean 0.44 0.14 1.55 BG 
Paarl 10.21 1.03 0.75 1.44 1.73 3.03 0.85 clean clean 3.69 3.16 1.78 1.03 2.21 W 
Peddie 1.41 2.24 1.57 1.35 3.12 1.54 0.20 2.32 3.05 2.99 8.69 5.11 7.69 3.18 BG 
Philipstown 9.74 37.22 10.10 n/a 25.43 1.50 5.07 2.85 0.34 2.98 2.44 1.78 0.98 7.73 W & M 
Piquetberg 4.40 2.25 1.13 n/a 9.45 2.63 5.67 4.87 1.18 0.92 2.13 2.30 1.64 2.97 W 
Port Elzbth. 0.88 clean clean clean clean clean clean clean 6.57 clean 0.98 clean clean 0.65 BG 
Prieska 47.13 32.28 4.84 5.64 11.94 4.45 2.96 4.67 2.58 1.84 3.31 4.76 5.88 10.18 W to M 
Prince Albert 37.47 7.20 11.90 17.94 34.89 17.00 3.64 1.59 1.17 5.72 7.57 12.35 3.54 12.46 W to M 
Queenstown 1.43 6.67 7.78 0.34 20.27 4.44 0.12 0.19 0.60 0.71 1.75 0.18 0.86 3.49 W 
Richmond 11.13 24.24 6.70 40.57 51.24 15.38 19.91 4.95 3.84 0.60 1.09 0.09 0.54 13.87 W & M 
Riversdale 13.82 2.26 14.88 11.31 9.82 4.15 0.75 0.44 0.48 0.46 0.56 3.08 0.33 4.80 W 
Robertson 3.44 3.41 2.02 5.35 11.83 5.39 16.28 4.02 6.64 0.00 3.41 clean clean 4.75 BG 
Somerset E. 6.21 4.06 6.40 12.10 8.99 9.01 5.53 2.71 3.21 0.81 3.13 1.39 1.93 5.04 MG 
Stellenbosch 31.76 0.00 6.02 2.75 clean clean clean clean clean 0.62 clean clean 0.55 3.42 W 
Steynsburg 4.99 22.69 7.95 n/a 25.83 7.64 3.19 1.92 2.16 3.60 0.36 3.73 clean 7.00 
 


















Stockenstrm. 14.45 2.81 1.06 n/a 5.05 3.07 clean 0.66 0.69 1.84 5.03 1.71 2.36 3.23 W 
Stutterheim 1.50 clean 1.57 1.35 0.48 0.37 0.58 0.74 clean 0.25 clean 0.21 clean 0.54 W 
Sutherland 17.14 0.72 8.62 12.31 10.41 6.59 6.44 1.10 11.96 6.50 3.72 10.91 16.69 8.70 W to M 
Swellendam 6.45 3.07 3.44 7.99 5.19 3.80 3.57 7.69 5.22 3.68 1.91 2.77 1.18 4.31 W 
Tarka 5.08 20.05 3.81 6.89 3.24 3.55 0.00 0.49 1.72 1.52 3.25 2.83 4.04 4.34 W 
Tulbagh 11.59 12.41 1.39 20.41 10.65 7.97 4.04 4.25 n/a 2.97 1.82 5.63 0.00 6.93 W 
Uitenhage 4.56 1.09 3.75 1.63 6.85 0.75 1.28 9.40 1.94 1.60 2.55 2.25 1.04 2.98 MG 
Uniondale 19.31 1.53 8.66 6.75 6.29 7.90 0.42 2.39 1.84 0.98 0.45 1.01 0.28 4.45 W & M 
Van Rhynsd. 1.00 clean clean 0.93 0.13 4.12 6.50 1.29 0.19 0.70 clean 1.30 2.03 1.40 M 
Victoria East 2.50 0.84 clean 0.42 1.54 0.69 0.40 clean 0.18 0.21 1.07 0.65 0.75 0.71 W & M 
Victoria W. 26.10 41.47 16.68 n/a 11.31 8.13 14.73 8.97 8.41 4.87 2.00 8.64 3.04 12.86 W & M 
Willowmore 35.28 1.38 9.87 11.72 25.30 4.69 1.57 1.89 2.40 15.06 6.84 3.07 0.58 9.20 MG 
Wodehouse 0.00 9.76 3.72 1.55 5.70 2.74 3.35 1.30 1.63 2.06 1.74 3.34 1.76 2.97 W 
Worcestor 15.54 1.31 4.45 3.68 2.33 10.47 1.28 0.76 0.21 2.23 1.35 1.32 7.03 4.00 W & M 
 
 
                
Total 
livestock 14,830,532 15,893,566 15,251,544 13,664,880 14,639,216 14,413,976 16,655,540 18,516,788 22,537,160 20,842,708 22,252,695 22,444,764 23,367,709   
 
 
Total infected 2,250,812 1,452,800 1,033,602 1,283,174 1,869,357 757,274 930,047 533,075 552,712 544,525 601,750 810,455 841,372   

















Note: annual averages were derived from the total small ruminant population of the Cape Colony and from the total number of scab infected animals, not by averaging scab incidence. 
Key for main products:         
BG = Boer Goats        
MG = Mohair         
M = mutton         
W= wool         
W & M = mainly wool but farmers increased their numbers of mutton sheep after the South African War  
W to M = mainly wool at Act's commencement but became mainly mutton farming district after the South African War 
 
 
